Moral objectivism and a punishing God

Many moral philosophers have assumed that ordinary folk embrace moral objectivism. But, if so, why do folk embrace objectivism? One possibility is the pervasive connection between religion and morality in ordinary life. Some theorists contend that God is viewed as a divine guarantor of right and wrong, rendering morality universal and absolute. But is belief in God per se sufficient for moral objectivism? In this paper, we present original research exploring the connections between metaethics and particular conceptions of God among religious participants. Study 1 shows that, when controlling for religiosity, age, and belief in God’s loving characteristics, it is belief in God’s punishing characteristics (specifically, the existence of Hell) that uniquely predicts rejection of moral relativism. Study 2 shows that followers of Abrahamic faiths are more likely to endorse moral objectivism when thinking of the Divine, regardless of loving or punishing characteristics. And Study 3 shows that priming for moral objectivism makes theists more likely to endorse God’s punishing characteristics. A general picture is suggested by these data. For Abrahamic theists, God’s particular characteristics are not germane to the question of whether his moral commandments are real and objective. And while theists strongly endorse God’s loving characteristics, focusing on the objective nature of morality can highlight God’s punishing nature, reminding theists that objective morality requires a divine guarantor of justice to enforce it

How to promote knowledge sharing in cross-functional NPD teams

This paper investigates the common issues that may arise in cross-functional new product development (NPD) teams from a Knowledge Management perspective. The study has been built around a contextualized trigger, where several factors were preventing a new-born NPD team from performing effectively. The purpose of this paper is to give insights of the main dynamics involved in the knowledge sharing process throughout the application of a systematic problem-solving approach to the case investigated by the authors. Due to the impossibility of building a universal recipe suitable for every team in every situation, this work represents a compromise trying to exemplify how to prioritise interventions in a given context, in order to provide a benchmark for similar circumstances. This paper, using an action research method within a single case context, takes shape around the advises and suggestions made by authors to Electronic Connected Ltd (disguised name), a small-medium enterprise (SME) in a situation of NPD paralysis. In particular, the paper emphasizes the importance of effective leadership and supporting environment in facilitating communication, enhancing cohesiveness, fostering joint commitment and giving direction in order to enable knowledge sharing and to leverage capabilities to conclusively deliver new products

Norm Manipulation as a Condition of Friendship

Cathy Mason (2020) argues – against my position in Phelan (2019) – that significant norm-manipulation is unnecessary for friendship. Instead, she holds that norm manipulation is a, perhaps omnipresent, causal result of the very feature I deny as necessary to friendship: mutual caring or love. Mason’s counter-examples allow for further explication of the norm-manipulation view of friendship. However, they do not constitute a compelling challenge to that view, because they do not seem to involve collaborative norm manipulation at all. Instead, they are better described as cases in which people come to be subject to established cultural norms they were not previously subject to, because they voluntarily come to fall under a distinctive relationship relative to one another

Figuration of the folk: the nature and use of a universal linguistic category

If Sally knows Sid to be a hard worker, she might make the point by asserting, Sid is a hard worker. Or she might say, Sid is a Sherman tank. We all recognize the first as an instance of literal language and the second as an instance of figurative language, specifically, a metaphor. This distinction is common even to people remote from us in space and time. But what does this distinction amount to? Theorists have often tried to explain the distinction in terms of different kinds of meaning or understanding. Davidson claims that metaphors simply mean what they literally mean, but they could have various distinctive effects upon us, and understanding a metaphor consists in being affected in these ways. Grice and Searle claim that literal meanings are somehow composed out of the meanings of the pronounced words, whereas metaphorical meanings are implicatures arising when it would not be rational for the speaker to mean her words literally in the context in which she uttered them. Contextualists, such as Sperber and Wilson, contend that insofar as there is a figurative/literal distinction at all, it consists in the presence of various interpretations for figurative utterances, no one of which is essential for understanding. I argue that attempts to explain the distinction between literal and figurative utterances in terms of distinctive kinds of meaning get the order of explanation backwards. Accounts of metaphorical meaning and understanding fall out of a prior account of what it is to speak figuratively (in general), and metaphorically (in particular). By saying, Sid is a Sherman Tank, Sally may express her belief that Sid is one who cannot be deterred from achieving his goals. She might also amuse her audience with the thought that Sid is an armored assault vehicle. Very roughly, the account I offer holds that if she intends to do both of those things, Sally speaks figuratively. More precisely, I contend that the distinction between figurative and literal utterances can only be explained through recourse to Austin's (1962) fundamental distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. Figurative utterances involve two propositional interpretations. One's aim with one of these interpretations is essentially 'illocutionary'. One aims to make an assertion, or to ask a question, or to pronounce sentence, or to perform some other conventional or psychologically expressive act. But one's aim with the other interpretation is essentially only 'perlocutionary.' With the other interpretation, one aims to affect the psychology of one's hearer--perhaps to frighten her, or to shock her, or to cause her to be entertained. To understand a figurative utterance fully is to grasp both expressed contents, as well as a speaker's intentions in expressing these. With my account of figurative utterances in place, I can explain the differences between metaphors and other subclasses of figurative utterances using various resources, such as those of classic rhetoric theory. My view suggests a distinctive argumentative function for figuration. Speakers unconsciously use figurative utterances to produce subtle affective reactions in their audiences. These reactions sometimes lead addressees to attribute more credence to what is actually asserted, which suggests a new explanation for a traditional claim about the pernicious effects of figurative language. My view offers a nuanced account of how we understand artistic metaphors, such as those appearing in poetry, as well as the more pedestrian metaphors appearing often in ordinary conversation. The order in which we grasp the illocuting and perlocuting contents reverses, depending on speakers' and hearers' distinctive goals in these distinct kinds of cases. My view also suggests a continuous account for certain non-verbal actions which are similar to figurative utterances

Reconceptualising professional learning through knowing-in-practice: a case study of a coaches high performance centre

In response to learning development literature that is negative regarding the formal education coaches’ encounter, there has been a conceptual/practical shift towards recognising the coaching workplace as a legitimate site for professional knowledge development. Building upon contemporary studies of learning ‘in situ’, this paper draws upon the theory of practice architectures to provide an innovative language by which to capture the complexity of learning within this context. In doing so, the cultural-discursive, material-economic, and socio-political arrangements of practice are shown to either enable or constrain learning activities. Findings from a 10-month ethnographic study of a high-performance training centre (n= 9 coaches/support staff), highlighted the significant role the macro-structural features of sport, and the inhernet ‘learning culture’, played in determining the learning valued within this context. This study draws attention to the challenges a transient coaching workforce, within a dynamic environment, presents to those attempting to foster learning in this context

Integrated flow analysis platform for the direct detection of nitrate in water using a simplified chromotropic acid method

This work describes the first use of a direct nitrate analyser using chromotropic acid. A simplified chromotropic acid method eliminating several steps previously associated with this method is employed in the platform. In a sulphuric acid medium, chromotropic acid reacts with nitrate ions and produces a characteristic yellow colour associated with an absorbance band in the visible region (430 nm).The modified method allows for nitrate determination over the linear range 0.9–80 mg/L nitrate with a limit of detection of 0.73 mg/L nitrate. Validation was achieved by analysing water samples from various sources including groundwater, trade effluent and drinking water by the modified method and by ion chromatography. The method was implemented on a flow analysis platform incorporating a paired emitter–detector diode (PEDD) as the optical detector. An excellent correlation coefficient of 0.993 was obtained between the modified method and ion chromatography. The modified chromotropic acid method represents a rapid, simple, low cost technique for the direct determination of nitrate in water