The dynamics of the contemporary supreme constitution viewed in light of pre- and early modern views of supremacy of the law and popular sovereignty

Constitutional supremacy – the contemporary refined form of the supremacy of the law – is the foundation upon which present supreme constitutions such as that of the United States of America and South Africa are based. Nevertheless, we find the opposite principle, namely that of popular sovereignty also featuring prominently in these constitutions. According to the doctrine underpinning the supreme constitution, the tension between the two is decisively resolved in favour of the supremacy of the law (and the constitution). However, there is a growing critical literature which questions whether the supremacy principle is actually predominant. It is argued, for example, that the most important changes to supreme constitutions result from dominant forces within the populus, beyond the amendment provisions of these constitutions. This literature underscores the need to revisit the relationship between legal supremacy and popular sovereignty. This article enquires into this question, more specifically with reference to the possible insights that might be gained from certain trends in the pre-modern and early modern thinking regarding the relationship between these two principles. The inquiry shows that the conceptions of legal supremacy and popular sovereignty were unified into one single harmonious constitutional theory. This article describes and explains this erstwhile union. It is concluded that popular sovereignty in the form of communal custom, or more correctly, the customs and practices of the dominant forces within the populus, were the active driving force of pre-modern constitutionalism. This is informative for present constitutional theory as it explains why the dominant forces within the populus so decisively determine the fate of the supreme constitution.http://www.lexisnexis.co.zaam2016Public La

Constitutional perspectives on the judgments of the Labour Appeal Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Solidarity (acting on behalf of Barnard) v South African Police Services

Save for a possible appeal to the Constitutional Court, the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Solidarity (acting on behalf of Barnard) v South African Police Services (Vereniging van Regslui vir Afrikaans amicus curiae) (Case number 165/2013 delivered on 28 November 2013) has brought to a close a legal battle of more than eight years between Captain Renate Barnard and the South African Police Services (SAPS) on Barnard's promotion to the rank of superintendent. The saga surrounding Barnard's promotion began in 2005. It went through the internal grievance procedure, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), the Labour Court (LC) and then the Labour Appeal Court (LAC). Barnard was successful in the LC (Solidarity abo Barnard v SAPS 2010 (10) BCLR 1094 (LC)) but on appeal by the SAPS to the LAC in South African Police Services v Solidarity abo Barnard (2013 (3) BCLR 320 (LAC)) she was unsuccessful. The judgment of the SCA was on appeal from a ruling of the LAC.http://www.dejure.up.ac.za/am201

Anderkant verstaatlikte konstitusionalisme

Openbare regeringsgesag, wat binne ʼn konstitusionele orde uitgeoefen word, is ʼn deurlopende essensie van die politiek en die konstitusionele reg. Die huidige territoriale staat, waarin ons ons tans bevind, is bloot een van verskeie verskyningsvorme waarbinne openbare gesag uitgeoefen word.1 Dit is nie permanent nie. Ingelui deur Engeland en Frankryk het die territoriale staat ʼn duidelik aanduibare ontstaan gedurende die sestiende en sewentiende eeue beleef en as historiese verskynsel is dit onvermydelik bestem om ook tot ’n einde te kom. Diegene wat met die territoriale staat omgaan asof dit bykans a-histories en tydloos is, kan hulself gerus daaraan herinner dat selfs Thomas Hobbes wat die magtige Leviatan in goddelike terme beskryf het, darem begryp het dat dié god oplaas ʼn tydelike – sterflike – god is.http://www.journals.co.za/content/journal/akgeeshttp://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0041-4751&lng=enam2017Public La

Deliberating the rule of law and constitutional supremacy from the perspective of the factual dimension of law

This discussion critiques the generally accepted doctrine of the rule of law and constitutional supremacy prevalent in contemporary constitutional states, including the doctrine as conceived in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The critique proceeds from the view that law, more specifically positive law is essentially two-dimensional. On the one hand there is the dimension of justice; that is, law's justice, moral or critical dimension (and requisite). On the other hand there is law's factual dimension (and requisite). Both of these dimensions are essential for an individual norm to qualify as a norm of positive law. By the same token, on a comprehensive basis both dimensions are also essential requisites for a system of law to be in place. A clear understanding of the two-dimensionality of law provides the basis for the critique presented in the present discussion, which is focussed upon the factual dimension of law. It will be pointed out that the leading doctrine on the rule of law and constitutional supremacy prevalent in contemporary constitutional states is premised on a failure to account for the factual dimension; and that the doctrine in consequence obscures a clear insight into the factual dimension of law, and therefore obscures a clear understanding of the nature and content of (positive) law, including the constitution.http://www.nwu.ac.za/p-per/index.htmlhb201

To what extent should the convention of cabinet secrecy still be recognised in South African constitutional law?

