7 research outputs found

    Social grooming network in captive chimpanzees: does the wild or captive origin of group members affect sociality?

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    International audienceMany chimpanzees throughout the world arehoused in captivity, and there is an increasing effort torecreate social groups by mixing individuals with captiveorigins with those with wild origins. Captive origins mayentail restricted rearing conditions during early infant life,including, for example, no maternal rearing and a limitedsocial life. Early rearing conditions have been linked withdifferences in tool-use behavior between captive- andwild-born chimpanzees. If physical cognition can beimpaired by non-natural rearing, what might be the consequencesfor social capacities? This study describes theresults of network analysis based on grooming interactionsin chimpanzees with wild and captive origins livingin the Kumamoto Sanctuary in Kumamoto, Japan.Grooming is a complex social activity occupying up to25 % of chimpanzees’ waking hours and plays a role inthe emergence and maintenance of social relationships.We assessed whether the social centralities and roles ofchimpanzees might be affected by their origin (captive vswild). We found that captive- and wild-origin chimpanzeesdid not differ in their grooming behavior, but thattheoretical removal of individuals from the network haddiffering impacts depending on the origin of the individual.Contrary to findings that non-natural early rearinghas long-term effects on physical cognition, living insocial groups seems to compensate for the negativeeffects of non-natural early rearing. Social network analysis(SNA) and, in particular, theoretical removal analysis,were able to highlight differences between individualsthat would have been impossible to show using classicalmethods. The social environment of captive animals isimportant to their well-being, and we are only beginningto understand how SNA might help to enhance animalwelfare

    Lack of evidence that Tonkean macaques understand what others can hear

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    International audienceBy distinguishing the attentional cues of theirmates, animals can learn what part of their environment is ofpotential interest. However, recognizing the attentional statesof others through auditory perception appears to be difficult,since these states are generally not accompanied by ostensivesignals liable to reveal them. In this context, one study foundthat rhesus macaques withhold their action when unobserved,then concluding that they know what others can hear. Wereplicated this study by testing 18 Tonkean macaques in anexperimental setting where subjects had to choose betweentwo boxes containing a food reward. One box made a noisewhen opened, and the other opened silently. An experimenterwas present and could either have her back to subjects or befacing them. If subjects aimed to avoid attracting the experimenter’sattention, they were expected to select the silent boxwhile the experimenter’s back was turned. Results showedthat subjects did not discriminate between boxes,whatever theexperimenter’s position. We thus found no evidence thatTonkean macaques are able to take the auditory attentionalstates of a human into account. It is therefore premature toconclude that monkeys can establish a link between hearingand knowing

    Evidence That Monkeys (Macaca tonkeana and Sapajus apella) Read Moves, but no Evidence That They Read Goals.

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    International audienceWhereas most experiments indicate that monkeys have no theory of mind, a study carried out by Wood and collaborators (2007) claimed that they can make inferences about the intentions of another individual. We applied the experimental procedure devised by these authors to investigate whether monkeys can recognize goal-directed actions. We tested 16 Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana) and 12 tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella). Each subject was submitted to 24 trials in randomized order. The experimenter presented 2 containers, 1 of which was potentially baited with a food reward. After the experimenter had either intentionally or accidentally made an action on 1 of the containers, the subject was asked to select 1 of them. We found that individuals in both species failed to distinguish between accidental and intentional actions. However, they displayed a significant preference for the container touched by the experimenter in the hand conditions, and not in the elbow conditions. These results do not support those reported by Wood and collaborators, but they are consistent with other studies concluding that monkeys are not capable of mind readin
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