Do Better Institutions Mitigate Agency Problems? Evidence from Corporate Finance Choices

This paper examines how firm characteristics, the legal system and financial development affect corporate finance decisions using a novel and unexplored data set containing balance sheet information for listed and unlisted companies. Contrary to the previous literature, by using data on unlisted companies of small dimension, the paper shows that institutions play an important role in determining the extent of agency problems in corporate finance decisions. In particular, it emerges that in countries with good accounting standards and above-average creditor protection, it is easier for firms investing in intangible assets to obtain loans. Therefore, institutions that are capable of effectively protecting lenders are good substitutes for collateral. The protection of creditor rights is also important for guaranteeing access to long-term debt for firms operating in sectors with highly volatile returns. In contrast, if the law does not guarantee creditor rights sufficiently, lenders prefer to issue short-term debt because they can use the threat not to renew the loan to limit entrepreneurs' opportunistic behavior. In this case, inefficiencies due to the excessive liquidation of projects in temporary difficulty may arise. Ceteris paribus, firms are more leveraged in countries where the stock market is less developed. Moreover, unlisted firms appear systematically more indebted even after controlling for firm characteristics, such as profitability, size and the ability to provide collateral. Finally, institutions, which favor creditor rights and ensure stricter enforcement, are associated with higher leverage, but also with greater availability of long-term debt.leverage, debt maturity, agency problems, enforcement, creditor rights

Risk sharing and firm size: theory and international evidence

This paper investigates the relationship between financial development and firm size. The model shows that the efficiency of the financial system, measured by the level of monitoring costs, affects the extent of risk sharing within an economy and through this channel the availability of external finance to growing firms. If the provision of finance to projects is concentrated in few individuals and firm shocks are idiosyncratic, the risk premium is likely to rise with the amount of funds firms demand. As a consequence, keeping constant the level of opacity and risk, firms with better growth opportunities face higher costs of external finance in countries where the financial system does not favor risk sharing; this limits firm size. Empirical evidence is also provided. Financial constraints appear more stringent for firms whose optimal size is larger in countries where the financial system is less developed.risk sharing; firm size; financial constraints; financial development

On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro-Evidence from Japan

Exploiting the Japanese banking crisis as a laboratory, we provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of bank bailouts. Government recapitalizations result in positive abnormal returns for the clients of recapitalized banks. After recapitalizations, banks extend larger loans to their clients and some firms increase investment, but do not create more jobs than comparable firms. Most importantly, recapitalizations allow banks to extend larger loans to low and high quality firms alike, and low quality firms experience higher abnormal returns than other firms. Interestingly, recapitalizations by private investors have similar effects. Moreover, bank mergers engineered to enhance bank stability appear to hurt the borrowers of the sounder banks involved in the mergers.Recapitalization, Merger, Banking Crisis

Financial integration and entrepreneurial activity: evidence from foreign bank entry in emerging markets

An extensive empirical literature has documented the positive growth effects of equity market liberalization. However, this line of research ignores the impact of financial integration on a category of firms crucial for economic development, i.e. the small entrepreneurial firms. This paper aims to fill this void. We employ a large panel containing almost 60,000 firm–year observations on listed and unlisted companies in Eastern European economies to assess the differential impact of foreign bank lending on firm growth and financing. Foreign lending stimulates growth in firm sales, assets, and leverage, but the effect is dampened for small firms. We also find that firms started during the transition period of 1989-1993 – arguably the most connected businesses – benefit least from foreign bank entry. This finding suggests that foreign banks can help mitigate connected lending problems and improve capital allocation. JEL Classification: G21, L11, L14competition, emerging markets, foreign bank lending, lending relationships

Risk sharing and firm size: Theory and international evidence

This paper investigates the relationship between financial development and firm size. The model shows that the efficiency of the financial system, measured by the level of monitoring costs, affects the extent of risk sharing within an economy and through this channel the availability of external finance to growing firms. If the provision of finance to projects is concentrated in few individuals and firm shocks are idiosyncratic, the risk premium is likely to rise with the amount of funds firms demand. As a consequence, keeping constant the level of opacity and risk, firms with better growth opportunities face higher costs of external finance in countries where the financial system does not favor risk sharing; this limits firm size. Empirical evidence is also provided. Financial constraints appear more stringent for firms whose optimal size is larger in countries where the financial system is less developed

On the Mechanics of Migration Decisions; Skill Complementarities and Endogenous Price Differentials

Why are skilled workers more mobile than average? What determines positive migration flows toward relatively poorer regions or states of a country? How can one explain the sharp decrease in the mobility rate observed within European countries notwithstanding persistent regional disparities? This paper aims to answer these questions using skill complementarities and endogenous price differentials between the richest and the poorest regions. If the skill premium is increasing in the average level of human capital of a location, and the price of non-traded goods is higher in the more human capital intensive regions, the more skilled the workers are, the stronger are the economic incentives to migrate towards the richest regions. In contrast, the least skilled workers have an incentive to migrate to the poorest regions to minimize their living costs. In this context, interregional cost-of-living differentials arise endogenously if the selfselection of migrants affects total factor productivity in the traded goods sector, as pointed out by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). Moreover, if the process of capital accumulation provokes faster convergence in interregional wage differentials than in living costs, convergence in per capita GDP may hinder migration to the richest regions, even if it leaves large regional disparities.

On the fortunes of stock exchanges and their reversals: evidence from foreign listings

Using a sample that provides unprecedented detail on foreign listings, new listings, and delistings for 29 exchanges in 24 countries starting from the early 1980s, we document a growing tendency of listings to concentrate in the U.S. and the U.K., and large changes in all exchanges’ ability to attract foreign companies. We highlight the following determinants of these patterns. First, during the sample period, investor protection improved in many countries. As investor protection improves in the country of origin, firms become less likely to list in countries with weak investor protection, but more likely to list in countries with strong investor protection, especially in the U.K. and the U.S. Second, we show that foreign listings are related to the exchange’s market valuation in the same way that domestic equity issues are and that firms that are more difficult to evaluate are more inclined to list in foreign exchanges with high valuations

Investor protection and the demand for equity

Anecdotal evidence suggests that investor protection affects the demand for equity, but existing theories emphasize only the effect of investor protection on the supply of equity. We build a model showing that the demand for equity is important in explaining financial development. If the level of investor protection is low, wealthy investors have an incentive to become controlling shareholders and pay a high price for their stocks, because they can earn additional benefits by expropriating outside shareholders. As a consequence of lower expected returns both domestic and foreign portfolio investors have a disincentive to hold stocks. The model implies that differences in stock market participation rates across countries and the pervasiveness of home equity bias depend on the degree of investor protection. Additionally, we uncover a good country bias in investment decisions as portfolio investors from countries with low level of investor protection hold relatively more foreign equity. We provide novel international evidence on stock market participation rates, and on holdings of domestic and foreign stocks consistent with the predictions of the model

Financial integration and entrepreneurial activity: evidence from foreign bank entry in emerging markets

An extensive empirical literature has documented the positive growth effects of equity market liberalization. However, this line of research ignores the impact of financial integration on a category of firms crucial for economic development, i.e. the small entrepreneurial firms. This paper aims to fill this void. We employ a large panel containing almost 60,000 firm–year observations on listed and unlisted companies in Eastern European economies to assess the differential impact of foreign bank lending on firm growth and financing. Foreign lending stimulates growth in firm sales, assets, and leverage, but the effect is dampened for small firms. We also find that firms started during the transition period of 1989-1993 – arguably the most connected businesses – benefit least from foreign bank entry. This finding suggests that foreign banks can help mitigate connected lending problems and improve capital allocation