This note deals with the question whether, under the present-day South African constitutional law, members of the public are entitled to any information held by cabinet (the national executive). This question is considered with specific reference to the law of comparative jurisdictions. Two competing principles must be considered: on the one hand, the constitutional right of access to information held by the state (cabinet information in the present case) and, on the other hand, the convention of cabinet secrecy. The latter originated in English constitutional law, which might be argued to have been inherited by South Africa.http://www.dejure.up.ac.za/hb2016Public La

Language deterioration with specific reference to the ideologies and practices of statism

It is argued in this article that the ideology of statism has been playing a major part in the accelerated rate of the deterioration and extinction of languages. Beginning with some general observations on the reason for language deterioration and extinction the emphasis subsequently shifts to the ideology of statism as a major factor determining the fate of minority languages. Statism refers to the territorial state with its single largely industrialised economy spanning the territory of the whole state and organised in terms of its own distinctive statist ideology, that reinforces and justifies a state-wide homogeneous nation and the monolingualism of a single dominant (state) language to the detriment of all other (minority) languages. The statist ideology might be slanting to the left, the right or the liberal centre but it always acts in defence and in support of the homogenising monolingual territorial state. The statist ideology and the dictates of the industrialised economy are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, both working towards the homogenisations and monolingualism of the territorial state. Statism harks back to the consolidation of the modern territorial state in England and France in the sixteenth century, soon followed by the other European territorial states and thereafter in the rest of the world. The advent of the first territorial states was accompanied with the emergence of large scale industrial homogenising economies in the place of the erstwhile localised agrarian economies. In discussing the homogenising and particularly monolingual consequences of the state-wide industrial economy the elucidating insights of Ernst Gellner are discussed in some detail. The ideology of statism comes in a variety of mutations spanning the entire ideological spectrum from left to right, however consistently having the same homogenising goal and effect also as far as language is concerned. All these ideologies, regardless of how divergent they are, are in the final analysis species of the same larger genus, namely the ideology of statism. In dealing with these species the French position with a more specific emphasis on the Jacobin and nationalist policies in relation to languages since the French Revolution is first dealt with. This is followed by an assessment of the position of language in terms of the right-wing nationalist approach in Spain which reached its zenith under the dictatorship of Franco. Thereafter the approach to language in Britain is discussed with reference to the impact of Anglicisation upon the Celtic languages of the British Isles. This approach was at least in part founded upon and received further momentum in the convictions articulated by some of the foremost liberal political theorists such as John Stuart Mill. The American approach – seemingly the purist liberal one – is then discussed with reference to the impact of monoculturalism on the minority languages of the United States. Subesequently, the focus shifts to the other extreme of the ideological spectrum when the Leftist approach to language with reference to Marx and Engels is assessed. The discussion reveals that the approaches in relation to languages were, if not in theoretical design, then most certainly in purpose and effect essentially the same in terms of all these ideological positions irrespective of the ideological orientations of their authors. What all of these approaches share – whether pursued from the left, right or the liberal centre – is the statist ideology which serves as the common foundation for all of them. The conclusion drawn from this is that smaller languages, that is, languages with minoritised linguistic communities stand in the way of an encompassing collection of modern ideologies that share the common ideological matrix of statism. Smaller languages and their communities are therefore imperilled by the broadly encompassing ideology of statism and not merely by an ideological assault forthcoming from a right-wing, left-wing or similarly distinctive ideology that occupies a specific position on the ideological spectrum. It is this encompassing challenge of statism that smaller linguistic communities need to overcome.In hierdie artikel word aangevoer dat verstaatliking in die moderne tydperk die belangrikste oorsaak vir die verdwyning van tale is. Verstaatliking verwys eerstens na die omvangryke territoriale staat, waarin ’n bepaalde dominante elite neig om sy eie karakter en identiteit aan die staat as sodanig toe te dig en van alle ander gemeenskappe (in ’n nie-oorheersende posisie) vereis om hulself in hierdie staatlike identiteit op te los. Tweedens verwys dit na die moderne industriële ekonomie, wat ’n sterk homogeniserende krag is wat eentaligheid in die hand werk. Derdens verwys dit na die ideologie van verstaatliking wat regverdiging vir die homogeniserende staat verskaf. Opvallend van die ideologie van verstaatliking is dat dit omvattend is en in verskeie verskyningsvorme oral oor die spektrum van die ideologiese skaal manifesteer. Dit sluit regse nasionalisme, Jakobinisme, tendense van die liberale politiek asook die linkse sosialisme in. In weerwil van die oënskynlik beduidende verskille tussen hierdie ideologieë en bypassende praktyke, wat oor die afgelope eeue van die belangrikste kragte in die politiek was, is hulle veranker in ’n enkele gemeenskaplike ideologiese matriks, naamlik dié van verstaatliking. Ofskoon daar ’n groeiende tendens in sowel die politieke denke as staatsregtelike praktyk is om minderheidsgemeenskappe met hulle eiesoortige kulturele bates (soos hulle tale) op ’n demokratiese wyse te akkommodeer, het die ideologie van verstaatliking nog lank nie sy houvas verloor nie en hou dit steeds ’n enorme bedreiging vir die voortbestaan van minderheidstale tale en minderheidsgemeenskappe in.http://www.journals.co.za/ej/ejour_akgees.htmlam201

