Supervising bank safety and soundness: some open issues

Banks and banking ; Bank supervision

Market discipline in the governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: monitoring vs. influencing

Market discipline is an article of faith among financial economists, and the use of market discipline as a regulatory tool is gaining credibility. Effective market discipline involves two distinct components: security holders' ability to accurately assess the condition of a firm ("monitoring") and their ability to cause subsequent managerial actions to reflect those assessments ("influence"). Substantial evidence supports the existence of market monitoring. However, little evidence exists on market influence, and then only for stockholders and for rare events such as management turnover. This paper seeks evidence that U.S. bank holding companies' security price reliably influence subsequent managerial actions. Although we identify some patterns consistent with beneficial market influences, we have not found strong evidence that stock or (especially) bond investors regularly influence managerial actions. Market influence remains, for the moment, more a matter of faith than of empirical evidence.Bank holding companies ; Bank supervision ; Bonds ; Stocks

The Federal Home Loan Bank system : the "other" housing GSE.

Founded in 1932, the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) have historically provided long-term funding to specialized mortgage lenders. But legislative changes in the wake of the 1980s’ thrift crises spurred the FHLBs to expand in both size and scope. For example, FHLB balance sheets now also include a substantial investment in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, and the attendant interest rate risk has created financial and accounting difficulties at some of the FHLBs. ; Like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the FHLB System is a government-sponsored enterprise that funds itself largely with federal agency debt obligations that investors perceive to be implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. government. This article identifies some differences in risk-taking incentives between the cooperatively owned FHLB System and investor-owned Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. ; Cooperative ownership itself does not reduce FHLB risk-taking incentives because, unlike many mutuals, the FHLB System does not bundle its equity and debt claims. Also, the joint-and-several liability provision in the FHLBs’ consolidated debt obligations and a lack of equity market discipline may heighten FHLB risk-taking incentives. However, the FHLBs cannot avail themselves of equity-based managerial compensation, which create high-powered risk-taking incentives in investor-owned firms. Thus, it is unclear whether the FHLBs’ risk-taking incentives are necessarily weaker than Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s.Federal home loan banks

The 2007-09 financial crisis and bank opaqueness

Doubts about the accuracy with which outside investors can assess a banking firm’s value motivate many government interventions in the banking market. The recent financial crisis has reinforced concerns about the possibility that banks are unusually opaque. Yet the empirical evidence, thus far, is mixed. This paper examines the trading characteristics of bank shares over the period from January 1990 through September 2009. We find that bank share trading exhibits sharply different features before vs. during the crisis. Until mid-2007, large (NYSE-traded) banking firms appear to be no more opaque than a set of control firms, and smaller (NASD-traded) banks are, at most, slightly more opaque. During the crisis, however, both large and small banking firms exhibit a sharp increase in opacity, consistent with the policy interventions implemented at the time. Although portfolio composition is significantly related to market microstructure variables, no specific asset category(s) stand out as particularly important in determining bank opacity.Banks and banking ; Stock market ; Financial crises

Market evidence on the opaqueness of banking firms' assets.

We assess the market microstructure properties of U.S. banking firms' equity, to determine whether they exhibit more or less evidence of asset opaqueness than similar-sized nonbanking firms. The evidence strongly indicates that large banks (traded on NASDAQ) trade much less frequently despite microstructure characteristics. Problem (noncurrent) loans tend to raise the frequency with which the bank's equity trades, as well as the equity's return volatility. The implications for regulatory policy and future market microstructure research are discussed.Bank stocks ; Bank assets

Large EU banks have remained undercapitalised for long stretches of time

Book-valued capital ratios and regulatory inertia are some of the causes, write Mark J. Flannery and Emanuela Giacomin

The informational advantage of specialized monitors: the case of bank examiners

Large commercial banking firms are monitored by specialized private sector monitors and by specialized government examiners. Previous research suggests that bank exams produce little useful information that is not already reflected in market prices. In this article, we apply a new research methodology to a unique data set, and find that government exams of large national banks produce significant new information which financial markets do not fully internalize for several additional months. Our results indicate that specialized government monitors can identify value-relevant information about private firms, even if those firms are already actively followed by investors and their private-sector agents.Bank supervision ; Bank examination

Leverage Expectations and Bond Credit Spreads

This is the publisher's version, also available electronically from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022109012000300.In an efficient market, spreads will reflect both the issuer’s current risk and investors’ expectations about how that risk might change over time. Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) show analytically that a firm’s expected future leverage importantly influences the spread on its bonds. We use capital structure theory to construct proxies for investors’ expectations about future leverage changes and find that these significantly affect bond yields, above and beyond the effect of contemporaneous leverage. Expectations under the trade-off, pecking order, and credit-rating theories of capital structure all receive empirical support, suggesting that investors view them as complementary when pricing corporate bonds