Redistribution and Welfare

The redistribution of welfare following a redistribution of endowments is arbitrary

International Coordination of Environmental Policies and Stability of Global Environmental Agreements

Environmental economics was the subject of a successful research pro-gramme in the 1960s and 1970s. This programme dealt with such a wide range of environmental issues and policy problems that Partha Dasgupta, in a recent survey of the subject [see Dasgupta (1990)], claimed the primary environmental issues are now ‘very cold ’ as topics for analytical investigation, and ‘dead ’ as research problems. The examples provided by Dasgupta, from the foundations of environmen-tal taxes, to the informative characteristics of tradeable emission permits, to the notion of ‘sustainable development’, are certainly appropriate. In the last few years, however, scientists have highlighted a set of ‘new ’ environmental problems- such as ozone layer depletion, global warming, deforestation, the loss of bio-diversity- which share some common features: close links with economic development; intrinsic uncertainty; a pervasive international dimen-sion. These issues require further research and development as they raise new questions, or propose old questions in a new context. Many of these questions derive from the international dimension of environmental pheno-mena, an issue which is interesting both in terms of theory and policy. As a consequence, we think that problems originating from the international dimension of environmental phenomena and policies are neither cold nor dead, but deserve serious analysis which must be integrated with the existing analytical and policy tools. In this paper, we open by reviewing several major environmental 001~2921/92/$05.00 0 1992-Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserve

The structure of international environmental agreements

Since the framework convention of Rio, actual environmental negotiations on climate change aim at inducing all world countries to sign global environmental agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the past unsuccessful attempts, even current negotiations seem to pursue the same objective. This paper shows from a game-theoretic viewpoint that the emergence of agreements signed by all countries is quite unlikely, even in the presence of appropriate and multi-issues negotiation strategies and transfers. Either a single partial agreement or a coalition structure in which regional environmental agreements to control climate change are signed are the most likely outcomes. The paper compares these two cases and argues that regional agreements may increase both countries welfare and environmental quality