Taxation and Market Power

We analyze the incidence and welfare e¤ects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We nd, in line with economic theory, that rms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behavior of a monopolist.tax incidence;monopoly;Bertrand competition;experiment

Merger and collusion in contests

Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable. -- In vielen Gütermärkten erfolgt der Wettbewerb zwischen Unternehmen nicht primär über Preise und Mengen, sondern über Verkaufsanstrengungen. Ein Beispiel hierfür ist der Kampf um Marktanteile und Kunden in Märkten mit hohen Werbeaufwendungen. Wenn Unternehmen in solchen Märkten kooperieren, müssen sie entscheiden, ob sie ihre gesamte Produktpalette beibehalten und ihre Verkaufsanstrengungen auf alle Produkte verteilen („Kollusion“) oder ob sie die Anzahl ihrer Produkte reduzieren („Fusion“). Wir zeigen, daß diese Entscheidung von den Konvexitätseigenschaften der Funktion abhängt, die den Markterfolg eines Produkts in Abhängigkeit von den Verkaufsanstrengungen für dieses Produkt bzw. für die Konkurrenzprodukte bestimmt, und untersuchen die Bedingungen, in denen Kooperation in Form von „Kollusion“ oder „Fusion“ für die kooperierenden Unternehmen profitabel ist.Contests,merger,collusion,promotional competition,Kampf um Marktanteile,Kollusion,Fusion

Merger in Contests

Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest st ructure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestantsContests, merger

Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages: The role of internal organization, information, and market structure

Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, me rger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare – improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions flows more freely within a merged firm. -- Unternehmensfusionen führen häufig zu komplexen Organisationen. Fusionen haben deshalb andere und tiefgründige Wirkungen auf die Marktstruktur. Sie reduzieren nicht einfach die Zahl der Wettbewerber in einem Markt, sondern durch Fusionen entstehen Wettbewerber, die sich wegen ihrer komplexen Organisationsstruktur anders verhalten als jedes der einzelnen Unternehmen vor der Fusion. Wir zeigen in dieser Arbeit, dass horizontale Fusion von Unternehmen aus diesen Gründen profitabel für die fusionierenden Unternehmen und wohlfahrtserhöhend wirken kann, selbst dann, wenn es durch die Fusion keinerlei Kostensynergien gibt. Der Schlüssel für dieses Ergebnis, das eine Theorie für eine Reihe von empirischen Befunden liefert, ist der verbesserte Informationsfluss zwischen Unternehmensteilen des durch die Fusion entstehenden Konzerns im Vergleich zum Informationsfluss zwischen unabhängigen Unternehmen.Merger,internal organizational structure,information,timing,market structure,Fusion,Organisationsstruktur,Informationsfluss,Marktstruktur

Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages: The Role of Internal Organization, Information, and Market Structure

Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare-improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions flows more freely within a merged firm.Merger, internal organizational structure, information, timing, market structure

Continuous beer production methods: A review of chances and risks

Beer brewing is one of the oldest biotechnological processes applied by humans. The production methods are comparatively complex and time consuming, which is the reason why inventors and scientists have steadily attempted to improve its manufacturing. During the industrial revolution more and more processes where done continuously in order to increase production efficiency. Breweries where trying to modify the classical batch modes into a continuous production process but were unsuccessful. Nearly all approaches failed due to changes of the beer quality. The presentation shall give a brief overview of different continuous production concepts tested in the past 150 years. Furthermore risks and chances of this technology will be critically discussed. Also a simple, alternative concept for continuous main beer fermentation will be presented with which a high quality product could be produced continuously