Ex-Communist Party Choices and the Electoral Success of the Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe

What explains the proletarization (the increasing embrace by the blue-collar constituencies) of the radical right vote in the countries of post-Communist Europe? I argue that the centrist shift of the ex-Communist left parties along the economic policy dimension drives the electoral success of radical right parties in the region. I show that the programmatic shift of the ex-Communist left parties (as instrumented by the implementation of austerity reforms) opened up their traditional blue-collar constituencies to the redistributive appeals of the radical right parties. I test my argument using several different approaches. First, I examine the relationship between the support for the radical right parties and the ex-Communist left parties’ policy positions using a quantitative cross-country analysis. Second, I provide an overview of the experiences of the four Visegrád Group countries and trace the blue-collar constituencies’ shift away from the ex-Communist left parties to the populist and radical right parties over time, as the left parties became more economically centrist. I then test my argument using constituency-level and individual-level experimental survey data within Hungary. Both methods help establish that the centrist shift of the ex-Communist left parties along the economic policy dimension boosted support for the radical right party. My argument contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of political systems and the rise of the radical right parties in Europe

Different Strokes for Different Folks: Who Votes for Technocratic Parties?

In this study, I look at two types of political actors commonly described as 'populist' in literature - namely, rightwing populists and technocratic leaders like France's Emmanuel Macron and the Czech Republic's Andrej Babiš. While both types of political actors tend to emerge as a response to a decline in trust in established parties and adopt platforms with anti-establishment and monist elements, they also possess noticeably different qualities. Unlike rightwing populists, technocrats lack a distinctive ideological profile and tend to adopt more inclusive rhetoric by appealing to a broadly-defined community of people. When contrasted with supporters of rightwing populists, empirical analysis of supporters of Macron's and Babiš' parties shows that the two have few commonalities. Relatively few examples of such political leadership, the lack of a distinct ideological profile and the variation of their support bases suggest that one should use caution when conceptualizing technocratic populists as a distinct theoretical type

How the Kremlin continued its social media influence campaign in the United States in 2020

Ahead of the 2020 presidential election, there was much concern over the likelihood that Russia would try to influence the vote, much as it did in 2016. In new research, Maria Snegovaya and Kohei Watanabe explore the Kremlin’s recent social media influence campaigns in the United States by analyzing the effectiveness of Russia’s information operations and the susceptibility of specific [...

Political Conservatism in Russia

In this paper I discuss the conservative turn that took place in Russia in the last 15 years comparing it to the recent experience of Hungary and Poland.  I show that to a large extent this backlash is of a socioeconomic nature and reflects the people’s frustration with the downsides of the economic liberalization. Moreover, the depth of the original social transformation determined a society’s ability to resist to the conservative trend. In Russia where the modernization processes were the shallowest, the old political elites could regain power sooner and roll back the society deeper. I also overview different conservative schools of thought in Russia and show Putin manipulated this ideology to strengthen his hold on power

Russlands Machtvertikale bröckelt: Die sinkenden Realeinkommen sorgen für Unzufriedenheit

Wirtschaftliche Faktoren sind für die Unterstützung föderaler Behörden in den russischen Regionen bedeutsam. Wladimir Koslow und Maria Snegovaya zeigen in einer Studie über die Wahlergebnisse von Gouverneurskandidaten, die vom Kreml unterstützt wurden, dass die Wahlergebnisse der Kreml-Kandidaten und die Entwicklung der real verfügbaren Einkommen in einem signifikanten Zusammenhang stehen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie werden dann auf die Regionalwahlen am 13. September 2020 übertragen. Der Kreml war aufgrund der durch die Pandemie hervorgerufene Wirtschaftskrise gezwungen, auf massive und bisher beispiellose Wahlmanipulation zurückzugreifen, um den vom Kreml vorher ernannten Kandidaten ins Amt zu helfen. Die Krise war Anlass dafür, dass derart einschneidend in die Wahlgesetzgebung eingegriffen wurde wie schon seit 25 Jahren nicht mehr. Bei Wahlen, die vom Kreml weniger direkt kontrolliert wurden, wie etwa zu den Regionalparlamenten und den Stadträten, waren die Ergebnisse für Kandidaten, die vom Kreml unterstützt wurden, weniger überzeugend. Die Risiken bei Wahlen werden für den Kreml in der Zukunft zunehmen, je mehr sich die sozioökonomische Lage verschlechtert und die Opposition sich weiter mobilisiert

The Ideology of Putinism: Is It Sustainable?

