Is It Hot in Here - The Eighth Circuit\u27s Reduction of Fourth Amendment Protections in the Home

Several years ago, the United States military developed thermal imaging technology for targeting and reconnaissance purposes which law enforcement agencies subsequently adopted as a means of conducting surveillance in support of counter-narcotics efforts. Police use thermal imaging devices in counter-narcotics operations by scanning buildings and homes in order to determine higher heat emissions from buildings. These higher than normal thermal readings of homes act as indicators of possible marijuana grow operations due to the high output of heat from the indoor lamps commonly used for such activities. Even though a majority of jurisdictions have held that a thermal imaging scan of a home does not qualify as a search under the Fourth Amendment, and thus require a warrant, in 2001, the United States Supreme Court held in Kyllo v. United States that the use of thermal imaging devices by police in their investigatory capacities required the issuance of a warrant. The Eighth Circuit, in their recent decision of United States v. Kattaria, misconstrued the Supreme Court\u27s holding in United States v. Kyllo. In Kattaria, the Eighth Circuit found that although a warrant is required prior to police using a thermal imaging device on a home, the traditional probable cause standard need not be met prior to a court or magistrate issuing such a warrant. Thus, the Eighth Circuit has created a hybrid Terry stop / search warrant

Protecting the Predator or the Prey - The Missouri Supreme Court\u27s Refusal to Allow Past Sexual Misconduct as Propensity Evidence

Americans consider child molestation and sexual assault among the most heinous crimes that one can commit. In response to the public\u27s opinion regarding these crimes, Congress created exceptions to the longstanding rule barring character propensity evidence. Over the protests of prominent lefal figures, Congress enacted Federal Rules of Evidence 413- 415 in 1994. Though these rules have been sustained by several appellate court decisions, the constitutionality of Rules 413-415 has not been conclusively decided by the United States Supreme Court. Missouri\u27s legislature has twice attempted to pass a statute regarding child molestation similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 414, and twice the Missouri Supreme Court has struck down these attempts as unconstitutional.7 Although the Missouri Supreme Court relied entirely on state constitutional grounds in refusing to uphold statutes permitting propensity evidence in child molestation prosecutions, one must ask whether the Missouri Supreme Court should instead follow in the footsteps of the of the federal judiciary, which has allowed similar long-standing rules of evidence to be rejected in favor of the will of the legislature. The essence of this query lies in the answer to the question of whether the prejudicial effect of such propensity evidence and the threat to an individual\u27s right to be tried only for the crime for which one stands accused outweighs the potential dangers posed to victims and society

Preemption & the Regulatory Paradigm in the Roberts Court

This short article first examines the Court\u27s general preemption doctrine, including relevant criticisms. It then details the rise of the regulatory paradigm in the Supreme Court\u27s cases, especially as it culminates in the Roberts Court\u27s reliance on it. Finally, it examines potential implications of increasing reliance on that paradigm, including manipulation of preemption doctrine by judges, continued deference to agency officials\u27 decisions to preempt, and adverse effects on individual tort plaintiffs