Diabetes Alters Diurnal Rhythm of Electroretinogram in db/db Mice

Diabetic retinopathy (DR) is the most common complications of diabetes and a leading cause of blindness in the United States. The retinal neuronal changes precede the vascular dysfunction observed in DR. The electroretinogram (ERG) determines the electrical activity of retinal neural and non-neuronal cells. The retinal ERG amplitude is reduced gradually on the progression of DR to a more severe form. Circadian rhythms play an important role in the physiological function of the body. While ERG is known to exhibit a diurnal rhythm, it is not known whether a progressive increase in the duration of diabetes affects the physiological rhythm of retinal ERG. To study this, we determined the ERG rhythm of db/db mice, an animal model of type 2 diabetes at 2, 4, and 6 months of diabetes under a regular light-dark cycle and constant dark. Our studies demonstrate that the diurnal rhythm of ERG amplitude for retinal a-wave and b-wave was altered in diabetes. The implicit time was increased in db/db mice while the oscillatory potential was reduced. Moreover, there was a progressive decline in an intrinsic rhythm of ERG upon an increase in the duration of diabetes. In conclusion, our studies provide novel insights into the pathogenic mechanism of DR by showing an altered circadian rhythm of the ERG

Shareholder Litigation Risk and Stock Returns

Examining the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws as an exogenous shock to shareholder litigation risk, we show that firms have lower stock returns following that adoption in a difference-in-differences (DID) design and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression. Sorting stocks into UD laws portfolios, we show that firms adopting UD laws earn lower risk-adjusted returns than those who do not. Further, the relation between UD laws and returns is more pronounced when firms face financial constraints, CEOs engage in high risk taking, or takeover protection is low

Shareholder Litigation Risk and Stock Returns

Examining the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws as an exogenous shock to shareholder litigation risk, we show that firms have lower stock returns following that adoption in a difference-in-differences (DID) design and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression. Sorting stocks into UD laws portfolios, we show that firms adopting UD laws earn lower risk-adjusted returns than those who do not. Further, the relation between UD laws and returns is more pronounced when firms face financial constraints, CEOs engage in high risk taking, or takeover protection is low

CEO Power and Firm Risk at the Onset of the 2007 Financial Crisis and the Covid-19 Health Crisis:International Evidence

We investigate the association between CEO power and firm risk at the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007 and the COVID-19 pandemic health crisis in 2020. Examining an international sample of publicly listed firms in the G7 nations between 2006 and 2021, we show that firms led by CEOs with greater power are exposed to higher risk than firms led by CEOs with lesser power. The result is primarily driven by the impact of CEO power on idiosyncratic risk rather than systematic risk. Further, we find that powerful CEOs tend to be more cautious and conservative during crises that they have no reference for or experience of, as in the case of the pandemic, during which the positive power–risk associations are less pronounced. Nevertheless, the power–risk association remains relatively unchanged during the more familiar financial crisis. This study has important implications for firms, investors, regulators, and policymakers

CEO Power and Firm Risk at the Onset of the 2007 Financial Crisis and the Covid-19 Health Crisis:International Evidence

We investigate the association between CEO power and firm risk at the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007 and the COVID-19 pandemic health crisis in 2020. Examining an international sample of publicly listed firms in the G7 nations between 2006 and 2021, we show that firms led by CEOs with greater power are exposed to higher risk than firms led by CEOs with lesser power. The result is primarily driven by the impact of CEO power on idiosyncratic risk rather than systematic risk. Further, we find that powerful CEOs tend to be more cautious and conservative during crises that they have no reference for or experience of, as in the case of the pandemic, during which the positive power–risk associations are less pronounced. Nevertheless, the power–risk association remains relatively unchanged during the more familiar financial crisis. This study has important implications for firms, investors, regulators, and policymakers

ESG, liquidity, and stock returns

We examine the effect of environment, social, and governance (ESG) score on stock returns in the United Kingdom (UK). Consistent with Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Bolton and Kacperczyk (2021), and Pedersen et al. (2021), firms with lower ESG earn higher returns than those with higher ESG. The environment and social premiums are more pronounced than the ESG premium. To understand the premium, we show that the ESG premium is significant for low liquidity securities but not for high liquidity securities, which suggests that ESG is likely associated with stock liquidity

ESG, liquidity, and stock returns

We examine the effect of environment, social, and governance (ESG) score on stock returns in the United Kingdom (UK). Consistent with Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Bolton and Kacperczyk (2021), and Pedersen et al. (2021), firms with lower ESG earn higher returns than those with higher ESG. The environment and social premiums are more pronounced than the ESG premium. To understand the premium, we show that the ESG premium is significant for low liquidity securities but not for high liquidity securities, which suggests that ESG is likely associated with stock liquidity

Investor sentiment, limited arbitrage and the cash holding effect

We examine the investor sentiment and limits-to-arbitrage explanations for the positive cross-sectional relation between cash holdings and future stock returns. Consistent with the investor sentiment hypothesis, we find that the cash holding effect is significant when sentiment is low, and it is insignificant when sentiment is high. In addition, the cash holding effect is strong among stocks with high transaction costs, high short selling costs, and large idiosyncratic volatility, indicating that arbitrage on the cash holding effect is costly and risky. In line with the limits-to-arbitrage hypothesis, high costs and risk prevent rational investors from exploiting the cash holding effect