Numerical static analysis of the curtain wall with light steel structure

This paper presents a numerical analysis of the effect of wind on the curtain wall in a high building. Two types of curtain wall were adopted: made of thin-wall C sections with nominal dimensions and the section that takes into consideration lower limits specified by the manufacturer

Quantum Geometry Phenomenology: Angle and Semiclassical States

The phenomenology for the deep spatial geometry of loop quantum gravity is discussed. In the context of a simple model of an atom of space, it is shown how purely combinatorial structures can affect observations. The angle operator is used to develop a model of angular corrections to local, continuum flat-space 3-geometries. The physical effects involve neither breaking of local Lorentz invariance nor Planck scale suppression, but rather reply on only the combinatorics of SU(2) recouping theory. Bhabha scattering is discussed as an example of how the effects might be observationally accessible.Comment: 5 pages, slightly extended version of the contribution to the Loops'11 conference proceeding

George Fox: The Red-Hot Quaker

Excerpt from Introduction: The story of George Fox\u27s life suffers from two great disadvantages which the reader should always bear in mind. In the first place, the old, strange, stilted language, used by all in his day, makes it difficult for us to feel as much at home with him as we should do. We must remember that even Salvationists in our own days are tempted when they write to give up their simple, everyday language, and to wrap up their thoughts more fashionably. But those who will try to see George Fox, as he so often was to be found, praising the Lord in a stinking prison cell, will be able in spite of his strange words to grasp his glorious meaning. And then we have also to remind ourselves that he had little chance either to observe or to organize any regular and effective warfare. For over a hundred years England had been victimized by religious discussions until the very idea of real worship had been almost lost. No wonder at poor George\u27s perplexities when his hungry soul began to long for God, and\u27 no wonder that the great note of his whole life thereafter was so largely that of avoiding whatever others did. If he could anywhere have seen how singing processions, flags, music, open-air demonstrations could be used in the power of the Holy Ghost to the salvation of the people; and if he could have been allowed to organize accordingly, all England would have been stirred and perhaps delivered at once from the curses of formalism and spiritual death. But it may be that God only granted him light according to what it was then possible to do. He lived a prophet\u27s life leaving to us in these days of liberty, not a complete description of our duties, but an example of fearless, devoted service, that, alas, but few have ever attempted to follow.https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/quakerbooks/1061/thumbnail.jp

Information sharing among banks about borrowers: What type would they support?

I address the following issue in this paper: how does information sharing among banks about borrowers affect banks' competition, and ultimately, the interest rate borrowers pay for the loan they take? One would expect that full information sharing among banks reduces lenders' risk and results in lower lending rates than any other arrangement. This may be the reason why regulators of the banking industry would like to see full information sharing in most countries. I shall show below that the regulators' expectation is usually not fulfilled. Full information sharing will result in higher lending rates than any other form of information sharing under fairly general conditions. Despite its lucrative features, banks are not always keen on supporting full information sharing. Information sharing only about bad borrowers is the fully rational banks' dominant strategy if the proportion of bad borrowers is substantial. Myopic banks would opt for no information sharing if the proportion of bad borrowers is large. Fully rational banks would only choose full information sharing if the share of bad borrowers is small. Borrowers with good credit records, on the other hand, would prefer information sharing only about bad customers rather than full or no information sharing, for they pay lower interest rates under a black list than with any other form of information sharing or with no information sharing