Can the Violent Jihad Do Without Sympathizers?

Interviews and public information were used to establish the role of sympathizers in the continuation of the violent jihad. Sympathizers are indispensable in some respects, but in others, it is unnecessary or unfavorable for extremists to resort to them. This means that the role of sympathizers is smaller than assumed by many counterterrorist officials and academicians, but this is not because sympathizers are deterred by possible reprisals for their support. It is because assailants sometimes deliberately choose not to recourse to sympathizers. This means that the role of sympathizers does not solely depend on their partisanship and fear of retribution alone, but also on the strategic choices made by Muslim extremists. Their impact on the role of sympathizers in collective violence is neglected in both Donald Black’s ‘geometry of terrorism’ theory and Roger V. Gould’s rational choice theory of collective violence

What Should Governments Take Into Account When They Consider To Involve Private Parties In Regulation?

Based on a literature review, this paper addresses the questions under what conditions four different types of private parties (manufacturers, purchasers, private regulators, and civil society) are more or less likely to have an added value to governmental regulation and how public regulatory bodies can further this added value. It appears self-regulation by manufacturers or purchasers works better as branches have a more self-evident interest to counter market failure, are smaller and more homogenous, have more experience with self-regulation and as self-regulatory systems are less ambitious (and, hence, can achieve less); private regulators seem to be more effective as consumers and purchasers are more willing to pay for quality, as companies not only want to obtain certificates in order to improve their market position (‘degree purchasing syndrome’) but also to improve the quality of their production processes, and as certifiers and accreditors compete with each other on price as well as quality; regulation by civil society seems to work better when citizens or interest groups are more powerful in relation to business, are better able to balance risks, and are more concerned about companies violating public or private norms. Public regulatory agencies can positively influence the conditions determining the added value of private parties’ contribution to the regulation of market failure by coordinating, facilitating, and intervening

Explaining Inequality in the Implementation of Asylum Law

Abstract Th e goal of this research was to identify factors that account for procedural and substantive inequality in implementing asylum law. Th e decisions of ninety-eight caseworkers of the Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Service on an asylum application were related to their answers on a questionnaire. Caseworkers diff er in the extent of available information on an asylum application they take for granted and in their fi nal decisions on it. Th ese diff erences result from work pressure, the caseworkers’ reputation, their role defi nition, political opinion, and professional background, and policy. Intensifying feedback and decreasing work pressure can achieve more consistent and careful decisions

De wisselvalligheid van de twijfel: ongelijkheid in de uitvoering van het asielbeleid verklaard

The goal of this research was to identify the factors that account for procedural and substantive inequality in the implementation of asylum law. Ninety-eight caseworkers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service were asked to decide on the same asylum application. These decisions were then related to their answers on a questionnaire. Employees differ to the extent that they take the information on an asylum application for granted and to their final decisions on it. These differences result from work pressure, the reputation of the caseworkers, their role definition, political opinions and professional background, and memo’s and policy guidelines. Intensifying feedback and decreasing work pressure can achieve more consistent and careful decisions

Facilitering van de gewelddadige jihad

Summary in English Muslims who do not actively contribute to the violent jihad but who tacitly or openly sympathize with it are vital to the persistence of this kind of terrorism according to some terrorist fighters and scholars. We used interviews and public information in order to examine the accuracy of this claim. The analysis points out that sympathizers are indeed crucial to some preparative terrorist activities, yet not to other. Muslim extremists depend less on sympathizers for making foreign journeys, generating revenues, and communication then they do for recruiting and sponsoring. This conclusion implies that receding of sympathy for the violent jihad will not automatically reduce it