International Criminal Law and Constitutionalism

As we move towards constructing narratives regarding the future outlook of global governance, constitutionalisation among them, the hope is that whatever shape this world order takes it will, somehow, forestall or hinder the possibili- ty of a hegemonic order. This article tries to deconstruct the notion of hegemony and claims that as it currently stands it is useless in doing its critical work since every successful nar- rative will end up being hegemonic because it will employ the ‘hegemonic technique’ of presenting a particular value (or value system), a particular viewpoint, as universal or at least applying to those who do not share it. The only way for a narrative in this discourse not to be hegemonic would be for it to be either truly universal and find a perspective that stems from nowhere and everywhere – a divine per- spective – or purely descriptive; the first being an impossibil- ity for fallible beings and the other not worth engaging with since it has nothing to say about how things should be structured or decided in a specific situation

Interpretation and the Constraints on International Courts

This paper argues that methodologies of interpretation do not do what they promise – they do not constrain interpretation by providing neutral steps that one can follow in finding out a meaning of a text – but nevertheless do their constraining work by being part of what can be described as the legal practice

Quality of Reasoning in International Criminal Tribunals

It is not unreasonable to say that international criminal law is, for the most part, a judge made law. For better or worse, given the diffused nature of its sources of law as well as the institutions built to enforce it, the rising case law gave the international criminal courts a chance and a burden to develop international criminal law into an expansive, and familiar, branch of international law. In this Chapter, I attempt to analyse and elaborate the main vehicle through which this transformation has taken place – the judgements of the courts – in terms of the quality of their reasoning. I will piece together some general rules of thumb that have been created in the branch of international criminal law to assess the quality of reasoning of the different International Criminal Courts. My focus will be the work of the International Criminal Court, although the work of the ICC rests to a large degree on the work of the previous ad hoc tribunals. As such, I will analyse the criticisms that have been levelled at the international criminal tribunals in terms of their interpretation and reasoning, highlight some of the continuing concerns and assess the ICC’s current practice