Islamist and secular forces in Morocco: not a zero-sum game

In Morocco, unlike in other Arab countries, Islamists and seculars tend to cooperate in formal as well as informal politics. Political opportunities and pragmatic interests trump ideology most of the time, providing a suitable environment for a broadly inclusive political order. However, two factors stand in the way of sustained cooperation between Islamist and secular currents: on the one hand, sporadic upsurges of identity politics, and on the other, the strategies of divide and rule traditionally pursued by the “Makhzen” and its close allies. Rather than focusing on a set of partners who appear at first to be compatible with their values, Europeans should promote an inclusive political process that integrates all actors with significant popular outreach, such as the social movement Jama’at Al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and Charity Association, AWI). (Autorenreferat

Moroccan foreign fighters: evolution of a phenomenon, promotive factors, and the limits of hardline policies

With a contingent of around 1,500 fighters, Morocco is considered one of the main exporters of foreign fighters to Syria. Until 2014, Moroccan authorities, who were content to see their own jihadis leave and add to the pressure on Bashar al-Assad, mostly turned a blind eye to networks of recruitment. Since the dramatic rise of the so-called Islamic State, or ISIS, concern over local repercussions and the return of war-hardened radicals has prompted Rabat to adopt a hardline, security-oriented approach instead. Repression, however, is unlikely to uproot these networks. Instead, a comprehensive strategy for de-radicalization should aim to rehabilitate and reintegrate returning fighters, and use their example to dissuade others from violent militancy. (author's abstract

Morocco's slow motion reform process: the tug of war between the Palace and the Justice and Development Party

The October 2013 government reshuffle in Morocco marks the latest round in the drawn-out tug of war between the Palace and the Justice and Development Party (Parti de la justice et du développement, PJD), which heads the ruling coalition. The Palace came out as the clear winner, and thereby managed to roll back some of the limited concessions granted in response to the protests in early 2011. Regional dynamics – support from the Arab Gulf monarchies and authoritarian reconstruction in Egypt after the July 2013 coup – and the dispute between the PJD and its coalition partner, the Istiqlal (Independence) Party (Parti de l’istiqlal, PI), worked to the Palace’s advantage. Even though the relation between the PJD and the Palace has ameliorated considerably compared to one decade ago, the Palace’s strategic aim is to weaken the party while at the same time using it to stabilize the regime. In the short term, and as long as the PJD is able to retain popular support, it will remain in office and retain a limited margin of maneuver for reform. Profound political reforms as well as structural socio-economic and judicial reforms, however, are likely to be postponed to the mid to long term. European Union policy makers should use the EU’s long and close relations with the Palace to encourage it to allow more substantial reform and cede power to the elected government. (Autorenreferat

Moving towards political participation: the moderation of Moroccan Salafis since the beginning of the Arab Spring

Salafis, including former “Salafi-Jihadis”, have become a presence in the public sphere through their participation in the protests – side-by-side with secular forces – of the so called 20 February Movement. There are also numerous indications that Salafis will play a role in shaping Morocco’s future political landscape, albeit while proposing less radical objectives than what they used to profess. The trend is leading towards greater acceptance of political plurality, more cooperation with moderate Islamists, and less aggressive attitudes towards seculars and Western governments. Most importantly, they are explicitly renouncing violent means in the domestic power struggle. Moroccan Salafis have begun aiming at assuming a political role, attempting to influence policy-making, and are increasingly prepared to play by the rules of the democratic game – thus following the example set by their peers in other Arab countries such as Egypt. (Autorenreferat