Supposition and Blindness

In 'Reasoning and Regress' I argued that inferring a conclusion from a set of propositions may simply consist in taking it that the conclusion follows from these propositions - thereby defusing familiar regress arguments. Sinan Dogramaci challenges the generality of this view, on the grounds that sometimes (specifically, in cases of suppositional reasoning) you may draw conclusions from no premisses that you believe. I respond by clarifying a distinction between the premisses of an argument (conceived of as a certain formal structure) from the reasons your conclusion is based upon. While suppositional reasoning may involve no premisses in the former sense, it does not follow that it does not involve concluding something on the basis of reasons. This allows the view defended in 'Reasoning and Regress' to extend to suppositional reasoning

Knowing what you are doing: Action-demonstratives in unreflective action

Almost everything that we do, we do by doing other things. Even actions we perform without deliberation or conscious planning are composed of ‘smaller’, subsidiary actions. But how should we think of such subsidiary actions? Are they fully-fledged intentional actions (in the sense of things that we do for reasons) in their own right? In this paper I defend an affirmative answer to this question, against a recently influential form of scepticism. Drawing on a distinctive kind of ‘action-demonstrative’ representation, I show that the sceptic's arguments do not go through