Japan's Banking Crisis: Who has the Most to Lose?

Japan has experienced a deep and prolonged banking crisis in the 1990s. In this paper we attempt to identify the characteristics of companies which have the most to lose from the banks' malaise. Using stock price data, we calculate abnormal returns of non-financial companies around significant dates in the history of the banking crisis, starting in 1995. The events we study include various government actions to address the crisis, downgrading of banks by international rating agencies, and bank mergers. We find that not all companies are equally sensitive to events in the banking sector. The most affected are small companies, with low profits, in low-tech sectors, with high leverage and limited access to bond markets. These findings are consistent with macroeconomic "credit crunch" theories according to which small companies with limited reputation are the most affected when banks reduce lending. Our results are also in line with theories suggesting that bank debt is not very important for financing innovation.

The Comparative Features and Economic Role of Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan

The Japanese economy is in the midst of a major merger and acquisition (M&A) wave for the first time in the postwar period. This paper puts a spotlight on Japan's M&A activity, which has surged since the end of 1999, and takes a look at the factors that have contributed to the surge, and its various economic dimensions. The paper places Japan's M&As in an international context, and identify the causes of the wave and its structural characteristics (sections 2 and 3). It also examines the economic role of M&A and its pros and cons. We contend that M&As contribute to raising the efficiency of resource allocation and organizations (sections 4 and 5). The last section addresses policy implications and contains concluding remarks.

Japan's Banking Crisis: Who has the Most to Lose?

Japan has experienced a deep and prolonged banking crisis in the 1990s. In this paper we attempt to identify the characteristics of companies which have the most to lose from the banks' malaise. Using stock price data, we calculate abnormal returns of non-financial companies around significant dates in the history of the banking crisis, starting in 1995. The events we study include various government actions to address the crisis, downgrading of banks by international rating agencies, and bank mergers. We find that not all companies are equally sensitive to events in the banking sector. The most affected are small companies, with low profits, in low-tech sectors, with high leverage and limited access to bond markets. These findings are consistent with macroeconomic "credit crunch" theories according to which small companies with limited reputation are the most affected when banks reduce lending. Our results are also in line with theories suggesting that bank debt is not very important for financing innovation.

Relationship Banking in post Bubble Japan: Co-existence of soft-and hard budget constraint

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the relationship banking in Japan in the 1990s. We show the increasing dependence on bank borrowing in spite of the deregulation of bond market in the mid 1990s in terms of the debt composition, and we confirm the loan from main-bank also increases among the firms with higher bank borrowing. Then, we examine the effects of these facts on borrowing firm behavior. By estimating the employment adjustment function, we present that main bank did not discipline effectively firms that were required the corporate restructuring, while it encouraged the restructuring of the firm with relatively better performance.

Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Markets: Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan, Germany, France, the UK and USA

This paper compares the characteristics of M&A in 1991-2005 across five countries: Japan, France, Germany, the UK and USA. We ask what factors explain the growth of M&A markets across these countries, and what similarities and differences exist in the ways the M&A market operates. We find that the growth of M&A reflects a rather similar combination of sectoral, international, and financial factors. However, despite some convergence toward increasing levels, we find important differences in the characteristics of M&A transactions that reflect institutional differences found within different national 'varieties of capitalism'. We find systematic differences between what Hall and Soskice (2001) call liberal market economies (UK and USA) and coordinated market economies (Japan, France, and Germany) across a wide range of in deal characteristics: takeover bids, the size of stakes purchased, the prior stakes held, the use of private negotiation, degree of hostility, and takeover premium. In line with theories of the social embeddedness of markets (Granovetter 1985), we find that in countries with 'coordinated' market economies, M&A reflects greater 'coordination' of transactions through on going business relations. As such, the market for corporate control does not necessary entail a convergence of national business systems, but a pattern of change influenced by strong continuities.

The Unwinding of Cross-shareholding: Causes, Effects, and Implications

Considering that the ownership structure of Japanese corporations has changed dramatically in the 1990s, this paper address a series of question related to these changes. Why is cross-shareholding, which has been in place for almost three decades, now beginning to unwind (and the mechanisms of the unwinding)? What explains the increasing diversity in the patterns of cross-shareholding among Japanese firms? Lastly what are the implications of the changing ownership structure on firm performance? Using the detailed and comprehensive data on ownership structure including individual cross-shareholding relationship and other variable (Tobin's q) developed by Nissai Life Insurance Research Institute and Waseda University, we highlight the determinants of the choice between holding or selling shares for both banks and firms. We show that profitable firms with easy access to capital markets and high foreign ownership prior to the banking crisis tend to unwind cross-shareholdings, while low-profit firms with difficulty accessing capital markets and low foreign ownership in the early 1990s tend to keep the cross shareholding with banks. For the effect of changing ownership structure on performance, we show that high instituitional shareholding and, somehow surprisingly, block shareholding of corporation have positive effect on firms performance, while the bank ownership had consistently have negative effect on firm performance since the middle of 1980s. Through these findings, we provide some policy implication and perspective on future ownership structure in Japanese firms.