Processes models, environmental analyses, and cognitive architectures: Quo vadis quantum probability theory?

A lot of research in cognition and decision making suffers from a lack of formalism. The quantum probability program could help to improve this situation, but we wonder whether it would provide even more added value if its presumed focus on outcome models were complemented by process models that are, ideally, informed by ecological analyses and integrated into cognitive architecture

Chapter 18 The winds of change

The ongoing process of digitalization seems to be changing our world dramatically. While many of these changes might lead to improvements for human well-being, others might entail profoundly disastrous consequences both for individuals and for societies as a whole. One research program that might be particularly suitable for studying environmental changes is the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework. This theoretical framework adopts an ecological perspective on human behavior, cognition, and performance. In an uncertain world, humans, so the argument goes, can adaptively respond to environmental demands by relying on a repertoire of simple decision strategies, called heuristics. Selecting heuristics that fit the environment results in adaptive behavior. This chapter focuses on the possible negative aspects of digitalization to discuss how the science of heuristic decision making under uncertainty might aid reflection on how individuals navigate their way through sudden, disruptive, and thorough environmental changes. Specifically, it sketches out what aversive future digital environments might look like, and which heuristics individuals and societies might rely upon in order to manage those aversive environments. The chapter concludes by (1) pointing to a series of research questions about how digital environments might differ from other environments that we humans have encountered both in our more recent history and over the course of our evolution, as well as (2) turning to questions about children and education

On theory integration: Toward developing affective components within cognitive architectures

In The Cognitive-Emotional Brain, Pessoa (2013) suggests that cognition and emotion should not be considered separately. We agree with this and argue that cognitive architectures can provide steady ground for this kind of theory integration and for investigating interactions among underlying cognitive processes. We briefly explore how affective components can be implemented and how neuroimaging measures can help validate models and influence theory developmen

Reflections of the Social Environment in Chimpanzee Memory: Applying Rational Analysis Beyond Humans

In cognitive science, the rational analysis framework allows modelling of how physical and social environments impose information-processing demands onto cognitive systems. In humans, for example, past social contact among individuals predicts their future contact with linear and power functions. These features of the human environment constrain the optimal way to remember information and probably shape how memory records are retained and retrieved. We offer a primer on how biologists can apply rational analysis to study animal behaviour. Using chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) as a case study, we modelled 19 years of observational data on their social contact patterns. Much like humans, the frequency of past encounters in chimpanzees linearly predicted future encounters, and the recency of past encounters predicted future encounters with a power function. Consistent with the rational analyses carried out for human memory, these findings suggest that chimpanzee memory performance should reflect those environmental regularities. In re-analysing existing chimpanzee memory data, we found that chimpanzee memory patterns mirrored their social contact patterns. Our findings hint that human and chimpanzee memory systems may have evolved to solve similar information-processing problems. Overall, rational analysis offers novel theoretical and methodological avenues for the comparative study of cognition

Reflections of the Social Environment in Chimpanzee Memory: Applying Rational Analysis Beyond Humans

In cognitive science, the rational analysis framework allows modelling of how physical and social environments impose information-processing demands onto cognitive systems. In humans, for example, past social contact among individuals predicts their future contact with linear and power functions. These features of the human environment constrain the optimal way to remember information and probably shape how memory records are retained and retrieved. We offer a primer on how biologists can apply rational analysis to study animal behaviour. Using chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) as a case study, we modelled 19 years of observational data on their social contact patterns. Much like humans, the frequency of past encounters in chimpanzees linearly predicted future encounters, and the recency of past encounters predicted future encounters with a power function. Consistent with the rational analyses carried out for human memory, these findings suggest that chimpanzee memory performance should reflect those environmental regularities. In re-analysing existing chimpanzee memory data, we found that chimpanzee memory patterns mirrored their social contact patterns. Our findings hint that human and chimpanzee memory systems may have evolved to solve similar information-processing problems. Overall, rational analysis offers novel theoretical and methodological avenues for the comparative study of cognition

We favor formal models of heuristics rather than lists of loose dichotomies: a reply to Evans and Over

In their comment on Marewski et al. (good judgments do not require complex cognition, 2009) Evans and Over (heuristic thinking and human intelligence: a commentary on Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2009) conjectured that heuristics can often lead to biases and are not error free. This is a most surprising critique. The computational models of heuristics we have tested allow for quantitative predictions of how many errors a given heuristic will make, and we and others have measured the amount of error by analysis, computer simulation, and experiment. This is clear progress over simply giving heuristics labels, such as availability, that do not allow for quantitative comparisons of errors. Evans and Over argue that the reason people rely on heuristics is the accuracy-effort trade-off. However, the comparison between heuristics and more effortful strategies, such as multiple regression, has shown that there are many situations in which a heuristic is more accurate with less effort. Finally, we do not see how the fast and frugal heuristics program could benefit from a dual-process framework unless the dual-process framework is made more precise. Instead, the dual-process framework could benefit if its two “black boxes” (Type 1 and Type 2 processes) were substituted by computational models of both heuristics and other processes