Decided correctly within the parameters of essentially irrelevant law

In Lourens v Speaker of the National Assembly 2015 1 SA 618 (EqC) the court held that the practice not to publish all national legislation in all eleven official languages is not constitutionally offensive, more specifically that it does not constitute unfair discrimination incompatible with section 9 of the Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. The court accepted in favour of the applicant that the practice not to publish all legislation in all official languages constitutes discrimination on the basis of language, but found the evidence tendered on behalf of the first respondent convincing enough to rebut the presumption of unfairness (of the discrimination) and therefore it is not unconstitutional.http://www.litnet.co.za/Category/akademies/litnet-akademieshttp://reference.sabinet.co.za/sa_epublication/litnet?am201

Heerskappy van die reg teenoor desisionisme in die Suid-Afrikaanse grondwetlike diskoers

Die heerskappy van die reg (rule of law) is een van die grondliggende waardes van die Suid-Afrikaanse grondwetlike orde. Saam met ’n aantal ander waardes wat in artikel 1 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid- Afrika van 1996 vervat is, omskryf dit die eenstemmige waardekompleks waarop die huidige grondwetlike orde berus. Hierdie bydrae ontleed onlangse gebeure in die Suid-Afrikaanse grondwetlike diskoers, meer bepaald: (1) die omstredenheid rondom die Regterlike Dienskommissie se hantering van die klagtes van die regters van die Konstitusionele Hof teen regterpresident John Hlophe en (2) die president se verlenging van die ampstermyn van die vorige hoofregter kragtens ’n ongrondwetlike wetsbepaling. Daar word geargumenteer dat die omstredenheid te wyte is aan twee onversoenbare denkbeelde oor die heerskappy van die reg. Die een is die klassieke konsep van oppergesag van die reg, wat op die beginsel van legaliteit gegrond is, en die ander, hier desisionisme genoem, is gegrond op ’n “norm” van die “beste” besluit in die omstandighede. Hierdie diepliggende verskil spruit voort uit twee uiteenlopende (regs)kulture. Die een het ’n skriftuurlike grondslag en is geanker in ’n soewereine corpus van reg teenoor die ander een wat mondeling en teenswoordig-gesentreerd is en wat nie met die idee van ’n soewereine corpus van reg soos dit eeue lank in veral die Westerse regskultuur bestaan, bekend is nie.http://www.dejure.up.ac.za/am2013ai201

