Incompletely Reasoned \u3cem\u3eSex\u3c/em\u3e: A Review of Posner\u27s Somewhat Misleading Guide to the Economic Analysis of Sex and Family Law

A Review of Sex and Reason by Richard A. Posne

Public insurance, private insurance, and the demand for hospital care: implications for Medicare and private contracts

The findings of this paper can briefly be summarized. Demand, as measured by hospital admissions rate, is inelastic. Demand, as measured by mean length of stay, is elastic. A given amount of public hospital insurance has a small, but significantly larger effect on demand, by either measure, than an equal amount of private hospital insurance. These estimates can then be applied to several topics. One such topic is the effect of the Reagan Administration\u27s plan to alter the Medicare benefit payment system. A second application measures the welfare loss (Martin Feldstein\u27s phrase) of excess hospital insurance coverage, and the gains which would occur if patients were forced to pay a larger share of total costs. Finally, suggestions are made regarding structural changes in private insurance contracts, and ways in which these proposed changes can alter incentives, and thus alleviate tile health care crisis which plagues America. Chapter 2 is a brief history of private hospital insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid. Chapter 3 is a review of pertinent literature. Chapter 4 describes the methodology used. Chapter 5 enumerates the results. Chapter 6 offers interpretation of the results. Chapter 7 analyzes the implications of the results obtained. Chapter 8 concludes the paper

Incompletely Reasoned \u3cem\u3eSex\u3c/em\u3e: A Review of Posner\u27s Somewhat Misleading Guide to the Economic Analysis of Sex and Family Law

A Review of Sex and Reason by Richard A. Posne

Do Students Care about School Quality? Determinants of Dropout Behavior in Developing Countries

School quality and grade completion by students are shown to be directly linked. Unique panel data on primary school–age children in Egypt permit estimation of behavioral models of school leaving that incorporate output‐based measures of school quality. With the student’s own ability and achievement held constant, a student is much less likely to remain in school if attending a low‐quality school rather than a high‐quality school. This individually rational behavior suggests that common arguments about a trade‐off between quality and access to schools may misstate the real issue and lead to public investment in too little quality.