False memories in forensic psychology: do cognition and brain activity tell the same story?

One of the most important problems in forensic psychology is the impossibility of reliably discriminating between true and false memories when the only prosecution evidence comes from the memory of a witness or a victim. Unfortunately, both children and adults can be persuaded that they have been victims of past criminal acts, usually of a sexual nature. In adults, suggestion often occurs in the context of suggestive therapies based on the belief that traumatic events are repressed, while children come to believe and report events that never occurred as a result of repeated suggestive questioning. Cognitive Researchers have designed false memory paradigms (i.e., misinformation effect, Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, event implantation paradigm) to first form false memories and then determine whether it is possible to reliably differentiate between false and true memories. In the present study, we review the contribution of cognitive research to the formation of false memories and the neuropsychological approaches aimed to discriminate between true and false memories. Based on these results, we analyze the applicability of the cognitive and neuropsychological evidence to the forensic settingThe author(s) declare that financial support was received for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. This work was supported by the Transfer Knowledge Project 088501 – FUAM (Foundation of the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) co-directed by the author

I Behave Well (and my Teacher too): Memory and Suggestion in Preschoolers

Este estudio examinó cómo la valencia (acciones positivas o negativas) y el agente de la acción (profesora o niño) afectaban a la memoria y a la aceptación de la sugestión de los preescolares. En una primera sesión, preescolares de entre 3 y 6 años interactuaban con una profesora en diversas actividades. Una semana después, una entrevistadora formulaba preguntas de sí/no acerca de acciones verdaderas y sugeridas respecto de la interacción de la semana anterior. Los resultados revelaron el efecto del factor edad en el rendimiento de memoria y en la sugestión, que fueron evaluados a través de las respuestas dadas a la tarea de reconocimiento de sí/no. Se encontró un mayor reconocimiento correcto de las acciones de la profesora que de las acciones de los niños y, al mismo tiempo, se aceptaron menos las sugestiones sobre las acciones de la profesora en comparación con las propias del niño. Los preescolares fueron más resistentes a las sugestiones sobre acciones negativas que sobre acciones positivas. Más allá del efecto típico de la edad en el reconocimiento correcto y la aceptación de la sugestión de los preescolares, el contenido de las preguntas influyó de forma diferente en estas dos medidas: el reconocimiento correcto se vio afectado exclusivamente por el agente de la acción; mientras que la sugestión se vio afectada por la valencia y el agente de la acción.    This study examined how valence (positive and negative actions) and the action's agent (teacher or child) influenced memory and the acceptance of suggestion in preschoolers. In a first session, preschoolers aged between 3 and 6 years old interacted with a teacher and performed different tasks. A week later, an interviewer asked yes or no questions to the children with regard to the activities carried out in the previous session. Results revealed the effect of age on memory performance and suggestion, which were evaluated by yes/no answers given to the task of recognition. In addition, there was a higher correct recognition for the teacher's actions than for the children ones. However, suggestions about teacher's actions were less accepted than children ones. Also, positive suggestions were more accepted than negative ones. In conclusion, setting aside the typical effect of age on correct recognition and acceptance of suggestion, the questions' content influenced both measures differently: Correct recognition was exclusively influenced by the action's agent, whereas suggestion was affected by valence and the action´s agent.     &nbsp

How does prior knowledge affect children's memory and suggestibility?

In this review chapter, we analyzed various studies focused on the effect of prior knowledge on children’s memory and suggestibility. Specifically, three types of knowledge are considered: social knowledge, script knowledge and semantic knowledge. Social knowledge benefits memory when the actions performed by another person fit into children’s knowledge, but it is also probably that children accept false suggestions consistent with that knowledge. Script knowledge is only beneficial for memory when the repeated event occurs always in the same way, but when some details change across repetitions, children could become confused and not be able to distinguish the particular detail in each repetition of the event. Semantic knowledge benefits episodic memory and makes more probably to reject false suggestions, unless the suggestion were repeated many times, in this case the beneficial effect of semantic knowledge disappears. Findings from studies are extrapolated to the forensic field, and limitations of the studies analyzed are discusse

Effects of divided attention and cued recall test on true and illusory memories in the DRM paradigm