Does Vladimir Putin have an ideology? The authors of this report argue that he does. Borrowing heavily from czarist and Soviet themes, as well as other intellectual sources like the twentieth-century radical right, Putinism elevates an idea of imperial-nationalist statism amplified by Russian greatness, exceptionalism, and historical struggle against the West. Statism, a key pillar of Putin's ideology, includes deference to a strong, stable state, allowing Russians to be Russians; such statism is based on exceptionalism and traditional values. Another pillar is anti-Westernism, which, when combined with Russian exceptionalism, promotes a messianic notion of Russia as a great power and civilization state, guarding a Russo-centric polyculturalism, traditional family and gender roles, and guarding against materialism and individualism. That this ideology is not spelled out in philosophical texts but most often absorbed through signs, symbols, and popular culture makes it both malleable and easily digestible for less-educated people. Will this ideology help keep Putin in power? This report suggests that it could. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its radical break with the West have prompted the regime to mount even more sustainable ideology-building effort. It is hard to see where challenges to the Putinist ideology could emerge in Russia. Societal resistance to Kremlin propaganda has remained marginal, even during more liberal periods. An alternative pro-Western identity able to challenge the Kremlin's propaganda has failed to emerge and is less likely following the massive exodus of Russian liberals as a result of the Ukraine war. The flexibility of Putin's ideology machine and the simplicity of the narratives it spreads suggest that Putinism is not going anywhere soon and may become further entrenched in the Russian social sphere.

Successions of terrestrial invertebrate communities during the Tsey Glacier retreat, Central Caucasus

In the Caucasus, the total area taken up by glaciers is known to have reduced by 23% over the last 20 years. This natural experiment allows for additive and replacement models of autogenic succession of biocoenoses within paraglacial landscapes to be tested. A certain risk of the extinction of cryophilic species also exists. However, montane paraglacial successions of invertebrate assemblages have hitherto been studied neither in the Caucasus nor in Russia as a whole. Structural changes of taxocoenoses were traced in a spatial and temporal sequence of ten properly dated paraglacial sites in the Tsey Gorge, North Ossetia − Alania (1–170-years old) among the testate amoebae, earthworms, molluscs, myriapods, mites, spiders, harvestmen, pseudoscorpions, collembolans, and beetles. As the glacier retreats, in place of bare paraglacial wastelands, grassland communities are formed that, after 10–14 years, are replaced by shrub vegetation and, on 30–35-year old surfaces, by forest communities. Most of the invertebrate groups, once “appearing” along a postglacial transect, were recorded from most older plots as well. Yet, their taxocoenoses underwent considerable transformations through increasing (or an increase turning into some decline in beetles) the species diversity and a strong, often complete change in the taxonomic composition and dominance structure. The most considerable transformations were observed at all major vegetation changes. The “appearance” of some groups in the transect was determined not only by dispersion capacities but mainly by the environmental conditions of particular habitats. When comparing the composition of the pioneer postglacial species complex of the study region with that in the mountains of Europe’s south and north, its high-degree regional specificity was noted, sometimes shown at the family level (in spiders). Spatial β-diversity of all larger taxa studied was mainly attributed to turnover (due to “the replacement model” of succession). The general level of change diminished towards the later succession stages. Endemic arthropod species were revealed both in pioneer grassland and developed forest communities

Successions of terrestrial invertebrate communities during the Tsey Glacier retreat, Central Caucasus

In the Caucasus, the total area taken up by glaciers is known to have reduced by 23% over the last 20 years. This natural experiment allows for additive and replacement models of autogenic succession of biocoenoses within paraglacial landscapes to be tested. A certain risk of the extinction of cryophilic species also exists. However, montane paraglacial successions of invertebrate assemblages have hitherto been studied neither in the Caucasus nor in Russia as a whole. Structural changes of taxocoenoses were traced in a spatial and temporal sequence of ten properly dated paraglacial sites in the Tsey Gorge, North Ossetia − Alania (1–170-years old) among the testate amoebae, earthworms, molluscs, myriapods, mites, spiders, harvestmen, pseudoscorpions, collembolans, and beetles. As the glacier retreats, in place of bare paraglacial wastelands, grassland communities are formed that, after 10–14 years, are replaced by shrub vegetation and, on 30–35-year old surfaces, by forest communities. Most of the invertebrate groups, once “appearing” along a postglacial transect, were recorded from most older plots as well. Yet, their taxocoenoses underwent considerable transformations through increasing (or an increase turning into some decline in beetles) the species diversity and a strong, often complete change in the taxonomic composition and dominance structure. The most considerable transformations were observed at all major vegetation changes. The “appearance” of some groups in the transect was determined not only by dispersion capacities but mainly by the environmental conditions of particular habitats. When comparing the composition of the pioneer postglacial species complex of the study region with that in the mountains of Europe’s south and north, its high-degree regional specificity was noted, sometimes shown at the family level (in spiders). Spatial β-diversity of all larger taxa studied was mainly attributed to turnover (due to “the replacement model” of succession). The general level of change diminished towards the later succession stages. Endemic arthropod species were revealed both in pioneer grassland and developed forest communities