Functional data analysis in an operator-based mixed-model framework

Functional data analysis in a mixed-effects model framework is done using operator calculus. In this approach the functional parameters are treated as serially correlated effects giving an alternative to the penalized likelihood approach, where the functional parameters are treated as fixed effects. Operator approximations for the necessary matrix computations are proposed, and semi-explicit and numerically stable formulae of linear computational complexity are derived for likelihood analysis. The operator approach renders the usage of a functional basis unnecessary and clarifies the role of the boundary conditions.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.3150/11-BEJ389 the Bernoulli (http://isi.cbs.nl/bernoulli/) by the International Statistical Institute/Bernoulli Society (http://isi.cbs.nl/BS/bshome.htm

Inequality and Political Clientelism: Evidence from South India

Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.decentralization; patronage; clientelism; inequality; poverty; India

Democracy, Redistributive Taxation and the Private Provision of Public Goods

The paper studies in a simple, Downsian model of political competition how the private provision of public goods is affected when it is embedded in a system of democracy and redistributive taxation. Results show that the positive effect of inequality on public goods production, which Olson (1965) pointed to, is weakened and might even be reversed in this context. Also, the median voter may choose a negative tax rate, even if he is poorer than the mean, in order to stimulate public goods production. The relevance of the model is illustrated with an application to the finance of higher education.public goods; political economy; inequality; taxation; higher education

When Does Ethnic Diversity Lead to Violence? Evidence from the 2007 Elections in Kenya

Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.Conflict; ethnicity; poverty; unemployment; public services; Kenya

Political Connections and Investment in Rural Vietnam

This paper uses household panel data from rural Vietnam to explore the effects of having a relative in a position of political or bureaucratic power on farmers. agricultural investment decisions. Our main result is that households significantly increase their investment in land improvement as a result of relatives moving into public office. Connections to office holders appear to be important for investment because they strengthen de facto land property rights and improve access to off-farm employment and to informal loans. The findings underline the importance of informal networks for economic behaviour in environments with developing institutions and markets. They also suggest the presence of an untapped potential for economic development: if households without connections could obtain equally strong property rights and accessto credit and insurance as the well-connected households, investment levels would risesubstantially.political connections, informal networks, land property rights, investment,credit, Vietnam

Quantifying Transition Voltage Spectroscopy of Molecular Junctions

Transition voltage spectroscopy (TVS) has recently been introduced as a spectroscopic tool for molecular junctions where it offers the possibility to probe molecular level energies at relatively low bias voltages. In this work we perform extensive ab-initio calculations of the non-linear current voltage relations for a broad class of single-molecule transport junctions in order to assess the applicability and limitations of TVS. We find, that in order to fully utilize TVS as a quantitative spectroscopic tool, it is important to consider asymmetries in the coupling of the molecule to the two electrodes. When this is taken properly into account, the relation between the transition voltage and the energy of the molecular orbital closest to the Fermi level closely follows the trend expected from a simple, analytical model.Comment: 5 pages, 4 figures. To appear in PR

Serving the Public Interest

We present a model of political selection in which voters elect a president from a set of candidates. We assume that some of the candidates are benevolent and that all voters prefer a benevolent president, i.e. a president who serves the public interest. Yet, political selection may fail in our model because voters cannot easily tell benevolent from egoistic candidates by observing their pre-election behavior. Egoistic types may strategically imitate benevolent types in the pre-election stage to extract rents once in office. We show that strategic imitation is less likely if the political system is likely to produce good governance. That is, if benevolent candidates are common, if the president has little discretionary power, and if the public sector is effective. We analyze the role of institutions like investigative media and re-election and show that they can improve or further hamper political selection, depending on the parameters of the political game.political selection; elections; social preferences; political leadership