Leviathans, Federal Transfers, and the Cartelization Hypothesis

Federal fiscal arrangements are argued to give rise to tacit collusion among competing Leviathans (Brennan and Buchanan, The Power to Tax, CUP, 1980). Though frequently encountered in academic and policy discussions, the cartelization hypothesis has rarely been scrutinized formally. This paper explores the effect of federal equalizing transfers on Leviathans engaged in tax competition. Contrary to the hypothesis, equalization is found to potentially complement tax competition in taming the Leviathan by implicitly taxing tax revenues extracted by the Leviathan. Thus, transfers might be an appropriate constitutional provision against fiscal expropriation.JEL classification: H7, H1, H20Leviathan, fiscal transfers, fiscal competition, federalism, constitution

Tax Competition in a Fiscal Union with Decentralized Leadership

This paper examines capital tax competition in the presence of an interstate transfer policy without federal commitment. Lack of commitment implies that tax policy is chosen prior to federal transfers. The paper’s main result is that ex-post federal policy internalizes horizontal fiscal externalities, insulating tax policy from capital mobility. Federal policy, however, introduces a new source of inefficiency unrelated to tax competition. Specifically, ex-post transfer payments prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue-sharing system which may render federal intervention in the presence of fiscal externalities welfare-deteriorating relative to tax competition.federalism, capital tax competition, commitment, soft budget constraints

Government Spending and Legislative Organization: Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany

This paper presents empirical evidence of a positive effect of council size on government spending using a data set of 2,056 municipalities in the German state of Bavaria over a period of 21 years. We apply a regression discontinuity design to avoid an endogeneity bias. In particular, we exploit discontinuities in the legal rule that relates population size of a municipality to council size to identify a causal relationship between council size and public spending, and find a robust positive impact of council size on spending. Moreover, we show that municipalities primarily adjust current expenditure in response to a rise in council size.Legislative organization; Regression-discontinuity design; Government spending; Mayor-council system

Social Security Reform and Intergenerational Trade: Is there Scope for a Pareto-Improvement?

In earlier literature, the suggested Pareto improvements in pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems have relied on the presence of externalities or the possibility of intragenerational redistribution. We show that neither assumption is necessary in an economy with intergenerational trade in a fixed factor of production, here labeled as land. Reducing the social security tax rate encourages investment in complementary human capital. Future efficiency gains accruing to land are capitalized in its value which compensates the land-owning pensioners for reduced benefits. We also explain why the PAYG system may have lost its appeal even for pensioners after its introduction.social security reform, fixed factor, pay-as-you-go system, capital gains taxation

Does Tax Competition Really Promote Growth?

This paper considers the relationship between tax competition and growth in an endogenous growth model where there are stochastic shocks to productivity, and capital taxes fund a public good which may be for final consumption or an infrastructure input. Absent stochastic shocks, decentralized tax setting (two or more jurisdictions) maximizes the rate of growth, as the constant returns to scale present with endogenous growth implies “extreme” tax competition. Stochastic shocks imply that households face a portfolio choice problem, which may dampen down tax competition and may raise taxes above the centralized level. Growth can be lower with decentralization. Our results also predict a negative relationship between output volatility and growth, consistent with the empirical evidence.tax competition ; uncertainty ; stochastic growth

Why are More Redistributive Social Security Systems Smaller? A Median Voter Approach

We suggest a political economy explanation for the stylized fact that intragenerationally more redistributive social security systems are smaller. Our key insight is that linking benefits to past earnings (less redistributiveness) reduces the efficiency cost of social security (due to endogenous labor supply). This encourages voters who benefit from social security to support higher contribution rates in political equilibrium. We test our theory with a numerical analysis of eight European countries. Our simple, but suggestive median voter model performs relatively well in explaining the stylized fact and cross-country differences in social security contribution rates.earnings-related and flat-rate benefits, social security, public pensions, median voter model

Do Fiscal Transfers Alleviate Business Tax Competition? Evidence from Germany

The paper empirically analyzes the incentive effects of equalizing transfers on business tax policy by exploiting a natural experiment in the state of Lower Saxony which changed its equalization formula as of 1999. We resort to within-state and across-state difference-in-difference estimates to identify the reform effect on municipalities' business tax rates. Confirming the theoretical prediction, the reform had a significant impact on the municipalities’ tax policy in the four years after the reform with a “phasing out” of the effect starting in the fourth to fifth year. The finding is robust to various alternative specifications.equalization grants, tax competition, local public finance, fiscal capacity equalization

Taxation in Two-Sided Markets

Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook result in one-sided markets is that a government may increase a monopolist's output and reduce the deadweight loss by subsidizing output. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher ad-valorem tax rate - rather than a subsidy - could increase output and enhance welfare.two-sided markets, ad-valorem taxes, specific taxes, imperfect competition, industrial organization

Does tax competition really promote growth?

This paper considers the relationship between tax competition and growth in an endogenous growth model where there are stochastic shocks to productivity,and capital taxes fund a public good which may be for final consumption or an infrastructure input. Absent stochastic shocks, decentralized tax setting (two or more jurisdictions) maximizes the rate of growth, as the constant returns to scale present with endogenous growth implies “extreme” tax competition. Stochastic shocks imply that households face a portfolio choice problem, which may dampen down tax competition and may raise taxes above the centralized level. Growth can be lower with decentralization. Our results also predict a negative relationship between output volatility and growth, consistent with the empirical evidence