Despite party pressures, House members’ support for their leadership in procedural votes is not guaranteed

Control of the floor agenda in the U.S. House of Representatives is integral if the majority party wishes to achieve its political and electoral aims. In new research, Jamie L. Carson, Michael H. Crespin, and Anthony J. Madonna find that parties will call on their members’ support during important procedural votes – which influence what is discussed, and the scope and length of the debate – when it is unlikely that voters will punish members for their support. However, despite these party pressures, members’ support is not guaranteed – more moderate and conservative members are less likely to support the leadership when requested

If the next president wants to put an ideologue on the Supreme Court, they will have to sacrifice their initial domestic policy goals.

One of the first tasks for the new president this January – whoever they may be – could be to nominate a new justice to the Supreme Court. But how should the next president go about this? In new research, Anthony J. Madonna, James E. Monogan III, and Richard L. Vining, Jr. find that the more a president supports a particular Supreme Court nominee, the lower the chance that they can get a major new policy initiative through the Senate. If the new president wishes to focus on achieving their policy goals in their first 150 days, they argue, they should compromise by appointing a moderate to the Supreme Court, rather than an ideologue

Ideology, Qualifications, and Covert Senate Obstruction of Federal Court Nominations

Scholars, policymakers, and journalists have bemoaned the emphasis on ideology over qualifications and party over performance in the judicial appointment process. Though, for years, the acrimony between the two parties and between the Senate and President remained limited to appointments to the United States Supreme Court, the modern era of judicial appointments has seen the so-called “appointments rigor mortis” spread throughout all levels of judicial appointments. A host of studies have examined the causes and consequences of the growing acrimony and obstruction of lower federal court appointments, but few rely on archival data and empirical evidence to examine the underlying friction between the parties and the two branches. In a unique study, the authors examine archival data to determine the conditions under which Senators obstruct judicial nominations to lower federal courts. More specifically, the authors examine one form of Senate obstruction — the blue slip — and find that Senators use their blue slips to block ideologically distant nominees as well as unqualified nominees. More importantly, however, the authors find that among nominations to federal circuit courts, Senators block highly qualified nominees who are ideologically distant from them just as often as they block unqualified nominees who are ideologically distant from them. That is, stellar qualifications do not appear to mitigate the negative effects of ideological distance. The fact that blue slips occur in private, away from public view, allows Senators to block nominees entirely on ideological grounds, without fear of individualized public retribution. Senators, in short, have taken an aggressive role in blocking highly qualified nominees who would otherwise make significant — but opposing — policy and who might one day become credible nominees to the Supreme Court were their nominations to move forward. By killing these nominations in the cradle, and outside the public view, Senators can block or delay the confirmation of judges with whom they disagree ideologically. The authors point out that policymakers and scholars who seek to reform the judicial appointment process must therefore be very clear about their goals. If a reform’s goal is to minimize the role of Senate ideology in the appointment process, then proposals that insulate the process from the public eye are likely to backfire. For, as the data show, Senators take advantage of insulation to achieve ideological goals. On the other hand, if a reform’s goal is to maximize the role of Senate ideology — perhaps to offset the President’s first mover advantage or to recognize and directly address the fact that courts are policymaking bodies — then proposals that insulate the process from the public eye are likely to accomplish that goal

Confirmation Wars, Legislative Time, and Collateral Damage: Assessing the Impact of Supreme Court Nominations on Presidential Success in the U.S. Senate

This page includes four datasets to replication duration models of presidential success on policy proposals and judicial nominations in the U.S. Senate. All four files contain monthly information about whether the nomination or proposal passed in the given month, along with several covariates. The two policy datasets are for "important" and "routine" legislative proposals from 1967-2010. The two nomination datasets are for circuit and district court nominees