84 research outputs found

    Change & Maintaining Change in School Cafeterias: Economic and Behavioral-Economic Approaches to Increasing Fruit and Vegetable Consumption

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    Developing a daily habit of consuming fruits and vegetables (FV) in children is an important public-health goal. Eating habits acquired in childhood are predictive of adolescent and adult dietary patterns. Thus, healthy eating patterns developed early in life can protect the individual against a number of costly health deficits and may reduce the prevalence of obesity. At present, children in the United States (US) under-consume FV despite having access to them through the National School Lunch Program. Because access is an obstacle to developing healthy eating habits, particularly in low-income households, targeting children’s FV consumption in schools has the advantage of near-universal FV availability among more than 30 million US children. This chapter reviews economic and behavioral-economic approaches to increasing FV consumption in schools. Inclusion criteria include objective measurement of FV consumption (e.g., plate waste measures) and minimal demand characteristics. Simple but effective interventions include (a) increasing the variety of vegetables served, (b) serving sliced instead of whole fruits, (c) scheduling lunch after recess, and (d) giving children at least 25 minutes to eat. Improving the taste of FV and short-term incentivizing consumption of gradually increasing amounts can produce large increases in consumption of these foods. Low-cost game-based incentive program may increase the practicality of the latter strategy

    Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case

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    In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or extended unanimity preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (Strategy-proof social choice on single-peaked domains: possibility, impossibility and the space between, 2002), Nehring (Oligarchies in judgment aggregation: a characterization, 2006), Dietrich and List (Soc Choice Welf 29(1):19-33, 2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (J Econ Theory 145(2):495-511, 2010a)
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