13,605 research outputs found
Endogenous Time-Dependent Rules and Inflation Inertia
In this paper we endogenize fixed price time-dependent rules to examine the output effects of monetary disinflation. We derive the optimal rules in and out of inflationary steady states, and develop a methodology to aggregate individual pricing rules which vary through time. Because of strategic complementarities we have to solve both problems simultaneously. This allows us to reassess the output costs of monetary disinflations, including aspects such as the roles of the initial level of inflation, and of the degree of strategic complementarity in price. Finally, we relax the strict assumption of pure time-dependent rules by allowing price setters to reevaluate their rules at the time disinflation is announced.
Non-linear relativistic perturbation theory with two parameters
An underlying fundamental assumption in relativistic perturbation theory is
the existence of a parametric family of spacetimes that can be Taylor expanded
around a background. Since the choice of the latter is crucial, sometimes it is
convenient to have a perturbative formalism based on two (or more) parameters.
A good example is the study of rotating stars, where generic perturbations are
constructed on top of an axisymmetric configuration built by using the slow
rotation approximation. Here, we discuss the gauge dependence of non-linear
perturbations depending on two parameters and how to derive explicit higher
order gauge transformation rules.Comment: 5 pages, LaTeX2e. Contribution to the Spanish Relativity Meeting (ERE
2002), Mao, Menorca, Spain, 22-24.September.200
Imperfectly Credible Disinflation under Endogenous Time-Dependent Pricing
The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how the policymaker's credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine the output effects of an imperfectly credible monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. We take as the base case a disinflation policy with a constant degree of credibility, and show that the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation. We also study the case in which the monetary authority gains credibility during the disinflation as agents update their beliefs.
Endogenous Time-Dependent Rules and the Costs of Disinflation with Imperfect Credibility
The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how the policymaker's credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine the output effects of an imperfectly credible monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. We take as the base case a disinflation policy with a constant degree of credibility, and show that the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation. We also study the case in which the monetary authority gains credibility during the disinflation as agents update their beliefs.
Endogenous Time-Dependent Rules and the Costs of Disinflation with Imperfect Credibility
The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how the policymaker's credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine the output effects of an imperfectly credible monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. We take as the base case a disinflation policy with a constant degree of credibility, and show that the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation. We also study the case in which the monetary authority gains credibility during the disinflation as agents update their beliefs.
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