Minding Nature: A Defense of a Sentiocentric Approach to Environmental Ethics

Environmental philosophers allege that philosophical views supporting the animal liberation movement are theoretically and practically inconsistent with environmentalism. While it is true that some animal ethicists argue that we ought to intervene extensively in nature such as the prevention of predation, these views take controversial positions in value theory and normative theory: (i) hedonism as a value theory, and (ii) a view of normativity which places the good before the right, e.g. maximizing utilitarianism, or a rights theory that includes strong positive rights, i.e. animals are entitled to a certain level of welfare or protection from harm. Importantly, environmental philosophers’ critiques mistakenly assume that sentience-based ethics must take these forms. I argue that there are least two angles for progress and reconciliation: (i) countenance values other than pleasure and the absence of pain, such as the value of “free” beings, come what may, or (ii) embrace a view of normativity where, unlike utilitarianism, the right is prior to the good, constraining the scope of obligation from the outset. Together or individually, these angles give shape to a workspace of animal ethical theories amenable to environmentalism. In short, I argue that a sentience-centered notion of moral considerability is correct, that several plausible views about the good and its relation to the right compatible with sentiocentrism can reconcile animal ethics with environmental ethics, and that a sentiocentric ethic constitutes an adequate environmental ethic. If this argumentative arc is on track, it provides a broad justification for the core goals of environmentalism and promises greater consilience between considered judgments about the value of wild animals and the rest of the environment

What the Wild Things Are: A Critique on Clare Palmer’s “What (If Anything) Do We Owe Wild Animals?”

In this critique of “Clare Palmer’s “What (if anything) do we owe wild animals?”, I develop three points. First, I consider the case study which opens her essay and argue that that there are good empirical reasons to think that we should assist domesticated horses and not wild deer. Then, I critique Palmer’s claim that “wildness is not a capacity”, arguing that wildness connotes certain capacities which wild animals generally have and which domesticated animals generally lack. Lastly, I develop what I call the “supererogation problem” against Palmer’s preferred contextualist view, claiming that while the contextualist view doesn’t obligate us to eliminate predators and otherwise redesign nature in the name of wild animal welfare, it may nonetheless allow such interventions. This suggests that the problem with both utilitarian and contextualist views arises from their shared theory of value and not their theory of obligation