Controlling contractual exchange risks in R&D interfirm cooperation: an empirical study

Suppliers and buyers of R&D results perceive two exchange risks: first, the risk to achieve a lower profitability on the innovation return than the exchange partner, second, the risk of the partner becoming a competitor by unplanned, one-sided knowledge flows. Both risks motivate opportunistic behaviour. The paper deals with the reduction of the perceived supplier risks. We analyse how an option on later negotiation of an additional continuous innovation return sharing which is based on contractual hostages can lower the perceived exchange risks. An empirical study examines how effectively these hostages lower the perceived risks

Compensation preferences of R&D-suppliers: some empirical results

R&D suppliers who are not compensated according to their preferences are motivated to behave opportunistically. The paper presents empirical findings about these preferences. The investigation is based on the assumption that the probability of a continuous compensation, instead of a final payment, increases when the negotiation power of the supplier rises. The results confirm this presumption with regard to the power determinants of effective intellectual property rights and the number of cooperation alternatives. In contrast to that, suppliers, who control the complementary assets themselves, have no explicit preference