In this study, we were interested in examining how the reduction of attentional resources during the encoding of word lists and the type of recall test affected true and false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM paradigm). Three DRM lists were presented visually under full attention conditions or while participants had to monitor a concurrent auditory task of letters and digits. After the presentation of each list, participants completed a free recall test or a cued recall test. Divided attention had an opposite effect on correct recall of studied words and false recall of critical words. Thus, the concurrent task caused a reduction in correct recall, but increased false recall. The retrieval cue did not affect the correct recall of studied words, but it was helpful in reducing the false recall of critical words and other intrusions. The results are discussed taking into account the theoretical proposals of the activation monitoring account and fuzzy trace theoryThis work was supported by the transfer knowledge Project 088501 – FUAM (Foundation of the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) co-directed by the first and second author

Effects of preparation on recalls of imagined and perceived events

Johnson and Raye (1981) proposed a model of a process to differentiate between self-generated and perceptual memories, which is based on the distinctive qualities of representations of both memories. Descriptions of self-generated memories are usually longer and have more references to cognitive operations and, in general, more idiosyncratic information. These descriptions of self-generated memories, also, have less sensorial and contextual details than the descriptions of perceptual memories. These differences have been also found between real memory descriptions and those generated by misleading information (Schooler et al., 1986, 1988), lies (Alonso-Quecuty, 1992) or self-suggested information based on previous knowledge (Diges, 1992). On the other hand, it has been investigated how several factors influence the differential features of both types of memory descriptions. Suengas (1991) point out five variables with an influence in reality monitoring process: age, information subject matter, delay, thinking or talking about memory contents, perceptive resemblance and the cutting down in the cognitive mechanisms. The aim of this study was to examine the effect of preparation on the characteristics of imagined and perceptual memory descriptions. Following recent research (Alonso-Quecuty, 1992; Suengas and Johnson, 1988) it was hypothesized that real memories of subjects in the preparation condition would contain more sensorial and contextual details and more internal characteristics (in terms of the Johnson and Raye, 1981, reality monitoring) than subjects in the no-preparation condition. Also, descriptions of subjects asked to prepare a report of an imagined event should contain more external characteristics than the imagined memories of subjects who do not receive instructions about preparing their reports. A 2x2 factorial design was used, which included the between-subjects manipulation of two variables: the origin of the memory (perceived vs. imagined) and the preparation of reports (prepared vs. not-prepared). And, the free recall measures included: accuracy variables (sensorial and contextual details and distortions) and qualitative variables (explanations, length of the narrative, changes in the narrative order, reference to cognitive processes, dubitative expressions, impossible information and spontaneous corrections). Half of the subjects were asked to remember a filmed traffic accident (27 secs. duration). The rest of the subjects were presented with verbal description of the accident and were asked to imagine it. Half of each group were instructed to prepare the reports before give it them; the other half were not instructed to do this. Then, the reports were typed and analysed by two independent trained judges in terms of the presence or absence of the quantitative and qualitative variables. The scoring sys-tem used to analyse the statements was developed and validated in previous studies (e.g., Diges et al., 1990). Previous analysis showed that imagined and perceptual descriptions cannot be directly compared because of the imagined instructions. Thus, the preparation effects on perceptual and on imagined descriptions were analysed separately. On the external memories, the results showed that preparation significantly increased the number of sensorial and contextual details (t(28)=1.6l8; p<.05) and dubitative expressions (t(28)=2.687; p<.01). This effect of preparation could have been caused not only by the information organization determined by the preparation process, but also by a greater effort to recall involved in this process. These results are in agreement with the findings of Alonzo-Quecuty (1992) who observed that delayed reports had more sensorial and contextual information and more idiosyncratic features. Our results also coincided with the obtained by Suengas and Johnson (1988) who found that delay (associated to thinking and talking about the stored information) did not affect the contextual information but influence the idiosyncratic information contained in the reports of real events. This effect was observed mainly when subjective and affective connotations were the main characteristics of them. In summary, when the reports of previously experienced events are prepared, these reports exhibit more internal characteristics (idiosyncratic information) and more sensorial and contextual details than when they are not prepared. With respect to descriptions of memories for imagined events the results showed that the effects of preparation on the number of sensorial and contextual details (t(32)= 1.867; p<.05) and explanations (t(32)= 1.688; p<.05) were significant. Prepared reports of an imagined event had less idiosyncratic information, in the sense that they had less explanations than the non-prepared ones. And also, subjects under the prepared conditions recalled more details than in the non-prepared condition, as it happened in the real memory case. These results are also in agreement with Alonso-Quecuty's (1992) findings. She found that the delayed false declarations had less idiosyncratic information and more sensorial and contextual details than the immediate ones. Thus, preparation provoked internal narratives become more external. How could we explain this preparation effect on imagined and real memories? When presented with the real events subjects perceived, coded, and stored the selective information about the events. When subjects were asked to prepare their memory descriptions they retrieved the memory traces and reconstructed the information. When they talked about the event they spoke not about the perceived event but about the interpreted, coded, reorganised, stored, recalled and reconstructed event. This is the recall of a «trace» of memory (perhaps, it could be defined as a re-representation in terms of Johnson and Raye, 1981). As a result of this reconstructive process the memories of the external event acquire more internal characteristics because of a greater implication of cognitive pro-cesses. On the other hand, preparation produces an enrichment of the memories of the imagined events resulting in memory descriptions with more external characteristics (more sensorial and contextual details) and less internal ones. Here we have the recall about a memory trace of an internally experienced event. Finally, the significanes of these results for theoretical explanations about retrieval and discrimination processes is examined

