Category Theoretic Analysis of Hierarchical Protein Materials and Social Networks

Materials in biology span all the scales from Angstroms to meters and typically consist of complex hierarchical assemblies of simple building blocks. Here we describe an application of category theory to describe structural and resulting functional properties of biological protein materials by developing so-called ologs. An olog is like a “concept web” or “semantic network” except that it follows a rigorous mathematical formulation based on category theory. This key difference ensures that an olog is unambiguous, highly adaptable to evolution and change, and suitable for sharing concepts with other olog. We consider simple cases of beta-helical and amyloid-like protein filaments subjected to axial extension and develop an olog representation of their structural and resulting mechanical properties. We also construct a representation of a social network in which people send text-messages to their nearest neighbors and act as a team to perform a task. We show that the olog for the protein and the olog for the social network feature identical category-theoretic representations, and we proceed to precisely explicate the analogy or isomorphism between them. The examples presented here demonstrate that the intrinsic nature of a complex system, which in particular includes a precise relationship between structure and function at different hierarchical levels, can be effectively represented by an olog. This, in turn, allows for comparative studies between disparate materials or fields of application, and results in novel approaches to derive functionality in the design of de novo hierarchical systems. We discuss opportunities and challenges associated with the description of complex biological materials by using ologs as a powerful tool for analysis and design in the context of materiomics, and we present the potential impact of this approach for engineering, life sciences, and medicine.Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (N000141010562)United States. Army Research Office. Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (W911NF0910541)United States. Office of Naval Research (grant N000141010841)Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of MathematicsStudienstiftung des deutschen VolkesClark BarwickJacob Luri

So what do we really mean when we say that systems biology is holistic?

Background: An old debate has undergone a resurgence in systems biology: that of reductionism versus holism. At least 35 articles in the systems biology literature since 2003 have touched on this issue. The histories of holism and reductionism in the philosophy of biology are reviewed, and the current debate in systems biology is placed in context. Results: Inter-theoretic reductionism in the strict sense envisaged by its creators from the 1930s to the 1960s is largely impractical in biology, and was effectively abandoned by the early 1970s in favour of a more piecemeal approach using individual reductive explanations. Classical holism was a stillborn theory of the 1920s, but the term survived in several fields as a loose umbrella designation for various kinds of anti-reductionism which often differ markedly. Several of these different anti-reductionisms are on display in the holistic rhetoric of the recent systems biology literature. This debate also coincides with a time when interesting arguments are being proposed within the philosophy of biology for a new kind of reductionism. Conclusions: Engaging more deeply with these issues should sharpen our ideas concerning the philosophy of systems biology and its future best methodology. As with previous decisive moments in the history of biology, only those theories that immediately suggest relatively easy experiments will be winners

Mendelian randomization: can genetic epidemiology help redress the failures of observational epidemiology?

Establishing causal relationships between environmental exposures and common diseases is beset with problems of unresolved confounding, reverse causation and selection bias that may result in spurious inferences. Mendelian randomization, in which a functional genetic variant acts as a proxy for an environmental exposure, provides a means of overcoming these problems as the inheritance of genetic variants is independent of-that is randomized with respect to-the inheritance of other traits, according to Mendel's law of independent assortment. Examples drawn from exposures and outcomes as diverse as milk and osteoporosis, alcohol and coronary heart disease, sheep dip and farm workers' compensation neurosis, folate and neural tube defects are used to illustrate the applications of Mendelian randomization approaches in assessing potential environmental causes of disease. As with all genetic epidemiology studies there are problems associated with the need for large sample sizes, the non-replication of findings, and the lack of relevant functional genetic variants. In addition to these problems, Mendelian randomization findings may be confounded by other genetic variants in linkage disequilibrium with the variant under study, or by population stratification. Furthermore, pleiotropy of effect of a genetic variant may result in null associations, as may canalisation of genetic effects. If correctly conducted and carefully interpreted, Mendelian randomization studies can provide useful evidence to support or reject causal hypotheses linking environmental exposures to common diseases

Towards a systemic paradigm in carcinogenesis: linking epigenetics and genetics

For at least 30 years cancer has been defined as a genetic disease and explained by the so-called somatic mutation theory (SMT), which has dominated the carcinogenesis field. Criticism of the SMT has recently greatly increased, although still not enough to force all SMT supporters to recognize its limits. Various researchers point out that cancer appears to be a complex process concerning a whole tissue; and that genomic mutations, although variably deleterious and unpredictably important in determining the establishment of the neoplastic phenotype, are not the primary origin for a malignant neoplasia. We attempt to describe the inadequacies of the SMT and demonstrate that epigenetics is a more logical cause of carcinogenesis. Many previous models of carcinogenesis fall into two classes: (i) in which some biological changes inside cells alone lead to malignancy; and (ii) requiring changes in stroma/extracellular matrix. We try to make clear that in the (ii) model genomic instability is induced by persistent signals coming from the microenvironment, provoking epigenetic and genetic modifications in tissue stem cells that can lead to cancer. In this perspective, stochastic mutations of DNA are a critical by-product rather then the primary cause of cancer. Indirect support for such model of carcinogenesis comes from the in vitro and vivo experiments showing apparent 'reversion' of cancer phenotypes obtained via physiological factors of cellular differentiation (cytokines and other signaling molecules) or drugs, even if the key mutations are not 'reversed'