Alcohol-Related Car Accidents - The Eighth Circuit Moves toward Policy Change in ERISA Litigation

According to the National Center for Statistics and Analysis, the 16,694 alcohol-related fatalities in 2004 accounted for 39% of all traffic deaths. Although declining slightly from previous years, alcohol-related driving deaths are tragic, and their devastating effects on families are readily apparent. Although typically dubbed drunk-driving accidents, courts have traditionally refused to describe these deaths as accidental. This is particularly true when decedents or their beneficiaries attempt to collect accidental death benefits under the Employment Retirement Income Securities Act ( ERISA ). Focusing on the previously mentioned statistics, courts have often reflected the social intolerance for drunk driving in their decisions. Courts, however, have shown signs of bending on this nearly universal rule, particularly in light of the fact that alcohol-related fatalities occur in only 7% of all car wrecks and the rate of alcohol-related fatalities is roughly one for every 200 million vehicle miles traveled. Other commentators have also noted that of the approximately 1.4 million drivers arrested in 2002, only 8,474 drunk drivers died in an automobile crash, and that drunk drivers make 94 million diriving trips each year. Given this, some courts have concluded that, objectively, it is not highly likely for an impaired driver to die in an alcohol-related wreck, and those deaths are therefore acciednts. While not addressing this question directly, the Eighth Circuit in King v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co. took a small step away from the universal denial of accidental death benefits and toward the contrary holding

Residential Privacy and Free Speech: Competing Interests in Charitable Solicitation Regulation

Although these two quotations represent society\u27s mixed feelings toward charity, they also represent a distinction people often make between a charity\u27s aims and its means. Charitable organizations have the potential to spread hope, re-allocate societal resources, and advocate societal values. How they go about accomplishing these noble goals, however, is sometimes the subject of public frustration and annoyance. This creates a tension between admiring the charity\u27s philanthropy and becoming irritated with the means used to achieve it. Undoubtedly, one of the most unwelcome guests in any household is a telemarketer. In fact, 98% of 1.78 million respondents to a recent online survey said telemarketing calls made them angry. Because of this, many states have enacted laws regulating charities\u27 use of telemarketing as a means to further their message. While public sentiment seems to support heavy regulation of telemarketers, regulating charitable solicitation presents interesting and unique problems. Charitable solicitation receives full First Amendment protection, so any state legislature attempting to regulate charitable solicitation must respect charities\u27 free speech rights. In examining these laws, courts must also care fully delineate the boundaries between a state\u27s power to protect its residents\u27 privacy and the charties\u27 First Amendment right to advance its message. As demonstrated in Fraternal Order of Policy, North Dakota State Lodge v. Stenehjem, drawing this line between First Amendment rights and residential privacy is a difficult task, particularly in light of prior Supreme Court decisions muddying the water. Ultimately, when such weighty values collide, lower courts need particularized guidance to assist with their decisions. This Note argues that Stenehjem was wrongly decided, and that its misguided analysis reflects the uncertainty in this area of the law