The WTO and market-supportive regulation: a way forward on new competition, technological and labor issues, commentary

World Trade Organization

Vertical price control and parallel imports - theory and evidence

A policy of national exhaustion says that the rights to control distribution, end upon first sale only within a country, thereby permitting rights holders to exclude parallel imports. A policy of international exhaustion states that such rights end upon first sale anywhere, and therefore permits parallel imports. The European Union has a policy of regional exhaustion within its territory. Language in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) suggests that this policy choice remains the prerogative of individual countries. The authors review the international policy debate about parallel imports, which are controversial because they erode the ability of intellectual property owners to segment markets. Against considerable opposition, for example, Australia recently deregulated its import controls in major copyrighted goods, because domestic prices were evidently sustained at high levels by those controls. Both the European Union, and the United States are considering permitting parallel imports of prescription pharmaceuticals from abroad. Developing countries must consider their exhaustion regimes in the context of competition policies, and intellectual property rights. Economic theory demonstrates that the welfare tradeoffs in regulating parallel imports, are complex and depend on circumstances. The authors advance a new model that analyzes parallel imports as a response to vertical pricing arrangements between a rights holder ("manufacturer") and a foreign distributor. In this model, if markets were segmented, the manufacturer would change a wholesale price to its foreign distributor to ensure an efficient (profit-maximizing) retail price. But if markets were integrated by parallel trade, the distributor could purchase the good at a wholesale price, and sell it back to the manufacturer's home market at the local retail price. If transport costs were low enough, this would be profitable, but would diminish the return to the manufacturer, and waste resources in costly trade. So there would be tradeoffs: Parallel imports would benefit consumers in the high-price country, but hurt consumers in the low-price country. Such trade forces the manufacturer to set an inefficientwholesale price to limit its extent; it also consumes resources. The welfare implications of allowing parallel imports are ambiguous. If the costs of engaging in such trade were low, there would be gains from permitting it; if the costs were high, it would be more sensible to ban it. Countries near each other, with low trade barriers, might prefer an open regime of parallel trade. The vertical pricing model provides an explanation of this pricing behavior that is consistent with manufacturer's preferences to deter parallel trade.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access,Trade Policy

Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products in the European Union

We study the effects of parallel trade in the pharmaceutical industry. We develop a model in which an original manufacturer competes in its home market with parallel-importing firms. The theoretical analysis results in two key hypotheses. First, if the potential for parallel imports is unlimited, the manufacturer chooses deterrence and international prices converge. Second, with endogenously limited arbitrage the manufacturing firm accommodates and the price in the home market falls as the volume of parallel trade rises. Simple empirical tests favor the accommodation hypothesis with a time lag. Using data from Sweden we find that the prices of drugs subject to competition from parallel imports increased less than other drugs during the period 1995-1998. Approximately 3/4 of this effect on be attributed to lower prices of parallel imports and 1/4 to lower prices charged by the manufacturing firm. Econometric analysis find that rents to parallel importers (or resource costs in parallel trade) could be more than the gain to consumers from lower prices.  Parallel Imports; International Arbitrage; Drug Pricing

Joint Trade Liberalization and Tax Reform in a Small Open Economy: The Case of Egypt

We develop a computable general equilibrium model of the Egyptian economy. The model is suitable for analyzing the impacts of reforms in the tax system, the trade-policy regime, or both taken together. A two-sector, general-equilibrium model is presented diagrammatically to illustrate the separate and joint effects of distortionary capital taxes, consumption taxes, and tariffs. Thus, trade or tax reform may be undertaken conditionally upon maintenance of the other distortions or may be undertaken in a combined policy package. We compute the welfare gains from various policy changes, along with impacts on the real exchange rate and on real factor prices, allowing tax rates to vary endogenously to satisfy a fixed real revenue target for the Egyptian government. Scenarios include removal or unification of the consumption tax, the capital tax. Or both, and tariff unification, a free-trade agreement with the European Union, and unilateral tariff elimination. Welfare effects depend critically on the reform undertaken and the type of replacement tax. While both are important, neither trade-policy reform nor tax reform dominates. We also calculate interaction effects between policy regimes.tax reform, trade liberalization, welfare gain

