Political Parties and the Tax Level in the American states: Two Regression Discontinuity Designs

Do parties matter? Yes, but not in the usual way we tend to think of them: big government Democrats and small government Republicans. Our first regression discontinuity design shows that whether the majority in the House of Representatives is Republican or Democratic does not affect the tax level. This surprising result goes against the recent literature in political economy. We then perform another regression discontinuity design in which we find that whether a government is aligned (both the Governor and the majority in the state House belong to the same party) or divided (they belong to different parties) does have an effect on the tax level. Taxes are higher when the government is aligned.Regression discontinuity design, Democrats, Republicans, divided government, line item veto, tax level.

Separation of Powers, Line Item Veto and the Tax Level: Evidence from the American States Draft 1

Line item veto, a feature present in most American States, gives the governor the power to veto single appropriation items from the budget. Its effects on the tax level, however, are still controversial in the empirical and theoretical literature (cf. Holtz-Eakins (1988) and Besley and Case (2003)). Line item veto is mostly a time invariant feature and to asses its effects previous studies have interacted it with political control variables such as a divided government. The endogenity problems that arise from using a political variable to explain a policy variable, however, have not been dealt with in these studies. We use three empirical approaches to tackle the problem and show that line item veto does have a significant negative effect on the tax rate in the States: diffs-in-diffs estimation with instrumental variables (election results in lower offices at the state level), regression discontinuity design, and a dynamic panel. Our prior on its effects comes from adapting the separation of powers model by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) to the American States setup: we add line item veto and an executive. Our model delivers a clear prediction on the tax level, on the amount of public good, and on the importance of group specific transfers.

Making Racing Fun Through Player Modeling and Track Evolution

This paper addresses the problem of automatically constructing tracks tailor-made to maximize the enjoyment of individual players in a simple car racing game. To this end, some approaches to player modeling are investigated, and a method of using evolutionary algorithms to construct racing tracks is presented. A simple player-dependent metric of entertainment is proposed and used as the fitness function when evolving tracks. We conclude that accurate player modeling poses some significant challenges, but track evolution works well given the right track representation

Budgetary Separation of Powers in the American States and the Tax Level: A Regression Discontinuity Design

Should the Federal government and the remaining American states adopt the line item veto? What are its effects? We use regression discontinuity design to claim that in states with the line item veto, divided government has a causal negative effect on the tax level. By investigating a panel of 38 American states from 1960 to 2006, we estimate a significant discontinuous increase of 13% in the tax level as the party affiliated with the Governor in the state Legislature switches from being the minority party to being the majority. In the nine states that have block veto, we find no significant discontinuity in the tax level. We also find little evidence to suggest that the partisan identity of the majority party in the Legislature has a causal effect on the state tax level.Separation of powers, line item veto, tax level, regression discontinuity, nonparametric

Separation of Powers or Ideology? What Determines the Tax Level? Theory and Evidence from the US States.

We find the surprising result that the tax level is negatively correlated with the size of the Democratic majority in the interval in which the Democrats hold between 50 and 66% of the seats in the state Legislatures. This negative relationship suggests the failure of a simple ideological model that had found some support in the literature, that the main determinant of the tax level is the extent of partisan control over the Legislature. We compare this model with an alternative: a separation-of-powers model in which ideology plays no role in determining the tax level. The driving force of our model is the overlap between the supporters of the Governor and the supporters of the legislative majority. The tax level at first rises and then decreases as the size of the ruling majority increases above 50% of the seats, whether the legislative majority is of the same party as the Governor or from the opposition. This non-monotonic relationship is observed in the data and explained by our model.Separation of powers, divided government, line-item veto, tax level, semiparametric.

Budgetary Separation of Powers in the American States and the Tax Level: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis

A political regime has budgetary separation of powers if the power with the prerogative to raise taxes is not the full residual claimant of a tax increase. In the American states two conditions are needed: the governor must have the line item veto, and the political interests of the legislative majority and the governor must not be perfectly aligned. Political alignment between the executive and the legislative depends on the numbers of seats the governor's party controls in the state legislature; it changes discontinuously as we move from a unifed to a divided government. We use regression discontinuity design to establish a causal relation between a divided government and lower tax rates in states with line item veto. In states with block veto such relation is not present. We estimate the jump in the tax level at the discontinuity semiparametrically.Separation of powers, line item veto, tax level, regression discontinuity, semiparametric.

Evolution of Neural Networks for Helicopter Control: Why Modularity Matters

The problem of the automatic development of controllers for vehicles for which the exact characteristics are not known is considered in the context of miniature helicopter flocking. A methodology is proposed in which neural network based controllers are evolved in a simulation using a dynamic model qualitatively similar to the physical helicopter. Several network architectures and evolutionary sequences are investigated, and two approaches are found that can evolve very competitive controllers. The division of the neural network into modules and of the task into incremental steps seems to be a precondition for success, and we analyse why this might be so