The enterprise sector and emergence of the Polish fiscal crisis, 1990-91

The author analyzes the causes of the collapse of profitability in 1991 of the Polish enterprise sector. He explores how it affected the government budget and assesses the forecasts of enterprise sector performance used to prepare the government's 1990 and 1991 budgets. About half of the drop in profitability he attributes to the decrease in the inflation rate and the consequent decrease in the inflation bias in profits that results from historical cost accounting. He attributes most of the rest of the collapse in profitability to higher labor costs and higher amortization allowances. When wages are endogenized in a simple model, nearly the entire collapse of profitability is explained by the changes in inflation bias and amortization allowances. The decrease in the inflation bias and the increase in amortization allowances caused profits, and thus profit taxes, to fall, freeing up cash that could be spent on wages, causing profits and profit taxes to fall even further. This loss in government revenues was offset by increased revenues from wage taxes, which were in turn offset by an increase in wage indexed government spending, notably on pensions. As a result of all these changes, the government deficit increased about 4 to 5 percent of GDP - about half of the fiscal swing between 1990 and 1991. Policy options recommended for increasing tax revenues include: increasing the turnover tax rate and introducing the value added tax that will replace it at rates that maintain the increased level of revenue; increasing the social security tax rate; and maintaining, but not raising, the historical cost based profit tax, an automatic stabilizer. An obvious alternative to the profit tax based on historical cost accounting is to redress 1991 mistake, the indexing of amortization deductions. The author recommends drastically reducing or even abolishing amortization deductions for state owned enterprises for fixed capital acquired before 1990 (before the start of the transition from socialism). It is odd that these firms are given a tax break on top of the free use of state owned capital. If anything, they should be paying for the use of the capital.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management

Effective versus Statutory Taxation: Measuring Effective Tax Administration in Transition Economies

Wide differences between effective or realised average tax rates and tax yields that would result if statutory tax rates were strictly applied indicate tax compliance and collection problems. Due to the greater politicisation of tax systems in transition economies (TEs), we would expect the shortfalls in effective tax yields for TEs to be larger than a benchmark for the mature market economies where tax systems are well established, the administrative capacity is stronger and tax arrears are tolerated less frequently. The methodology involves calculating an effective/statutory (E/S) tax ratio. Initial results indicate that the leading TEs have E/S ratios similar to the EU average. We find a positive correlation between progress in transition and effective tax administration, as measured by our E/S ratio. For slow reformers, the effectiveness of tax collection appears to vary with the extent of state control. Those TEs that have maintained the apparatus of the state have done well in tax collection compared to those countries where there is evidence of state decay. This raises a number of broad policy issues relating to the speed of transition, the interaction of politics and economic reforms, the capacity of the state to govern and the need for market institutions to develop.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39731/3/wp347.pd

Wage Determination in Russia: An Econometric Investigation

Using a firm level dataset from four regions of Russia covering 1996/97, an investigation was carried out into how the surplus created within the firm is divided between profits and wages. An efficient bargaining framework based on the work of Svejnar (1986) is employed which takes into account the alternative wage or outside option available to employees in the firm as well as the value added per employee. Statistical differences in the share of the surplus taken by employees employed in state, private and mixed forms of firms are found. In addition, the results prove sensitive to the presence of outliers and influential observations. A variety of diagnostic methods are employed to identify these influential observations and robust methods are employed to lessen the influence of them. Whereas in practice some of the diagnostic and robust methods utilised proved incapable of identifying or accommodating the gross outlier(s) in the data, the more successful methods included robust regression, Winsorising, the Hadi and Siminoff algorithm, Cook's Distance and Covratio.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39679/3/wp295.pd

Effective versus Statutory Taxation: Measuring Effective Tax Administration in Transition Economies