Intellectual property rights, licensing, and innovation

There is considerable debate in economics literature on whether a decision by developing countries to strengthen their protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) will increase or reduce their access to modern technologies invented by industrial countries. This access can be achieved through technology transfer of various kinds, including foreign direct investment and licensing. Licensing is the focus of this paper.To the extent that inventing firms choose to act more monopolistically and offer fewer technologies on the market, stronger IPRs could reduce international technology flows. However, to the extent that IPRs raise the returns to innovation and licensing, these flows would expand. In theory, the outcome depends on how IPRs affect several variables-the costs of, and returns to, international licensing; the wage advantage of workers in poor countries; the innovation process in industrial countries; and the amount of labor available for innovation and production. The authors develop a theoretical model in which firms in the North (industrial countries) innovate products of higher quality levels and decide whether to produce in the North or transfer production rights to the South (developing countries) through licensing. Different quality levels of each product are sold in equilibrium because of differences in consumers'willingness-to-pay for quality improvements. Contracting problems exist because the inventors in the North must indicate to licensees in the South whether their product is of higher or lower quality and also prevent the licensees from copying the technology. So, constraints in the model ensure that the equilibrium flow of licensing higher-quality goods meets these objectives. When the South strengthens its patent rights, copying by licensees is made costlier but the returns to licensing are increased. This change affects the dynamic decisions regarding innovation and technology transfer, which could rise or fall depending on market parameters, including the labor available for research and production. Results from the model show that the net effects depend on the balance between profits made by the Northern licensor and lower labor costs in the South. If the size of the labor force used in Northern innovation compared with that used in producing goods in both the North and South is sufficiently small (a condition that accords with reality), stronger IPRs in the South would lead to more licensing and innovation. This change would also increase the Southern wage relative to the Northern wage. So, in this model a decision by developing countries to increase their patent rights would expand global innovation and increase technology transfer. This result is consistent with recent empirical evidence. It should be noted that while the results suggest that international agreements to strengthen IPRs should expand global innovation and technology transfer through licensing, the model cannot be used for welfare analysis. Thus, while the developing countries enjoy more inward licensing, the cost per license could be higher, and prices could also rise, with an unclear overall effect on economic well-being.Agricultural Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Knowledge Economy,Labor Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Education for the Knowledge Economy,Knowledge Economy,Agricultural Research

Quantifying the impact of services liberalization in a developing country

The authors consider how service liberalization differs from goods liberalization in terms of welfare, the level and composition of output, and factor prices within a developing economy, in this case Tunisia. Despite recent movements toward liberalization, Tunisian service sectors remain largely closed to foreign participation and are provided at high cost relative to many developing nations. The authors develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Tunisian economy with multiple products and services and three trading partners. They model goods liberalization as the unilateral removal of product tariffs. Restraints on services trade involve both restrictions on cross-border supply (mode 1 in the GATS) and on foreign ownership through foreign direct investment (mode 3 in the GATS). The former are modeled as tariff-equivalent price wedges while the latter are comprised of both monopoly-rent distortions (arising from imperfect competition among domestic producers) andinefficiency costs (arising from a failure of domestic service providers to adopt least-cost practices). They find that goods-trade liberalization yields a gain in aggregate welfare and reorients production toward sectors of benchmark comparative advantage. However, a reduction of services barriers in a way that permits greater competition through foreign direct investment generates larger welfare gains. Service liberalization also requires lower adjustment costs, measured in terms of sectoral movement of workers, than does goods-trade liberalization. And it tends to increase economic activity in all sectors and raise the real returns to both capital and labor. The overall welfare gains of comprehensive service liberalization amount to more than 5 percent of initial consumption. The bulk of these gains come from opening markets for finance, business services, and telecommunications. Because these are key inputs into all sectors of the economy, their liberalization cuts costs and drives larger efficiency gains overall. The results point to the potential importance of deregulating services provision for economic development.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Environmental Economics&Policies,Decentralization,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Health Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform

Parallel imports of pharmaceutical products in the European Union

The point of parallel imports of pharmaceuticals is arbitrage between countries with different prices. For several years, an important issue in the European Union (EU) has been the evident conflict between differing price regulations in the member states, on the one hand, and the consequences of parallel trade, on the other. In the EU, so long as the manufacturer has placed the good on the market voluntarily, the principle of free movement of goods allows individuals, or firms within the EU to trade goods across borders, without the consent of the producer. In this context, the authors study the effects of parallel trade in the pharmaceutical industry. They develop a model in which an original manufacturer competes in its home market with parallel-importing firms. The two key hypotheses in their theoretical analysis are these: First, if the potential for parallel imports is unlimited, the manufacturer chooses deterrence, and international prices converge. Second, with endogenously limited arbitrage, the manufacturing firm accommodates, and the price in the home market falls as the volume of parallel trade rises. The authors test their hypotheses on data from the Swedish market for 1995-98. Before 1995, Sweden prohibited parallel imports of pharmaceutical products, but entry into the EU, on January 1, 1995, required Sweden to allow them. Simple empirical tests favor the accommodation hypothesis with a time lag. Using data from Sweden, the authors find that the prices of drugs, subject to competition from parallel imports increased less than those for other drugs between 1995 and 1998. Roughly, three-fourths of this effect can be attributed to the lower prices of parallel imports, and one-fourth to lower prices charged by the manufacturing firm. Econometric analysis finds that rents to parallel importers (or resource costs in parallel trade) could be more than the gain to consumers from lower prices.Community Development and Empowerment,Montreal Protocol,General Technology,Information Technology,Public Health Promotion,Markets and Market Access,Access to Markets,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Consumption

Labor Skills and Foreign Investment in a Dynamic Economy: Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model for Singapore

Singapore is an interesting example of how the pattern of foreign investment changes with economic development. In this paper, we analyze inbound and outbound investment between Singapore and a sample of industrialized and developing countries over the period 1984-2003. We find that SingaporeÂ’s two-way investment with industrialized nations has shifted into skill-seeking activities over the period, while SingaporeÂ’s investments in developing countries have increased sharply and become concentrated in labor-seeking activities. SingaporeÂ’s increasing skill abundance relative to all countries in our sample accounted for 41 per cent of average inbound stocks during the period, i.e. US$18 billion annually; the corresponding figure for outbound stocks was 40 per cent, i.e. US$5.51 billion annually.