Green consumerism and collective action

We analyze the effect of collective action by green/environmentally aware consumers on ambient environmental quality and market equilibrium. We consider a model with two types of consumers who differ in their willingness-to-pay for a good available in two different environmental qualities, and two competing firms: one selling the good of high environmental quality and the other of low environmental quality. We show that collective action by green consumers reduces competition and leads to higher prices for the good of both qualities. Though it improves the ambient environmental quality, it may reduce the welfare of both types of consumers.green consumers, collective action, environmental quality, differentiated duopoly, firm profitability

Vehicle ownership and usage charges

We present a simple model to study the welfare effects of a shift from ownership to usage taxes for cars. We consider a model in which a single representative consumer derives utility from consuming two goods--consumption of motor vehicle kilometers, and an aggregate consumption good treated as numeraire. We characterize the optimal consumption of car kilometers by a representative car user and find that a shift from ownership towards usage taxes is not necessarily welfare-improving: while a revenue-neutral shift makes the representative car user worse off; a utility-neutral shift leads to a significant loss of revenue to the government. An empirical analysis based on Singapore data is also consistent with our theoretical results.Transport externalities Fixed tax Usage tax Variabilization Consumer welfare Revenue loss

Green consumerism and pollution control

10.1016/j.jebo.2015.02.013Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization11427-3