Locke's Answer to Molyneux's Thought Experiment

Philosophical discussions of Molyneux's problem within contemporary philosophy of mind tend to characterize the problem as primarily concerned with the role innately known principles, amodal spatial concepts, and rational cognitive faculties play in our perceptual lives. Indeed, for broadly similar reasons, rationalists have generally advocated an affirmative answer, while empiricists have generally advocated a negative one, to the question Molyneux posed after presenting his famous thought experiment. This historical characterization of the dialectic, however, somewhat obscures the role Molyneux's problem has played in spawning debates within the empiricist tradition. Fortunately, the differences between various empiricist accounts have been widely recognized and discussed among historians of philosophy working on the topic. The focus of the present essay is to develop an interpretation of John Locke's views on Molyneux's problem that best coheres with his other views on human understanding as well as with the predominant scientific opinion about the nature of perception during the period in which he lived

Modularist explanations of experience and other illusions

Debates about modularity invariably involve a crucial premise about how visual illusions are experienced. This paper argues that these debates are wrongheaded, and that experience of illusions is orthogonal to the core issue of the modularity hypothesis: informational encapsulation

Intrinsic alignments of group and cluster galaxies in photometric surveys

Intrinsic alignments of galaxies have been shown to contaminate weak gravitational lensing observables on linear scales, $r>$ 10 $h^{-1}$Mpc, but studies of alignments in the non-linear regime have thus far been inconclusive. We present an estimator for extracting the intrinsic alignment signal of galaxies around stacked clusters of galaxies from multiband imaging data. Our estimator removes the contamination caused by galaxies that are gravitationally lensed by the clusters and scattered in redshift space due to photometric redshift uncertainties. It uses posterior probability distributions for the redshifts of the galaxies in the sample and it is easily extended to obtain the weak gravitational lensing signal while removing the intrinsic alignment contamination. We apply this algorithm to groups and clusters of galaxies identified in the Sloan Digital Sky Survey `Stripe 82' coadded imaging data over $\sim 150$ deg$^2$. We find that the intrinsic alignment signal around stacked clusters in the redshift range $0.1<z<0.4$ is consistent with zero. In terms of the tidal alignment model of Catelan et al. (2001), we set joint constraints on the strength of the alignment and the bias of the lensing groups and clusters on scales between 0.1 and $10\,h^{-1}$ Mpc, $b_LC_1\rho_{\rm crit} = -2_{-14}^{+14} \times 10^{-4}$. This constrains the contamination fraction of alignment to lensing signal to the range between $[-18,23]$ per cent below scales of 1 $h^{-1}$ Mpc at 95 per cent confidence level, and this result depends on our photometric redshift quality and selection criteria used to identify background galaxies. Our results are robust to the choice of photometric band in which the shapes are measured ($i$ and $r$) and to centring on the Brightest Cluster Galaxy or on the geometrical centre of the clusters.Comment: 30 pages, 16 figures, published in MNRA

Can resources save rationality? ‘Anti-Bayesian’ updating in cognition and perception

Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should? We present two phenomena — belief polarization and the size-weight illusion — that are not obviously explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them

Troubles with Bayesianism: An introduction to the psychological immune system

A Bayesian mind is, at its core, a rational mind. Bayesianism is thus well-suited to predict and explain mental processes that best exemplify our ability to be rational. However, evidence from belief acquisition and change appears to show that we do not acquire and update information in a Bayesian way. Instead, the principles of belief acquisition and updating seem grounded in maintaining a psychological immune system rather than in approximating a Bayesian processor

Seeing in the dark – I. Multi-epoch alchemy

Weak lensing by large-scale structure is an invaluable cosmological tool given that most of the energy density of the concordance cosmology is invisible. Several large ground-based imaging surveys will attempt to measure this effect over the coming decade, but reliable control of the spurious lensing signal introduced by atmospheric turbulence and telescope optics remains a challenging problem. We address this challenge with a demonstration that point spread function (PSF) effects on measured galaxy shapes in the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS) can be corrected with existing analysis techniques. In this work, we co-add existing SDSS imaging on the equatorial stripe in order to build a data set with the statistical power to measure cosmic shear, while using a rounding kernel method to null out the effects of the anisotropic PSF. We build a galaxy catalogue from the combined imaging, characterize its photometric properties and show that the spurious shear remaining in this catalogue after the PSF correction is negligible compared to the expected cosmic shear signal. We identify a new source of systematic error in the shear–shear autocorrelations arising from selection biases related to masking. Finally, we discuss the circumstances in which this method is expected to be useful for upcoming ground-based surveys that have lensing as one of the science goals, and identify the systematic errors that can reduce its efficacy

The Architecture of Belief: An Essay on the Unbearable Automaticity of Believing

People cannot contemplate a proposition without believing that proposition. A model of belief fixation is sketched and used to explain hitherto disparate, recalcitrant, and somewhat mysterious psychological phenomena and philosophical paradoxes. Toward this end I also contend that our intuitive understanding of the workings of introspection is mistaken. In particular, I argue that propositional attitudes are beyond the grasp of our introspective capacities. We learn about our beliefs from observing our behavior, not from introspecting our stock beliefs. The model of belief fixation offered in the dissertation poses a novel dilemma for theories of rationality. One might have thought that the ability to contemplate ideas while withholding assent is a necessary condition on rationality. In short, it seems that rational creatures shouldn‘t just form their beliefs based on whatever they happen to think. However, it seems that we are creatures that automatically and reflexively form our beliefs based on whatever propositions we happen to consider. Thus, either the rational requirement that states that we must have evidence for our beliefs must be jettisoned or we must accept the conclusion that we are necessarily irrational

Seeing in the dark – II. Cosmic shear in the Sloan Digital Sky Survey

Statistical weak lensing by large-scale structure – cosmic shear – is a promising cosmological tool, which has motivated the design of several large upcoming surveys. Here, we present a measurement of cosmic shear using co-added Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS) imaging in 168 square degrees of the equatorial region, with r < 23.5 and i < 22.5, a source number density of 2.2 per arcmin^2 and mean redshift of z_(med) = 0.52. These co-adds were generated using a new method described in the companion Paper I that was intended to minimize systematic errors in the lensing measurement due to coherent point spread function anisotropies that are otherwise prevalent in the SDSS imaging data. We present measurements of cosmic shear out to angular separations of 2°, along with systematics tests that (combined with those from Paper I on the catalogue generation) demonstrate that our results are dominated by statistical rather than systematic errors. Assuming a cosmological model corresponding to Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe 7(WMAP7) and allowing only the amplitude of matter fluctuations σ_8 to vary, we find a best-fitting value of σ_8=0.636^(+0.109)_(−0.154) (1σ); without systematic errors this would be σ_8=0.636^(+0.099)_(−0.137) (1σ). Assuming a flat Λ cold dark matter model, the combined constraints with WMAP7 are σ_8=0.784^(+0.028)_(−0.026)(1σ)^(+0.055)_(−0.054)(2σ) and Ω_mh^2=0.1303^(+0.0047)_(−0.0048)(1σ)^(+0.009)_(−0.009)(2σ); the 2σ error ranges are, respectively, 14 and 17 per cent smaller than WMAP7 alone