An assessment of the forces impacting on the meaning and outcome of the discretionary official language clause of the South African Constitution

In ’n bydrae in SA Publiekreg/SA Public Law (ter perse) is uiteengesit dat die taalbepalings, hierna “die taalklousule” genoem, vervat in artikel 6 van die Suid-Afrikaanse grondwet ’n sterk diskresionêre karakter het. Die gesaghebbende interpreterende gemeenskap van hierdie bepaling, wat hoofsaaklik kom vanuit die huidige toonaangewende Afronasionalistiese stroming in Suid-Afrika, het derhalwe aansienlike beweegruimte om by wyse van hulle besondere vertolking van hierdie klousule konkrete inhoud daaraan te verleen. Teen hierdie agtergrond is dit van groot belang om te bepaal wat die sosiopolitieke kragte is wat in daardie geledere werksaam is en wat gevolglik die konkrete inhoud van die bepaling via die interpretasie daarvan bepaal. In hierdie ondersoek word aangetoon dat dieselfde kragte wat in Suid-Afrika werksaam is, eweneens elders in Afrika aan die werk is. Die belangrikste van hierdie kragte word vervolgens geïdentifiseer en ontleed. Daar word in die besonder op vier hiervan gefokus: die kunsmatigheid van die staat in Afrika; die aard van politieke bewussyn in Afrika in samehang met die aard van Afrika-nasionalismes; die populêre oortuiging dat Engels (en die ander koloniale tale), anders as die inheemse tale, die weg baan om ekonomiese en sosiale aspirasies te verwesenlik, en gevolglik ook as voertaal in die onderwys verkies word; en laastens, dat die Afrikatale distansiërend met premoderniteit verbind word teenoor Engels (en die ander koloniale tale) wat vereenselwigend met modernisering en vooruitgang verbind word. Al vier hierdie kragte werk sterk ten gunste van Engels en verengelsing, en teen die Afrikatale. Indien die Suid-Afrikaanse grondwet oor ’n taalklousule beskik het wat in besonderhede uiteengesit het op welke wyse die inheemse tale hanteer en bevorder moet word, kon dit ’n belangrike rol gespeel het om hierdie tale te ondersteun en verengelsing teen te werk. Die diskresionêre taalklousule het egter juis die teenoorgestelde uitwerking deur as’t ware die werking van hierdie kragte aan te help in plaas daarvan om dit te verswak.Section 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the official language clause) provides for eleven official languages. It then proceeds to create what on a proper analysis amounts to a broad discretion for organs of state in relation to the actual treatment of the official languages. (This aspect is fully explored in an article “The discretionary nature of the official language clause”, SA Public Law / Publiekreg 2011, forthcoming). The way in which this discretion has been exercised (in conjunction with some other factors) has decisively steered South Africa in the direction of an official English monolingual state in all domains of official language use. The question which this article seeks to answer is why this has been happening. To answer the question one needs to identify the forces that are causing organs of state to exercise their discretion in this monolingual English fashion. The discretionary official language clause has created space for these forces to determine the actual content of the official language dispensation in South Africa. The same forces have also exerted a similar influence elsewhere in African continent. The foremost of these forces are identified and assessed.http://www.litnet.co.za/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news&cat=201&cause_id=127

Toepaslikheid en ontoepaslikheid van ubuntu in die staatsreg – intergemeenskapsbetrekkinge teenoor openbare ampsbekleding

