Coalition Formation Problems With Externalities

We study coalition formation problems with general externalities. We prove that if expectations are not prudent a stable coalitions structure can fail to exist. Under prudent expectations a stable coalition structure exists if the set of admissible coalitions is single-lapping. This assumption also guarantees the existence of a stable and efficient coalition structure. However, under this assumption, the stable set is not a singleton, and no stable and efficient strategy-proof revelation mechanism exists, differently from the case in which agents care only about the coalition they belong to. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium

Notes on Marriage Markets With Weak Externalities

We consider marriage markets with externalities. We focus on weak externalities, that is, markets in which each agent is primarily concerned about her partner. We formalize and prove the claim that weak externalities are not so significant in the marriage market: in this case the ω-core and the α-core coincide and are both non-empty. In addition, we show that, if we allow agents to block matchings without changing their mate, the results do not longer hold

Incentives and Implementation in Allocation Problems with Externalities

We study the implementation of social choice rules in environments with externalities. We prove the impossibility of implementing efficient and α-individually rational rules in dominant strategies. We prove that the α-core is implementable in Nash equilibrium under mild restrictions and discuss the maximality and the minimality of our results. We extend our analysis to weakly efficient rules

Incentives and Implementation in Marriage Markets with Externalities

We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium

Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities

We study the implementation of social choice rules in environments with externalities. We prove the impossibility of implementing efficient and α-individually rational rules in dominant strategies. We prove that the α-core is implementable in Nash equilibrium under mild restrictions and discuss the maximality and the minimality of our results. We extend our analysis to weakly efficient rules

Coalition formation problems with externalities

We study coalition formation problems with externalities. We prove that, if expectations are not prudent a stable coalitions structure may fail to exist. Under prudent expectations a stable and efficient coalition structure exists if the set of admissible coalitions is single-lapping. However, under this assumption the stable set is not a singleton, and no stable strategy-proof revelation mechanism exists, differently from the case without externalities. Finally, the stable correspondence is Nash implementable

¿Cómo saber qué políticas públicas generan mayor bienestar? Aplicación en el sector salud de un modelo para la evaluación de políticas públicas en Nicaragua

El estudio presenta paso a paso la aplicación en el sector salud del modelo Cerda- Torche (2005), una metodología para la evaluación de políticas públicas a través de la valoración de los beneficios sociales derivados de la reducción en las tasas de mortalidad. Dicha metodología puede ser aplicada a cualquier sector para evaluar el impacto social de la ejecución de políticas, programas o proyectos y de esta forma reorientar eficazmente los recursos económicos del gobierno. El valor económico de la vida se determina a través de un modelo intertemporal en el que los agentes maximizan sus patrones de consumo y ocio sujetos a una restricción presupuestaria en la que se puede acumular activos a lo largo del ciclo de vida, en ausencia de mercados completos y enfrentando probabilidades exógenas de supervivencia. Este modelo se calibra con datos de la economía nicaragüense durante 2008 y simulaciones a través de modificaciones paramétricas que permiten determinar los beneficios sociales provocados por la reducción de las tasas de mortalidad de las primeras seis causas de muerte en Nicaragua en 2008

Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities

We consider marriage markets with externalities. We focus on weak externalities, that is, markets in which each agent is primarily concerned about her partner. We formalize and prove the claim that weak externalities are not so significant in the marriage market: in this case, the ω-core and the α-core coincide and are both nonempty. In addition, we show that, if we allow agents to block matchings without changing their mate, the results do not longer hold