Intergenerational transfers in rural households: A game theoretical approach

The household membership decision is viewed as a “research project” where the offspring invests in human and non human capital to influence the probability of finding an alternative to the parental household. The problem is formulated as a differential game between a selfish offspring and altruistic parents. The solution is consistent with facts” such as the “flexibility of inheritance systems” and the “generational fragmentation” of the family property when the economic opportunities expand outside the parental household.intergenerational transfers, rural households, game theory

Evolution of a sandpile in a thick flow regime

We solve a one-dimensional sandpile problem analytically in a thick flow regime when the pile evolution may be described by a set of linear equations. We demonstrate that, if an income flow is constant, a space periodicity takes place while the sandpile evolves even for a pile of only one type of particles. Hence, grains are piling layer by layer. The thickness of the layers is proportional to the input flow of particles $r_0$ and coincides with the thickness of stratified layers in a two-component sandpile problem which were observed recently. We find that the surface angle $\theta$ of the pile reaches its final critical value ($\theta_f$) only at long times after a complicated relaxation process. The deviation ($\theta_f - \theta$) behaves asymptotically as $(t/r_{0})^{-1/2}$. It appears that the pile evolution depends on initial conditions. We consider two cases: (i) grains are absent at the initial moment, and (ii) there is already a pile with a critical slope initially. Although at long times the behavior appears to be similar in both cases, some differences are observed for the different initial conditions are observed. We show that the periodicity disappears if the input flow increases with time.Comment: 14 pages, 7 figure

Values, norms, transactions and organizations

This paper may be considered an essay on metaeconomics, since it deals with the meaning of several concepts often left undefined, or very briefly defined in economic theories. These concepts are the following: value including the values of things and moral values, social norms or institutions, social power, goods and services, transactions and organizations (firms, and others). The paper starts by proposing a general concept of value, encompassing both the value of things and moral values. From this concept it proceeds to the definition of six different types of values of things and moral values and to the concept of value transformation process of things which includes all the operations dealt with in economic theory as well as many other human actions. The last part of the paper starts with the distinction between moral values and social norms (or institutions) and the roles of social power and human organization in connecting the domains of morality and social normativity. The paper proceeds by distinguishing different types of norms, including possession norms which are important for defining the concepts of goods and services and transaction processes.

Forest owners’ collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach

This paper is a follow up on a earlier one (Mendes, 1998) where I proposed a series of models for forest owners associations represented as organisation made up of two groups of strategically interacting players: the forest owners who are members of the association and the board of directors they have elected. The directors decide on the amount of services provided by the association which can be public goods (collective representation of the members, promotion of their common interests, diffusion of general information about forest programmes and best forest management practices, etc.) and private goods and services (silvicultural works preventive of forest fires, technical advice, etc.). The models were set up as games in strategic form with complete information and no payoff uncertainty. Here I pick up the second of, what is called in that previous paper, the "Portuguese" models and extend it in the following directions: - there is payoff risk for the forest owners due to exogenous hazards (forest fires or others); - forest owners can buy private services from the owners which contribute to reduce the losses resulting from those hazards. The main focus in this paper is to derive the comparative static results about the demand of these private services by the forest owners.forest owners’ associations, public and private goods joint supply, game theory