Negotiating the Great Recession: How Teacher Collective Bargaining Outcomes Change in Times of Financial Duress

This article examines how teacher collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), teacher salaries, and class sizes changed during the Great Recession. Using a district-level data set of California teacher CBAs that includes measures of subarea contract strength and salaries from 2005–2006 and 2011–2012 tied to district-level longitudinal data, we estimate difference-in-difference models to examine bargaining outcomes for districts that should have been more or less fiscally constrained. We find that unions and administrators change critical elements of CBAs and district policy during times of fiscal duress. This includes increasing class sizes, reducing instructional time, and lowering base salaries to relieve financial pressures and negotiating increased protections for teachers in areas with less direct financial implications, including grievance procedures and nonteaching duties

The Effect of Teachers’ Union Contracts on School District Efficiency: Longitudinal Evidence From California

© The Author(s) 2021. While the effect of teachers’ unions on school districts continues to be debated, the research literature provides few definitive conclusions to guide these discussions. In this article, we examine the relationship between teachers’ union contracts and school district efficiency. We define efficiency as the ratio of short-run productivity (student performance on standardized exams) to expenditures. We estimate a series of school district fixed effect models using measures of district collective bargaining agreement (CBA) restrictiveness tied to longitudinal outcomes. We find that CBA restrictiveness is positively associated with expenditures on students, instruction, instruction support services, and teacher and administrator salaries over time. We find no significant relationship between CBA restrictiveness and student achievement. Finally, we find a negative relationship between CBA restrictiveness and district efficiency. Given the small magnitude of our effect sizes, we conclude that weakening union rights may not produce large gains in efficiency and may come at substantial political costs

Prepping for Another Recession: Re-Assessing the Validity of Teacher Evaluation Systems for Human Capital Decision-Making

Problem. The school budget cuts concomitant with the COVID-19 pandemic mean educator jobs may again be threatened by layoffs. During prior recessions, school district administration primarily deter- mined teacher layoffs by virtue of seniority. However, as new evidence emerges that seniority policies may not be the most equitable way to determine teacher layoffs, some have turned towards performance-based measures from evaluation systems. Purpose. The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity and reli- ability of the Nevada Educator Performance Framework (NEPF) for making human capital decisions like layoffs. Recommendations. We recommend that Nevada and other states improve the differentiation in scores across the varying evaluation domains by engaging in more rigorous training of evaluators. Addi- tionally, we recommend that Nevada and other states improve the distribution of final teacher evaluation scores so that the performance measure really distinguishes among teacher performance. Strategies could include lessening the administrative burden of filling out the final evaluation, increasing the number of performance levels, or rotating the specific standards focused on each year

Power in a Pandemic: Teachers’ Unions and Their Responses to School Reopening

Drawing on Bachrach and Baratz’s first and second faces of interest group power, we explore the relationship between teachers’ union power and reopening decisions during the fall 2020 semester in 250 large districts around the United States. We leverage a self-collected panel data set of reopening decisions coupled with measures of teachers’ union first face power (drawn from social media postings on teachers’ unions’ Facebook pages) and second face power (operationalized as district size, whether the school district negotiates a collective bargaining agreement with the teachers’ union, the length of the collective bargaining agreement, and the amount of revenue raised by the union). We found that school districts where teachers’ unions exhibit strong second face power (but not first face power) were less likely to start the school year with in-person instruction, were less likely to ever open during fall semester with in-person instruction and spent fewer weeks in in-person learning

Teachers’ Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Response to COVID-19

In response to the COVID-19 crisis, school districts worked quickly to roll out distance learning plans in the spring. Sometimes these plans impinged upon or were directly in conflict with provisions found in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) negotiated between teachers\u27 unions and district administration. In this brief, we unpack how urban school systems changed CBAs to make way for learning under COVID-19 conditions. We review COVID-19–related contract changes in 101 urban school districts around the country. We find that twenty-five urban school districts returned to the bargaining table with teachers’ unions to negotiate short-term fixes to CBAs that allowed for more flexibility to implement distance learning. These contract changes focused on several areas of the CBA, including compensation, workload, non-teaching duties, evaluation, leave, and technology. We argue that the lessons learned in spring contract negotiations have implications for the design and implementation of fall schooling plans, and that how fall schooling plays out will shape teacher morale and labor relations beyond the 2020–21 school year