To Serve the Cause of Justice: Disciplining Fact Determination

As a part of a larger project called The Challenge of Change: Rethinking Law as Discipline, the authors seek to identify and examine current challenges to the conceptual underpinnings and methodology of the traditional legal paradigm. In focusing on the construction of \u27fact, the meanings of knowledge and the interplay between cultural understandings and the law of evidence, the authors note that the shifting boundaries of the discipline of law are engendering debates about what is marginal and what is core. They draw on challenges posed by the increasing diversity of producers and consumers of law in searching for the core idea of what lawyers do in contrast to, for instance, anthropologists, and argue that a core idea of law is to engage in legal reasoning that pays attention to the value of human rights in their broadest sense. In examining methods whereby the knowledge which grounds legal factual determinations can be made consistent with fundamental human rights such as equality and access to justice, the authors draw on a variety of legal topics-Aboriginal rights claims, sexual assault, contracts and self-defence

Models of Market Behaviour and Competition Law: Exclusive Dealing

The paper arose out of the authors\u27 belief that economic principles should, and probably will, play a larger role in the decisions of the new Competition Tribunal. The objective of the paper is to clarify some of the underlying assumptions and choices implicit in the regulation of competitive behaviour by examining the literature on economic analysis of market behaviour written by both economists and lawyers. The authors are especially concerned with the recent emphasis on strategic behaviour and its contrast to the Chicago school approach which recommends less interference with market behaviour. They examine the differences between the assumptions of both models and then consider the implications for the regulation of exclusive dealing. In particular, the authors examine the requirement that competition must be substantially lessened, by developing two different approaches to a rule-of-reason test

Models of Market Behaviour and Competition Law: Exclusive Dealing

The paper arose out of the authors\u27 belief that economic principles should, and probably will, play a larger role in the decisions of the new Competition Tribunal. The objective of the paper is to clarify some of the underlying assumptions and choices implicit in the regulation of competitive behaviour by examining the literature on economic analysis of market behaviour written by both economists and lawyers. The authors are especially concerned with the recent emphasis on strategic behaviour and its contrast to the Chicago school approach which recommends less interference with market behaviour. They examine the differences between the assumptions of both models and then consider the implications for the regulation of exclusive dealing. In particular, the authors examine the requirement that competition must be substantially lessened, by developing two different approaches to a rule-of-reason test

Legal Knowledge For Our Times: Rethinking Legal Knowledge and Legal Education

The essays gathered for this symposium reflect a number of overlapping concerns about contemporary legal knowledge and education. Though they are considerably diverse in focus and subject-matter, ranging from admissions to films to marketing of law faculties, each of these articles addresses aspects of legal education, the construction of legal knowledge and the character of what Ian Duncanson calls the law discipline. Educational practice, knowledge and disciplinarity are thoroughly inter-related. The contributors to this volume are all acutely aware that, as educators and researchers, we both: participate in the construction of legal knowledge (for the readers of learned journals, for our students, for ourselves, occasionally for the media or in representative roles) AND are subjected to constructions and constraints on legal knowledges produced elsewhere (in courts, in legislatures, government ministries, law offices, law societies, in the research of others, in political parties, in the media and the discourses of daily life and, pre-eminently, in radio talk-shows, US television sitcoms and television commercials). In short, we construct legal knowledge, but not entirely under conditions of our own choosing. The construction of legal knowledge is important to us. It affects our lives. In many ways it is our lives