2 research outputs found
A Theory of Political Influence and Economic Organization
I propose a cooperative game theory model of economic reform in a political environment with interest groups. Agents in a better economic position have strategic advantage in formulating economic policy. Agents bargain over policies because they are associated with different income distributions. In this context I examine the robustness of the `Coase Theorem' prediction of efficient bargaining. I use the Aspiration Core and the Aspiration Bargaining Set as solutions to the cooperative game. Even under zero transaction costs, if endogenous coalition formation is allowed, bargaining between interest groups need not result in efficient economic change because the core may be empty. Indeed, I show that there are inefficient equilibrium outcomes if and only if the core is empty.Political Economy, Interest Groups, Institutional Change, Coalition Formation, Cooperative Games, Aspiration Solution Concepts
Interest Groups and Trade Reform in Mexico
Mexico experienced widespread economic reform in the last two decades. From being a protectionist economy with a policy of import substitution, it has turned into an export-oriented open economy. Why was protectionism a stable policy, and how was it overturned by a reform that went against entrenched interests? I apply a game theoretic model of political influence and economic reform to answer these questions using data to calculate the payoffs for the relevant interest groups. In the underlying cooperative game, the core is empty and a protectionist coalition of import-substituting firms and the government was "stable" until the eighties. Adjusting the model's parameters to changes in the government's financing options in the late eighties and early nineties leads to a different and unique outcome. In the predicted outcome a free trade policy is adopted through cooperation between all players.Trade Reform, Mexico, Coalition Formation, Aspirations, Cooperative Games, Interest Groups