The Structure of the American Civic Sphere

Book review: The Civic Constitution: Civic Visions and Struggles in the Path toward Constitutional Democracy. By Elizabeth Beaumont. Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xvi + 343. Peopling the Constitution. By John E. Finn. University Press of Kansas, 2014. Pp. xv + 350 Reviewed by Mariah Zeisber

The Structure of the American Civic Sphere

Book review: The Civic Constitution: Civic Visions and Struggles in the Path toward Constitutional Democracy. By Elizabeth Beaumont. Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xvi + 343. Peopling the Constitution. By John E. Finn. University Press of Kansas, 2014. Pp. xv + 350 Reviewed by Mariah Zeisber

A New Framing? Constitutional Representation at Philadelphia's National Constitution Center A

in Philadelphia orients its representation of the Constitution around the role of "We the People" in the conduct of constitutional politics. The self-presentation of the NCC explicitly connects its participatory interpretation of the Constitution to the interactivity of the museum experience itself, and announces its aspiration that visitors "get involved!" In so doing the NCC draws upon an emerging edge in museum theory that emphasizes the capacity of museums to support political citizenship. Although the museum's aspiration to enact participatory citizenship is laudable, its exhibits-because of their technologies, use of space, and content-subvert, rather than sustain, the participatory ideal

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The classical portrait of legal fidelity emphasizes that interpreters should sharply distinguish between their own judgments about morality or public policy, and their judgments about what the law requires. An instrumental approach to legal reasoning violates this basic obligation. This article argues that one of the constitutional heroes most exalted by constitutional theorists, Frederick Douglass, explicitly advocated the instrumental approach to interpretation that the classical concept of fidelity warns against. The implication of this argument is either that Douglass is not a constitutional hero, or that constitutional fidelity is not necessary for constitutional heroes. The argument that constitutional heroism does not require citizens to be faithful to the documents’ text requires a reworking of our basic categories of constitutional agency. I conclude by offering a few thoughts on how such a reworking might be achieved if Douglass’ status as a constitutional hero is to be maintained

[no title]

The classical portrait of legal fidelity emphasizes that interpreters should sharply distinguish between their own judgments about morality or public policy, and their judgments about what the law requires. An instrumental approach to legal reasoning violates this basic obligation. This article argues that one of the constitutional heroes most exalted by constitutional theorists, Frederick Douglass, explicitly advocated the instrumental approach to interpretation that the classical concept of fidelity warns against. The implication of this argument is either that Douglass is not a constitutional hero, or that constitutional fidelity is not necessary for constitutional heroes. The argument that constitutional heroism does not require citizens to be faithful to the documents’ text requires a reworking of our basic categories of constitutional agency. I conclude by offering a few thoughts on how such a reworking might be achieved if Douglass’ status as a constitutional hero is to be maintained