The program for the simulation of electoral systems ALEX4.1: what it does and how to use it.

This paper illustrates ALEX4.1, the 2007 version of the program of simulation of electoral systems developed at ALEX, the Laboratory for Experimental and Simulative Economics of the Università del Piemonte Orientale at Alessandria, Italy. The main features of the program have been described with reference to a previous version in Bissey, Carini and Ortona, 2004; the paper may be freely downloaded from the site of the journal where it has been published, or in its working paper version from the site http://polis.unipmn.it/. The organization of this paper is, consequently, rather unusual. The next section presents only the very basic traits of the simulation program, as most details and theoretical considerations may be read in the quoted (and easy-to-find) reference. Sections 3 and 4 are the most important: they illustrate the novelties of ALEX4.1 with respect to previous versions. Section 5 is very short, as it contains only the instructions for downloading the program, and some caveats regarding its use. The core of the paper is a large appendix that contains the readme file of the package ALEX4.1. Actually, this paper should be considered a handbook for the use of ALEX4.1.

Jekyll and Hyde

Jekyll and Hyde were in fact two people inside the same person – an obviously dynamically inconsistent person. In the book and in the movie, the dynamic inconsistency was resolved in arather dramatic way. We investigate its resolution in the laboratory.dynamic inconsistency, saving, consumption, naïve, resolute, sophisticated, dual selves

Jekyll and Hyde

Jekyll and Hyde were in fact two people inside the same person – an obviously dynamically inconsistent person. In the book and in the movie, the dynamic inconsistency was resolved in a rather dramatic way. We investigate its resolution in the laboratory.Jekyll and Hyde were in fact two people inside the same person – an obviously dynamically inconsistent person. In the book and in the movie, the dynamic inconsistency was resolved in a rather dramatic way. We investigate its resolution in the laboratory.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

What's in a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic Theory

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to summarise the extant theory as it relates to the economics of trademark, and to give some suggestions for further research with reference to distinct streams of literature. The proposed line of study inevitably looks at the complex relationship between signs and economics. Trademark is a sign introduced to remedy a market failure. It facilitates purchase decisions by indicating the provenance of the goods, so that consumers can identify specific quality attributes deriving from their own, or others', past experience. Trademark holders, on their part, have an incentive to invest in quality because they will be able to reap the benefits in terms of reputation. In other words, trademark law becomes an economic device which, opportunely designed, can produce incentives for maximising market efficiency. This role must, of course, be recognised, as a vast body of literature has done, with its many positive economic consequences. Nevertheless, trademark appears to have additional economic effects that should be properly recognized: it can determine the promotion of market power and the emergence of rent-seeking behaviours. It gives birth to an idiosyncratic economics of signs where very strong protection tends to be assured, even though the welfare effects are as yet poorly understood. In this domain much remains to be done and the challenge to researchers is open

Semi-parametric estimation of preference functions

EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

A Simulative frame to study the integration of defectors in a cooperative

settin

The Integration of Defectors in a Cooperative Setting

This paper describes a study of the robustness of cooperative conventions. We observe the effect of the invasion of non-cooperating subjects into a community adopting a cooperative convention. The convention is described by an indefinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma game. We check the effects on the robustness of the cooperating convention of two characteristics of the game, namely the size of the prisonner-dilemma groups and the "intelligence" of the players. The relevance for real-world problems is considered. We find that the "intelligence" of the players plays a crucial role in the way players learn to cooperate. The simulation program is written in SWARM (Java version).Cooperation, Conventions, Prisoner's Dilemma, Social Simulation, SWARM

Jekyll and Hyde

Jekyll and Hyde were in fact two people inside the same person - an obviously dynamically-inconsistent person. In the book and in the movie, the dynamic inconsistency was resolved in a rather dramatic way. We investigate its resolution in the laboratory.

ALEX3: a Simulation Program to Compare Electoral Systems

he paper describes a program for comparing electoral systems based on the simulation of the preferences of the voters. The parameters requested (distribution of first preferences, district magnitude, etc) are set up by the user. The program produces the resulting Parliament under a number of electoral systems, an index of representativeness and an index of governability. The first part of the paper describes the characteristics of the program. In the second part it is used to compare eleven electoral systems in two virtual but realistic cases.Electoral Systems, Electoral Simulation, Representativeness, Governability