Wide differences between effective or realised average tax rates and tax yields that would result if statutory tax rates were strictly applied indicate tax compliance and collection problems. Due to the greater politicisation of tax systems in transition economies (TEs), we would expect the shortfalls in effective tax yields for TEs to be larger than a benchmark for the mature market economies where tax systems are well established, the administrative capacity is stronger and tax arrears are tolerated less frequently. The methodology involves calculating an effective/statutory (E/S) tax ratio. Initial results indicate that the leading TEs have E/S ratios similar to the EU average. We find a positive correlation between progress in transition and effective tax administration, as measured by our E/S ratio. For slow reformers, the effectiveness of tax collection appears to vary with the extent of state control. Those TEs that have maintained the apparatus of the state have done well in tax collection compared to those countries where there is evidence of state decay. This raises a number of broad policy issues relating to the speed of transition, the interaction of politics and economic reforms, the capacity of the state to govern and the need for market institutions to develop.statutory taxation, average tax rate, tax collection, effective administration, transition economies

Productivity, ownership, and the investment climate : international lessons for priorities in Serbia

The authors use data on 27,000 firms from 50 countries, half of which are transition economies, together with the case of Serbia to examine the relationship between productivity, the investment climate, and private ownership of firms. As government capacity to address investment climate constraints is limited, the prioritization of the constraints is critical. Identification of the relative effects of various investment climate constraints and ownership on productivity should serve as aguide for such prioritization. Although ownership has recently received less attention in policy decisions than before, according to the econometric analysis of productivity reported by the authors, private ownership is an equally or more important determinant of productivity than other components of the investment climate. The importance of ownership shows that an unfinished privatization and restructuring agenda might have negative effects on productivity, in parallel to poor investment climate. Another important finding is that countries in which firms complain more about infrastructure tend to have less productive firms.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Trade and Regional Integration,Banks&Banking Reform,Governance Indicators

Convergence in Institutions and Market Outcomes: Cross-Country and Time-Series Evidence from the BEEPS Surveys in Transition Economies

This paper uses the BEEPS firm-level data to study the process of convergence of transition countries with developed market economies. The primary focus of the study is on competition and market structure, finance and the structure of lending to firms, and how firms respond to the economic environment by restructuring; we are able to do this because the BEEPS cover thousands of firms from virtually all transition countries over a long time period (1996-99 through 2002-05), as well firms from developed market economies, thus providing a set of natural benchmarks. We find substantial evidence of convergence of transition countries with developed market economies in a number of dimensions. The pattern of growth at the country, sectoral and firm level shows rapid growth of the new private sector and of the micro- and small-firm sectors, with the size distribution of firms moving towards the pattern observed in the BEEPS surveys of developed market economies. Our interpretation of the evidence on competition is that there is an initial move by firms into niches to exploit local market power, and later in transition entry and domestic competitive pressure increases. In finance, the increasing reliance on retained earnings in transition countries reflects a maturation of the sector as new firms come to rely less on informal and family sources of finance. The scale of restructuring and innovation activity is as high or higher in transition economies as in developed market economies. Interestingly, we find evidence of an inverse-U shape pattern, with the peak of restructuring activity taking place in 2002, the middle of the period analyzed. Throughout, the regional patterns suggest greater convergence in the transition countries that joined the European Union in 2004 than in the other, lower-income transition economies.transition, convergence, market structure, competition, enterprise finance, enterprise restructuring

Wage Determination in Russia: An Econometric Investigation

Using a firm level dataset from four regions of Russia covering 1996/97, an investigation was carried out into how the surplus created within the firm is divided between profits and wages. An efficient bargaining framework based on the work of Svejnar (1986) is employed which takes into account the alternative wage or outside option available to employees in the firm as well as the value added per employee. Statistical differences in the share of the surplus taken by employees employed in state, private and mixed forms of firms are found. In addition, the results prove sensitive to the presence of outliers and influential observations. A variety of diagnostic methods are employed to identify these influential observations and robust methods are employed to lessen the influence of them. Whereas in practice some of the diagnostic and robust methods utilised proved incapable of identifying or accommodating the gross outlier(s) in the data, the more successful methods included robust regression, Winsorising, the Hadi and Siminoff algorithm, Cook's Distance and Covratio.Russian labour markets, efficient bargaining, outliers, regression diagnostics, robust regression