Job market signals and signs

What happens to job market signaling under two-dimensional asymmetric information? With 2 types of productivity and noise, the equilibrium remains separating if an extended single-crossing condition is satisfied. If not, there are partially pooling equilibria where only extreme types can be distinguished, and supplementary information is needed. On-the-job interaction gives employers private information on productivity, which employment relationships may reveal to the market. While sticky wages lead to public revelation of this private information through dismissals, flexible wages do not, allowing employers to do cream skimming. Beyond the 2x2 case, employment relationships are always a noisy sign, so education is valuable as a life-time job market signal for high-ability workers.two-dimensional asymmetric information, private information, informational rents, single-crossing, signals, signs

Reelection or term limits? The short and the long view of economic policy

An incumbent's drive for reelection can lead to political budget cycles. The distortion cycles cause in economic policy may be offset by the information they indirectly provide about the incumbent's competency. The informative content of cycles depends on the sophistication of voters, i.e. on whether they are rational or near rational. In a framework of individual candidates, constitutional clauses that prohibit the reelection of the president eliminate political budget cycles. One-term limits that allow non-immediate reelection also shift the focus from short-run cycles to the long-run soundness of economic policies, and have superior welfare properties. Hence, the choice is not reelection or not, but rather immediate or non-immediate reelection.rotation principle, term limits, non-immediate reelection, political budget cycles, rational and near rational voters.

Separation of Powers and Political Budget Cycles

From a theoretical viewpoint, political budget cycles (PBC) arise in equilibrium when rational voters are imperfectly informed about the incumbent's competency and the incumbent enjoys discretionary power over the budget. This paper focuses on the second condition, examining how executive discretion is affected by the budgetary process under separation of powers. We specifically model PBC in the composition of government spending. The main result is that effective checks and balances in the budgetary process curb PBC. The institutional features of the executive-legislature bargaining game, namely, the actual agenda-setting authority, the status quo location and the degree of legislative oversight and control of the implementation of the budgetary law, play critical roles for the existence and the size of PBC. These results are consistent with recent empirical findings, which show that PBC are more pronounced in developing countries, where there are also less effective checks and balances.Rational political budget cycles; budget composition; separation of powers; checks and balances; budgetary process.

Temporal aggregation in political budget cycles

While existing cross-country studies on political budget cycles rely on annual data, we build a panel with quarterly and monthly data from Latin American and OECD countries over the 1980-2005 period. Disaggregated data allow to center the electoral year more precisely, and show the effects are concentrated in a three-quarter window around elections. Cycles are statistically significant only in Latin America, but the pattern is similar to OECD countries: the budget surplus/GDP ratio falls in the election period and rises in the post-election period. In line with the logic of rational opportunistic manipulation, these effects cancel out.temporal aggregation, electoral window, pre- and post-electoral effects, political budget cycles, rational opportunistic cycles

Elections and the Timing of Devaluations

This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model for the open economy, in which devaluations are delayed in the run-up to elections, in order to increase the electoral chances of the party in office. By concentrating on the closed economy, previous political cycle models had overlooked the influence of elections on the behavior of exchange rates. We introduce voter uncertainty in two different dimensions. Not only are voters uncertain regarding the competency of the incumbent. They also ignore the degree to which the incumbent is opportunistic, i.e. willing to distort the economy for electoral gain. When there is only uncertainty about competence, we obtain a separating equilibrium, like in the previous political budget cycle literature. However, when uncertainty about opportunism is introduced, a partially pooling equilibrium emerges: an incompetent, opportunistic incumbent delays a devaluation until after elections, mimicking a competent incumbent, while the competent does not distort the optimal pattern of the exchange rate, regardless of the degree of opportunism. The model's prediction that there is a tendency to delay devaluations until after elections is used to look at the empirical evidence on devaluations around elections.devaluations, elections, political budget cycles, incomplete information.

Elections and the Timing of Devaluations

This paper presents a rational political budget cycle model for an open economy, in which devaluations are delayed in the pre-election period so as to increase the electoral chances of the party in office. By concentrating on closed economies, previous political cycle models had overlooked the influence of elections on the behavior of exchange rates. Voter uncertainty is introduced in two different dimensions. Not only are voters uncertain regarding the competency of the incumbent, but tey also ignore the degree to which the incumbent is opportunistic.

Determinants of the development of corporate bond markets in Argentina: survey to firms and investors

Conventional theory leads to expect bonds to be a financing vehicle for large firms because of economies of scale and contracting costs. In this paper we present the results for Argentina of a survey of firms and of investors on the use of corporate bonds. The result of these surveys supports the idea that for Argentine firms, bonds are a financing vehicle of choice only for firms above a certain (large) size. This is independent of the criteria used for firm size. This result is similar to results in other countries such as the United Sates.debt structure, leverage, short-term debt, corporate bonds, firm size, firm value

Determinants of the development of corporate bond markets in Argentina: One size does not fit all

Conventional theory leads to expect bonds to be a financing vehicle for large firms because of economies of scale and contracting costs. We find both in our econometric evidence for firms quoted on Latin American stock exchanges, and in our survey results for Argentina, that size of assets is a robust determinant of the use of bond finance. This result, together with the fact that there are few firms that are large in terms of market value, can help understand why Argentina, as well as Latin America, has small bond markets in terms of the ratio of the stock of bonds to GDP. Since firm value represents the present value of the cash flows against which the firm borrows, the outstanding stock of corporate bonds is as small as the size of Argentine firms.debt structure, leverage, short term debt, corporate bonds, firm size, firm value

Y, si no hay más remedio... Inflación , Desconfianza y la Desintegración del Sistema Financiero en Argentina

Aunque la inflación lleva a la substitución de monedas, en principio no tiene por qué afectar a un sistema financiero indexado. Sin embargo, en la Argentina la intermediación financiera se fue evaporando en el transcurso del proceso inflacionario. La inflación se enfoca como síntoma de una situación institucional donde las reglas de juego acordadas para regir las relaciones entre los miembros de la sociedad no se respetan. En este sentido, las devaluaciones son un método "informal" de violar los contratos nominales, que complementan la violación "formal" de los contratos indexados. La repetición de estas prácticas institucionales define un régimen de alta inseguridad jurídica que termina por destruir no sólo la confianza en la moneda, sino también en el sistema financiero local.inflación, violación de contratos, inseguridad jurídica, desconfianza.