Congestion, Private Peering and Capacity Investment on the Internet.

This paper presents a model of private bilateral and multilateral peering arrangements between Internet backbone providers when the network is congested. We study how different forms of interconnection and the competitive conditions of the market affect backbones' investments in network and peering point capacities. We show that network and peering point capacities are equilibrium complements; increasing competition reduces capacity investments (under-investment), thus worsening the quality of service both with multilateral and bilateral peering; under bilateral peering the inefficiency is less severe. Because of under-investment, welfare may be lower when the market is more competitive. We also show that asymmetries between backbones, which can take the form of uneven content distribution or product differentiation, may reduce under-investment and improve the quality of service. The introduction of an "inverse capacity interconnection fee" where providers pay each other a fee which is negatively correlated with their installed capacity may play the role of a coordinating mechanism towards a Pareto superior outcome.Internet, peering, congestion, QoS, capacity investment, interconnection

Dual licensing in open source software markets

Dual licensing has proved to be a sustainable business model for various commercial software vendors employing open source strategies. In this paper we study the main characteristics of dual licensing and under which conditions it represents a profitable commercial strategy. We show that dual licensing is a form of versioning, whereby the software vendor uses the open source licensing terms in order to induce commercial customers to select the proprietary version of the software. Furthermore, we show that the software vendor prefers dual licensing to a fully proprietary strategy when the customers are very sensitive to the reciprocal terms of the open source license

Plastic Clashes: Competition among Closed and Open Systems in the Credit Card Industry.

This paper analyses market competition between two different types of credit card platforms: not-for-profit associations and proprietary systems. The main focus is on the role of the interchange fee set by not-for-profit platforms. We show that when the interchange fee is set so as to maximise the sum of issuers' and acquirers' profits, the equilibrium values of platforms' profits, of the sum of the fees charged by each platform and their market shares are independent of the competitive conditions within the not-for-profit platform and are affected by the strength of inter-platform competition. We also show that the imposition of a ban on the setting of the interchange fee has ambiguous effects on the profit of the proprietary system.two-sided markets, network externalities, credit cards, interchange fee

Open Source vs Closed Source Software: Public Policies in the Software Market

This paper analyses the impact of public policies supporting open source software (OSS). Users can be divided between those who know about the existence of OSS, the "informed" adopters, and the "uninformed" ones; the presence of uniformed users yields to market failures that justify government intervention. We study three policies: i) mandatory adoption, when government forces public agencies, schools and universities to adopt OSS, ii) information campaign, when the government informs the uninformed users about the existence and the characteristics of OSS and, iii) subsidisation, when consumers are payed a subsidy when adopting OSS. We show that the second policy enhances welfare, the third is always welfare decreasing while mandatory adoption can be either good or bad for society depending on the number of informed and uninformed adopters. We extend the model to the presence of network effects and we show that strong externalities require "drastic" policies.software market, open source software, mandatory adoption, information campaign, subsidisation, network externalities

One-Way Compatibility, Two-Way Compatibility and Entry in Network Industries

We study the strategic choice of compatibility between two initially incompatible software packages in a two-stage game by an incumbent and an entrant firm. Consumers enjoy network externality in consumption and maximise expected surplus over the two periods. Compatibility may be achieved by means of a converter. We derive a number of results under diÆerent assumptions about the nature of the converter (one-way vs two-way) and the existence of property rights. In the case of a two-way converter, which can only be supplied by the incumbent, incompatibility will result in equilibrium and depending on the strength of network externalities the incumbent may deter entry. When both firms can build a one-way converter and there are no property rights on the necessary technical specifications, the only fulfilled expectations subgame perfect equilibrium involves full compatibility. Finally, when each firm has property rights on its technical specifications, full incompatibility and preemption are again observed at the equilibrium. Entry deterrence will then occur for su±ciently strong network eÆects. The analysis generalises to any market where network externalities are present.

One-Way Compatibility, Two-Way Compatibility and Entry in Network Industries

We study the strategic choice of compatibility between two initially incompatible network goods in a two-stage game played by an incumbent and an entrant firm. Compatibility may be achieved by means of a converter. We derive a number of results under different assumptions about the nature of the converter (one-way \emph{vs} two-way) and the existence of property rights. In the case of a two-way converter, which can only be supplied by the incumbent, incompatibility will result in equilibrium. When both firms can build a one-way converter and there are no property rights on the necessary technical specifications, the unique equilibrium involves full compatibility. Finally, when each firm has property rights on its technical specifications, full incompatibility and preemption are again observed at the equilibrium. With incompatibility, entry deterrence occurs for sufficiently strong network effects. The welfare analysis shows that the equilibrium compatibility regime is socially inefficient for most levels of the network effects.Network externalities, one-way compatibility, two-way compatibility, entry

On the role of public policies supporting Free/Open Source Software: an European perspective

Available in the .pd

Platform Competition and Broadband Uptake: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the European Union

Broadband access provides users with high speed, always-on connectivity to the Internet. Due to its superiority, broadband is seen as the way for consumers and firms to exploit the great potentials of new applications. This has generated a policy debate on how to stimulate adoption of broadband technology. One of the most disputed issues is about competition policies: these may be intended to promote competition in the Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) segment of the market (intra- platform competition), or to stimulate entry into the market for alternative platforms such as cable access or fiber optics (inter- platform competition). Using a model of oligopoly competition between differentiated products, our paper explicitly studies the effect of inter and intra platform competition on the diffusion of broadband access. The implications of the model are then tested using data from 14 European countries. The econometric evidence confirms the results of the theoretical model and indicates that while inter-platform competition drives broadband adoption, competition in the market for DSL services does not play a significant role. The results also confirm that lower unbundling prices stimulate broadband uptake.Broadband, inter-platform and intra-platform competition, local loop unbundling

From Planning to Mature: on the Determinants of Open Source Take-Off

Thanks to a recent and vast empirical literature, we know in details how the most popular open source projects are organized and why they succeed. However open source is not only Linux: in this paper we use a large data-set obtained from SourceForge.net to estimate the main determinants of the progress in the development of a stable and mature code of an open source software. We show that projects geared towards sophisticated users (i.e. system administrators) or projects aimed at developing tools for the Internet, multimedia and software have greater chances to reach an advanced development stage. On the contrary, projects devoted to the production of applications for games and telecommunication as well as projects distributed under highly restrictive licensing terms (GPL) have a significantly smaller probability to advance. Interestingly, we find that the size of the "community of developers" increases the chances of progress but this effect decreases as the community gets larger, a signal of possible coordination problems. Finally, we show that the determinants of projects' development stage change with the age of the project in many dimensions thus supporting the common perception of open source as an extremely dynamic phenomenon.software market, open source software, development status, intended audience, license