External accountability of collaborative arrangements; a case study of a Multi Academy Trust in England

This paper explores the impact of external accountability on four mechanisms of network-internal quality control and the properties of (mandated) inter-organizational networks. An explorative case study approach examines the external accountability of a newly established educational network (MAT) and how schools and the Trust are held accountable by the English Inspectorate of Education, Ofsted and the Department for Education (DfE), through Regional Schools Commissioners (RSCs). Analysis of documents and interviews were used to reconstruct a sequence of events over a period of five and a half years. Our findings indicate that the combination of accountability activities led to more centralized control over, and monitoring of curriculum, assessment and school improvement. This was accompanied by a pause in the growth of the Trust and the establishment of a regional structure of school collaboration. As accountability is particularly organized around individual school performance (through Ofsted inspections), this limited development of internal mechanisms of quality control around network-level outcomes. A short-term focus dominated the allocation of resources to schools in special measures or with an upcoming inspection visit. In the discussion, an alternative model is presented for network-level accountability and a set of indicators for effective accountability of collaborative arrangements

Strategic data use of schools in accountability systems

School inspections are expected to have an impact on data use and improvement of schools. Schools are expected to generate data (e.g., self-evaluation reports and student achievement results) as part of the inspection process. This process, in turn, also generates data (e.g., inspection reports) for school improvement. The high-stakes context in which both types of data are generated however has been known to lead to strategic responses of schools. In this study, we analyzed if schools cheat on tests and reshape their test pool in responses to the Dutch (risk-based) school inspections. We found that 5.5% of the schools do not to comply with the guidelines for administering the test; one third of the schools exclude one or more students from the test. These responses, however, do not appear to be related to specific measures in the Dutch school inspections or prior performance of schools on these measures. © 2012 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

Mechanisms of Change in Dutch Inspected Schools: Comparing Schools in Different Inspection Treatments

In many countries the need for education systems and schools to improve and innovate has become central to the education policy of governments. School inspections are expected to play an important role in promoting such continuous improvement and to help schools and education systems more generally to consider the need for change and improvement. This article aims to enhance our understanding of the connections between school inspections and their impact on school improvement, using a longitudinal survey of principals and teachers in primary and secondary education. Random effects models and a longitudinal path model suggest that school inspections in particular have an impact on principals, but less so on teachers. The results indicate that the actual impact on improved school and teaching conditions, and ultimately student achievement, is limited. Schools in different inspection categories report different mechanisms of potential impact; the lack of any correlation between accepting feedback, setting expectations and stakeholder sensitivity and improvement actions in schools suggests that the impact of school inspections is not a linear process, but operates through diffuse and cyclical processes of change

Evaluation and decentralised governance: Examples of inspections in polycentric education systems

Across Europe schools and other service providers increasingly operate in networks to provide inclusive education or develop and implement more localized school-to-school improvement models. As some education systems move towards more decentralized decision-making where multiple actors have an active role in steering and governing schools, the tasks and responsibilities of Inspectorates of Education must also change. This paper reflects on these changes and suggests ‘polycentric’ inspection models that fit such a decentralized context. Examples of inspection frameworks and methods from Northern Ireland, England and the Netherlands are provided, as well as a brief discussion of the potential impact of such ‘polycentric’ models

School inspectors, policy implementers, policy shapers: influences and activities

This chapter introduces the idea of school inspectors as implementers of public policy, framing their role within the context of policy implementation and the governance of education. Using a framework for policy implementation developed by Weible and Sabatier (2006), it presents a modified framework for inves-tigating inspectors’ work and practices as policy implementers. In so doing it questions their role as policy shapers and policy coalition workers in the context of the practice of inspection in Finland, Sweden, England, Germany, The German State of Lower Saxony, The Netherlands, The Republic of Ireland and The Austrian province of Styria. In introducing the idea of policy learning it introduces the ways in which policy learning theory has contributed to implementation theory, in order to further reflect on these issues in the final chapter of this book

Impact of school inspections on improvement of schools—describing assumptions on causal mechanisms in six European countries

School inspection is used by most European education systems as a major instrument for controlling and promoting the quality of schools. Surprisingly, there is little research knowledge about how school inspections drive the improvement of schools and which types of approaches are most effective and cause the least unintended consequences. The study presented in this paper uses interviews with inspection officials and a document analysis to reconstruct the “program theories” (i.e. the assumptions on causal mechanisms, linking school inspections to their intended outcomes of improved teaching and learning) of Inspectorates of Education in six European countries. The results section of the paper starts with a summary of the commonalities and differences of these six national inspection models with respect to standards and thresholds used, to types of feedback and reporting, and to the sanctions, rewards and interventions applied to motivate schools to improve. Next, the intermediate processes through which these inspection models are expected to promote good education (e.g. through actions of stakeholders) are explained. In the concluding section, these assumptions are critically discussed in the light of research knowledge