Responsible and Honest Behavior: Essays in Experimental Economics

By means of experimental studies, this dissertation analyses responsible and honest behavior in different economic decision problems

Exome Sequencing and Rare Variant Analysis Reveals Multiple Filaggrin Mutations in Bangladeshi Families with Atopic Eczema and Additional Risk Genes

M.P was supported by a Fellowship from the German Research Foundation (DFG). This work received infrastructure support through the DFG Cluster of Excellence “Inflammation at Interfaces” (grants EXC306 and EXC306/2), and was supported by grants (WE2678/6-1, WE2678/6-2, WE2678/9) from the DFG and the e:Med sysINFLAME grant no. 01ZX1306A from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). J.E.A.C. and X.F.C.C.W. are funded by A*STAR SPF funding for translational skin research and genetic orphan disease

The Limits to Moral Erosion in Markets: Social Norms and the Replacement Excuse

This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor will step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. We study experimentally whether people employ the argument "if I don’t do it, someone else will" to justify taking a narrowly self-interested action. Our data reveal a clear pattern. Subjects do not employ the "replacement excuse" if a social norm exists that classifies the selfish action as immoral. But if no social norm exists, subjects are more inclined to take a selfish action in situations where another subject can otherwise take it. By demonstrating the importance of social norms of moral behavior for limiting the power of the replacement excuse, our paper informs the long-standing debate on the effect of markets on morals

The competitive advantage of honesty

We study competitive markets where firms may lie to their workers to reduce costs. Consumers may benefit from firms' dishonesty through lower market prices. Does firms' (dis-)honesty affect consumers' purchasing decisions? Our experiment shows that when honesty is fully transparent, it can provide a competitive advantage: Honest firms sell more and - despite higher costs - achieve higher profits. This finding is in line with our equilibrium predictions when allowing for dishonesty-averse consumers. By identifying circumstances in which consumers - although not the addressee of dishonesty - punish firms for their within-firm dishonesty, we contribute both to behavioral ethics and behavioral industrial organization. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Consumer Social Responsibility

We investigate the emergence of socially responsible (SR) production through consumer decisions. Our experimental treatments vary market competitiveness and consumers' information on social responsibility in production. We show that-irrespective of consumers' information-SR production reduces monopolistic supplier's profit and is therefore unlikely to emerge. With supplier competition, SR production positively influences consumers' buying decisions and suppliers offering SR products achieve significantly higher profits, as long as their price is not too high. Our results yield valuable insights into the possibilities and limitations of promoting SR production through consumer behavior, and they provide evidence for positive effects of competition on moral behavior