The Effects of Tax Salience and Tax Experience on Individual Work Efforts in a Framed Field Experiment

We conduct a framed field experiment with 245 employed persons (no students) as subjects and a real tax, which is levied on the subjects' income from working in our real effort task. In our first three treatments, the net wage is constant but gross wages are subject to different constant marginal tax rates (0, 25%, 50%). It turns out that the effort is significantly higher under the tax than in the no tax treatment. Subjects perceive a too high net wage because they underestimate the tax. We conjecture that tax perception depends on the tax rate, the presentation of the tax and the experience subjects have with taxation. These conjectures are confirmed in four further treatments employing a direct and an indirect progressive tax scale. It turns out that simple at taxes are particularly prone to being misperceived because their simplicity reduces the tax salience.field experiment, real effort experiment, tax perception, tax salience, tax experience, behavioral economics

The perception of income taxation on risky investments: An experimental analysis of different methods of loss compensation

We analyze the effect of income taxation with limited loss deduction on investment decisions. An experiment with five treatments was conducted, one without taxation as a reference and four with taxation and limited loss compensation. The participants' task was to repeatedly choose one out of two risky investment opportunities. Earnings from the experiment depended on the payoffs of the participant's investments. Our results reveal that subjects do not only look at gross payoffs but also take taxes into account in their decisions. The experimental setup made sure that a rational participant who correctly perceives the effect of the different loss offset rules would take exactly the same decisions with and without taxation. Nevertheless, we find out that individuals tend to overestimate the value of loss compensation rules which offer less than a complete loss offset. --

Behavioral Explanation of Tax Asymmetries

This note develops a behavioral explanation for the existence of an asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses when investors are loss averse. We find that loss offset rules should be more restrictive for investors which are (1) more risk averse in case of gains, (2) less risk seeking in case of losses, or (3) more loss averse. Our findings have important policy implications. Tax authorities often implement identical loss offset rules for different investor clienteles. However, there should be specific loss offset rules for investors who differ in risk attitude as well as in loss aversion.Asymmetric Taxation, Loss Offset Rules, Loss Aversion, Behavioral Economics

The Effects of Tax Salience and Tax Experience on Individual Work Efforts in a Framed Field Experiment

We conduct a framed field experiment with 245 employed persons (no students) as subjects and a real tax, which is levied on the subjects' income from working in our real effort task. In our first three treatments, the net wage is constant but gross wages are subject to different constant marginal tax rates (0, 25%, 50%). It turns out that the effort is significantly higher under the tax than in the no tax treatment. Subjects perceive a too high net wage because they underestimate the tax. We conjecture that tax perception depends on the tax rate, the presentation of the tax and the experience subjects have with taxation. These conjectures are confirmed in four further treatments employing a direct and an indirect progressive tax scale. It turns out that simple flat taxes are particularly prone to being misperceived because their simplicity reduces the tax salience.Field experiment, real effort experiment, tax perception, tax salience, tax experience, behavioral economics

The Biased Effect of Aggregated and Disaggregated Income Taxation on Investment Decisions

Income taxation may not only affect investment behavior by distorting payoffs, it may also have a more subtle, psychological effect, by biasing investors\u27 perceptions of the financial consequences. In a laboratory experiment that allows us to vary the taxation method, while keeping the financial outcomes constant, we find clear evidence that aggregated income taxation (comparable to profit taxation) with complete loss deduction induces a sustained bias towards more risk-taking, while disaggregated income taxation (comparable to a transaction taxation with loss offset) does not. We suggest that this bias may be exploited to increase the volume of private investments by choosing aggregated income taxation, if investors are (too) risk-averse, and to decrease the volume and the risk by choosing disaggregated income taxation, if investors are (too) risk-seekin

The Effect of Straight-Line and Accelerated Depreciation Rules on Risky Investment Decisions - An Experimental Study

The aim of this study is to analyze how depreciation rules influence the decision behavior of investors. For this purpose, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which participants decide on the composition of an asset portfolio in different choice situations. Using an experimental setting with different payment periods, we show that accelerated compared to straight-line depreciation can increase the willingness to invest as hypothesized by theory. However, this expected behavior is only observed in a more complex environment (with a subsidy) and not in a less complex environment (without a subsidy)

Modellierung von Aktienanlagen bei laufenden Umschichtungen und einer Besteuerung von Veräußerungsgewinnen

Dieser Beitrag entwickelt ein Verfahren, das die Komplexität der Endvermögensberechnung von Aktienanlagen unter Berücksichtigung der Besteuerung und regelmäßiger Portfolioumschichtung erheblich reduziert. Bisher ist eine vergleichbar präzise Berechnung wegen rekursiver Abhängigkeiten sehr aufwändig. Die Belastungswirkungen verschiedener Besteuerungsverfahren von Aktienanlagen sind unter der Verwendung des hergeleiteten Verfahrens nun einfacher bestimmbar, sogar dann, wenn sie sich im Zeitpunkt des Steuerzugriffs unterscheiden (Aktienfonds, Zertifikate, Riester-Rente). Diese Vereinfachung wird erreicht, indem ein bestimmtes Umschichtungsverhalten angenommen wird. Dieses Umschichtungsverhalten stimmt mit dem Verhaltensmuster überein, dass der Investor zwar vor der steuerwirksamen Aufdeckung von Kurssteigerungen zurückschreckt, jedoch auch einen Anreiz hat, laufend Umschichtungen im Portfolio vorzunehmen, obwohl dies negative steuerliche Konsequenzen hervorruft. -- This paper develops a technique, which simplifies the calculation of terminal values of share investments when portfolio turnovers repeatedly trigger capital gains taxation. So far the calculations of these values are difficult, due to recursive dependencies, which cannot be expressed by geometric series. Using our technique, tax burdens of differently taxed forms of share investments can be determined in an easy way even if those methods imply different elements of deferred taxation (equity funds, certificates, preferred taxed pension plans). The simplification is reached by assuming a specific trading strategy. This strategy is in line with empirically observed investor behavior which is characterized by periodical portfolio turnovers and reluctance to realize taxable capital gains.Veräußerungsgewinnbesteuerung,Aktienanlage,laufende Umschichtungen,capital gains tax,portfolio investments,periodical portfolio turnovers

Investment Behavior and the Biased Perception of Limited Loss Deduction in Income Taxation

We use a laboratory experiment to study the extent to which investors\u27 choices are affected by limited loss deduction in income taxation. We first compare investment behavior in the no tax baseline to a tax control setting, in which the income from investments is taxed. We find that investors significantly reduce their risk-taking as predicted by theory. Next we compare the baseline investment choices to choices under three different types of income taxation. We observe that risk-taking is significantly increased with partial and with capped loss deduction, but is unaffected by a tax system that allows no loss deduction. Since in all these treatments the after tax outcomes of the prospects were identical, we conjecture that investors have a positively biased perception of partial and capped loss deduction that promotes their willingness to take risks