The Excess Burden of Government Indecision

Governments are known for procrastinating when it comes to resolving painful policy problems. Whatever the political motives for waiting to decide, procrastination distorts economic decisions relative to what would arise with early policy resolution. In so doing, it engenders excess burden. This paper posits, calibrates, and simulates a life cycle model with earnings, lifespan, investment return, and future policy uncertainty. It then measures the excess burden from delayed resolution of policy uncertainty. The first uncertain policy we consider concerns the level of future Social Security benefits. Specifically, we examine how an agent would respond to learning in advance whether she will experience a major Social Security benefit cut starting at age 65. We show that having to wait to learn materially affects consumption, saving, and portfolio decisions. It also reduces welfare. Indeed, we show that the excess burden of government indecision can, in this instance, range as high as 0.6 percent of the agent's economic resources. This is a significant distortion in of itself. It's also significant when compared to other distortions measured in the literature. The second uncertain policy we consider concerns marginal tax rates. We obtain similar results once we adjust for the impact of tax rates on income.

The Excess Burden of Government Indecision.

Governments are known for procrastinating when it comes to resolving painful policy problems. Whatever the political motives for waiting to decide, procrastination distorts economic decisions relative to what would arise with early policy resolution. In so doing, they engender excess burden. This paper posits, calibrates, and simulates a life cycle model with earnings, lifespan, investment return, and future policy uncertainty. It then measures the excess burden from delayed resolution of policy uncertainty. The first uncertain policy we consider concerns the level of future Social Security benefits. Specifically, we examine how an age-25 agent would respond to learning at an early age whether she will experience a major Social Security benefit cut starting at age 65. We show that having to wait to learn materially affects consumption, saving, and portfolio decisions. It also reduces welfare. Indeed, we show that the excess burden of government indecision can, in this instance, range as large as 0.6 percent of the agent’s economic resources. This is a significant distortion in of itself. It’s also significant when compared to other distortions measured in the literature.Social Security Administrationhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/49408/1/wp123.pd

Rentabilitätsvergleiche im Umlage- und Kapitaldeckungsverfahren : Konzepte, empirische Ergebnisse, sozialpolitische Konsequenzen

Die demographischen Veränderungen sind Auslöser einer grundsätzlicheren Debatte über Alterssicherungsverfahren, nämlich der Wahl eines effizienten Finanzierungsverfahrens der Altersvorsorge. Im Zentrum der Debatte steht immer wieder der Renditevergleich zwischen dem Umlage- und dem Kapitaldeckungsverfahren. Ihm gilt dieses Papier. Er ist keineswegs so einfach, wie es oft suggeriert wird, da Versicherungs- und Risikoaspekte, vor allem aber das Übergangsproblem berücksichtigt werden müssen. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt den wirtschaftstheoretischen Hintergrund mit den wichtigsten relevanten Konzepten dar und präsentiert empirische Schätzungen zur heutigen und Simulationsergebnisse zur zukünftigen Entwicklung der relevanten Renditen. Wir schließen mit den sozialpolitischen Konsequenzen für eine reformierte Altersvorsorge