How chronological age, theory of mind, and yield are interrelated to memory and suggestion in young children

We investigated the interrelations between chronological age, theory of mind (ToM), Yield (as a measure of individual suggestibility), memory and acceptance of experimental suggestion in a sample of children between 3 and 7 years old (N = 106). One week after participants interacted with ‘a Teacher’, they were asked to recall activities carried out with the Teacher (direct experience) and the contents of a story read to them by the Teacher (indirect experience). Data were examined with an analysis of developmental trajectories, which allows establishing the predictor value of socio-cognitive developmental factors regardless of participants’ chronological age. It also estimates predictor values in interaction with the age and determines whether age is the best predictor for performance. As in previous research, results showed that chronological age was the main predictor of memory performance, both for direct experience (i.e., activities performed) and indirect experience (i.e., contents of the story). However, ToM and Yield, together with participants’ ages, modulated their acceptance of the external suggestions received (presented only once, one week after the event). A turning point was observed at age 4.6. Below this age, the greater the mentalist skills (higher ToM), the lower was the vulnerability to external suggestion. Still, children below this age characterized individually as being suggestible (Yield medium or high) were more vulnerable to suggestion the younger they were. Thus, developmental socio-cognitive factors might modulate young children’s vulnerability to external suggestions, even if received only onceThis work was supported by the Transfer Knowledge Project 088501–FUAM (Foundation of the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) co-directed by the first and third authors, and the National Research SEJ2004–07655 financed by Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica (DGICYT

Effects of divided attention and word concreteness on correct recall and false memory reports

Lists of thematically related words were presented to participants with or without a concurrent task. In Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, English or Spanish word lists were either low or high in concreteness (concrete vs abstract words) and were presented, respectively, auditorily or visually for study. The addition of a concurrent visual or auditory task, respectively, substantially reduced correct recall and doubled the frequency of false memory reports (nonstudied critical or theme words). Divided attention was interpreted as having reduced the opportunity for participants to monitor successfully their elicitations of critical associates. Comparisons of concrete and abstract lists revealed significantly more recalls of false memories for abstract than concrete word lists. Comparisons between two levels of attention, two levels of word concreteness, and two presentation modalities failed to support the ‘‘more is less’’ effect by which enhanced correct recall is accompanied by increased frequencies of false memoriesThis research was supported in parts by research grants to the second author from the National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada while at the University of Lethbridge and to the third author from DGICYT (Project PB-96-0079

The effect of the instructions on face recognition: accuracy and eye movements

The present experiment examines how instructions (absolute judgement vs. relative judgement) affect the performance in simultaneous lineups (present perpetrator and absent perpetrator). To find out whether the participants really followed the instructions, their eye movements were recorded when they faced the photo lineup. Sixty participants (44 women and 16 men) took part in the experiment. Overall, the results showed that participants with absolute judgement instructions made significantly less inter-photograph comparisons than those with relative judgement instructions. In the present perpetrator lineup, hit rate was lower for participants with absolute judgement instructions than with relative judgement instructions. In the absent perpetrator lineup, no differences were between both instruction conditions. Furthermore, as was expected, no relationship was found between “pre” and “post” confidence and accuracy in the lineups. Moreover, we examined participants’ metamemory evaluations about their examination pattern of the photographs in the lineup. Our results did not show high incongruity between the own participants’ judgment and their visual behavio