Navigating Central Path with Electrical Flows: from Flows to Matchings, and Back

We present an $\tilde{O}(m^{10/7})=\tilde{O}(m^{1.43})$-time algorithm for the maximum s-t flow and the minimum s-t cut problems in directed graphs with unit capacities. This is the first improvement over the sparse-graph case of the long-standing $O(m \min(\sqrt{m},n^{2/3}))$ time bound due to Even and Tarjan [EvenT75]. By well-known reductions, this also establishes an $\tilde{O}(m^{10/7})$-time algorithm for the maximum-cardinality bipartite matching problem. That, in turn, gives an improvement over the celebrated celebrated $O(m \sqrt{n})$ time bound of Hopcroft and Karp [HK73] whenever the input graph is sufficiently sparse

Faster generation of random spanning trees

In this paper, we set forth a new algorithm for generating approximately uniformly random spanning trees in undirected graphs. We show how to sample from a distribution that is within a multiplicative $(1+\delta)$ of uniform in expected time \TO(m\sqrt{n}\log 1/\delta). This improves the sparse graph case of the best previously known worst-case bound of $O(\min \{mn, n^{2.376}\})$, which has stood for twenty years. To achieve this goal, we exploit the connection between random walks on graphs and electrical networks, and we use this to introduce a new approach to the problem that integrates discrete random walk-based techniques with continuous linear algebraic methods. We believe that our use of electrical networks and sparse linear system solvers in conjunction with random walks and combinatorial partitioning techniques is a useful paradigm that will find further applications in algorithmic graph theory

Spectral Signatures in Backdoor Attacks

A recent line of work has uncovered a new form of data poisoning: so-called \emph{backdoor} attacks. These attacks are particularly dangerous because they do not affect a network's behavior on typical, benign data. Rather, the network only deviates from its expected output when triggered by a perturbation planted by an adversary. In this paper, we identify a new property of all known backdoor attacks, which we call \emph{spectral signatures}. This property allows us to utilize tools from robust statistics to thwart the attacks. We demonstrate the efficacy of these signatures in detecting and removing poisoned examples on real image sets and state of the art neural network architectures. We believe that understanding spectral signatures is a crucial first step towards designing ML systems secure against such backdoor attacksComment: 16 pages, accepted to NIPS 201