In hierdie artikel word aangevoer dat ubuntu in bepaalde kontekste in die staatsreg van besondere waarde kan wees, maar dat die toepaslikheid daarvan op ander gebiede onder verdenking is. Wat die toepaslikheid daarvan betref, word geredeneer dat daar ’n korpus van reg, genaamd die reg van inter-gemeenskapsbetrekkinge aan die ontwikkel is. Die grondslag hiervan is in die wesensaard van die staat self. Op die keper beskou is die staat die beliggaming van, en waarborg vir die openbare vrede (of behoort dit ten minste so te wees). Die openbare vrede is op sy beurt afhanklik van die instandhouding van gesonde betrekkinge tussen gemeenskappe, by gebreke waarvan die veiligheid van die gemeenskappe in die gedrang kom en die stabiliteit, en trouens die voortbestaan van die staat self, in die gedrang kom. In die bespreking word met verwysing na die beskouing in Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak oor ubuntu aangevoer dat ubuntu saam met die verbod op haatspraak en dergelike verbiedinge wat die openbare vrede kan ontwrig, sowel as die internasionale reg rakende volksmoord en verwante internasionale misdade, die ontluikende reg van intergemeenskapsbetrekkinge, beliggaam. Daarenteen kan ubuntu egter treffend ontoepaslik wees naamlik op die gebied van openbare ampsbekleding. Die kernvraag by openbare ampsbekleding is of die ampsbekleër vir die openbare amp waarin sy/haar aangestel is, geskik is en die pligte wat met die amp vereenselwig word, soos dit in die toepaslike reg beskryf word, getrou (kan) uitvoer. Openbare ampsbekleding hang juis nie primêr van die persoonlike verhoudings van die ampsbekleër met die publiek of met die hoofde of ondersgeskiktes van die ampsbekleër af nie. Inteendeel, warm verhoudings kan juis verkeerdelik voortspruit uit oorwegings wat allermins met die betrokke amp vereenselwigbaar is. Dit kan voorkom omdat die kunsmatige identiteit van openbare ampsbekleding met vermeende ubuntugeïnspireerde knusse betrekkinge wat niks met die nakoming van openbare ampspligte te doen het nie, verwar word. Om hierdie rede is die aanwending van ubuntu-geïnspireerde goeie verhoudings in die konteks van openbare ampsbekding bevraagtekenbaar.The value of ubuntu, among other things encapsulating the notions of humaneness, human dignity, reconciliation, group solidarity, compassion, the establishment and the maintenance of warm relations and restorative justice is autochthonous to South African law, more in particular South African constitutional law. Lately it has come to play an increasingly important part in South African constitutional jurisprudence. It is not possible to measure exactly how prominent the place is that ubuntu occupies in the public order and in the public service. However, judging by the Constitutional Court, who observed that the spirit of ubuntu is part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population,1 ubuntu might be far more important than one might generally tend to assume. This article assesses the relevance or otherwise of ubuntu in constitutional law. The discussion proceeds from the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on ubuntu, thus beginning in section 2 with an overview of the judicial pronouncements on ubuntu. This discussion casts light on the definition and the field of application of ubuntu as viewed by the courts. There is a corpus of South African academic literature on ubuntu.2 In this corpus ubuntu is generally very favourably viewed. However, there is also stinging critique against ubuntu as for example in the thoroughly researched article by Ilze Keevy, who argues that ubuntu is fundamentally at odds with the values of equality and tolerance as endorsed by the South African constitution.3 Moreover, even those who generally praised ubuntu as a lofty ethicallegal value complex, encounter serious difficulties in their attempts to offer a workable core-definition of ubuntu.4 Moreover, some attempts to define ubuntu were to my mind so airy-fairy that they fail to communicate anything of value about ubuntu.5 For that reason, but for a few exceptions such as the discussion by Bilchitz, the academic commentary is mainly left aside in this article. The focus instead is on ubuntu as assessed by the courts. In the next two sections of the article the rightful place that ubuntu should occupy in constitutional law is considered. Hence, if there is a place for ubuntu, as the affirming dicta of the courts clearly suggest, the question is how to delineate the boundaries of its applicability, and how to clarify where ubuntu should have a place and a role and where not. It is argued in section 3, and this leads to the first conclusion, that ubuntu could be relevant and even of crucial importance in the sphere of inter-communal relations and for the maintenance of inter-communal peace, which is an essential condition for the very existence and survival of the state. In this context ubuntu may be playing an important part in what is here termed (an emerging) law of inter-communal relations, which is in fact a core issue of constitutional law and for the well-being of the state. However, in section 4 it is argued that there is a field of constitutional law where it would be inappropriate to allow ubuntu to play any part. This is in the context of certain aspects of public office-bearing, which is an essential aspect of constitutional law and on which the existence and well-being of the state depends. To allow ubuntu to play any part in this context could arguably be to the detriment of the state.http://www.dejure.up.ac.za/hb201