Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment

We study the effects of noncompetition agreements by analyzing time-series and cross-sectional variation in the enforceability of these contracts across US states. We find that tougher noncompetition enforcement promotes executive stability. Increased enforceability also results in reduced executive compensation and shifts its form toward greater use of salary. We further show that stricter enforcement reduces capital expenditures per employee. These results are consistent with a model in which enforceable noncompetition contracts encourage firms to invest in their managers' human capital. On the other hand, our findings suggest that these contracts also discourage managers from investing in their own human capital and that this second effect is empirically dominant. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Unequal access to foreign spaces: how states use visa restrictions to regulate mobility in a globalized world

Nation-states employ visa restrictions to manage the complex trade-off between facilitating the entrance to their territory by passport holders from certain countries for economic and political reasons and deterring individuals from other countries for reasons of perceived security and immigration-control. The resulting system is one of highly unequal access to foreign spaces, reinforcing existing inequalities. Trans-national mobility is encouraged for passport holders from privileged nations, particularly rich Western countries, at the expense of severe restrictions for others. Visa restrictions manifest states’ unfaltering willingness to monitor, regulate and control entrance to their territory in a globalised world