Twitter sentiment analysis: how to hedge your bets In the stock markets

Emerging interest of trading companies and hedge funds in mining social web has created new avenues for intelligent systems that make use of public opinion in driving investment decisions. It is well accepted that at high frequency trading, investors are tracking memes rising up in microblogging forums to count for the public behavior as an important feature while making short term investment decisions. We investigate the complex relationship between tweet board literature (like bullishness, volume, agreement etc) with the financial market instruments (like volatility, trading volume and stock prices). We have analyzed Twitter sentiments for more than 4 million tweets between June 2010 and July 2011 for DJIA, NASDAQ-100 and 11 other big cap technological stocks. Our results show high correlation (upto 0.88 for returns) between stock prices and twitter sentiments. Further, using Granger’s Causality Analysis, we have validated that the movement of stock prices and indices are greatly affected in the short term by Twitter discussions. Finally, we have implemented Expert Model Mining System (EMMS) to demonstrate that our forecasted returns give a high value of R-square (0.952) with low Maximum Absolute Percentage Error (MaxAPE) of 1.76 % for Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). We introduce and validate performance of market monitoring elements derived from public mood that can be exploited to retain a portfolio within limited risk state during typical market conditions

Fight or flee: Outside director departures prior to contested management buyout offers

Research Question/Issue: We investigate outside director departures prior to management buyout offers (MBOs). In these transactions, managers have both an information advantage and incentives to make a lowball offer to shareholders. Outside directors can safeguard against managerial self‐dealing by negotiating for the best terms for public shareholders from either management or another bidder. Research Findings/Insights: It is typical that outside directors stay on the board through an MBO offer as MBOs are less likely to have changes in directors—either joining or leaving—relative to a control sample. After controlling for endogeneity as well as firm and director characteristics, we find that outside directors are more likely to leave when the offer is later contested. We do not find any evidence that departing directors are replaced by new outside directors who ensure shareholders get a higher premium nor do we find any evidence that the board acts as a public auctioneer. We also find that outside directors are more likely to depart when the buyout contest is longer. Our findings show that outside directors provide a weak internal monitoring mechanism as they leave precisely when shareholders need their expertise the most. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results contribute to research that supports the notion that outside director departures are symptomatic of board weakness. The results of our study support the contention of other researchers that outside directors often fail to monitor managers. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our study offers useful information to M&A investment banking advisors and leverage buyout analysts by showing the mechanisms under which director turnover can affect the value and the outcome of MBOs