Institutional investors, analyst following, and the January anomaly

Studies have documented that average stock returns for small, low-stock-price firms are higher in January than for the rest of the year. Two explanations have received a great deal of attention: the tax-loss selling hypothesis and the gamesmanship hypothesis. This paper documents that seasonality in returns is not a phenomenon observed only for small firms' stock or those with low prices. Strong seasonality in excess returns is reported for a sample of widely followed firms. Sample firms have unusually low excess returns in January, and returns adjust upward over the remainder of the year. These results are consistent with the gamesmanship hypothesis but not the tax-loss-selling hypothesis. As financial institutions rebalance their portfolios in January to sell the stock of highly visible and low-risk firms, there is downward price pressure in January. In addition, the results suggest that firm visibility explains why seasonality in returns is related to firm size and stock price. Once we control for visibility, market value and uncertainty do not appear to be important determinants of seasonality.Financial markets ; Seasonal variations (Economics)

A simultaneous equations analysis of analysts’ forecast bias and institutional ownership

In this paper we use a simultaneous equations model to examine the relationship between analysts' forecasting decisions and institutions' investment decisions. Neglecting their interaction results in model misspecification. We find that analysts' optimism concerning a firm's earnings responds positively to changes in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock. At the same time, institutional demand responds positively to increases in analysts' optimism. We also investigate several firm characteristics as determinants of analysts' and institutions' decisions. We conclude that agency-driven behavioral considerations are significant.Financial institutions ; Forecasting ; Financial markets

The effects of subject pool and design experience on rationality in experimental asset markets

Empirical evidence suggests that prices do not always reflect fundamental values and individual behavior is often inconsistent with rational expectations theory. We report the results of fourteen experimental markets designed to examine whether the interactive effect of subject pool and design experience tempers price bubbles and improves forecasting ability. Our main findings are: (i) price run-ups are modest and dissipate quickly when traders are knowledgeable about financial markets and have design experience; (ii) price bubbles moderate quickly when only a subset of traders are knowledgeable and experienced; and (iii) individual forecasts of price are not consistent with the predictions of the rational expectations model in any market.Financial markets

Bid-ask spreads in multiple dealer settings: Some experimental evidence

We report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the behavior of quoted spreads in multiple-dealer markets. We manipulate verbal communication (not allowed and allowed) and order preferencing (not allowed, allowed, and allowed with order-flow payment) between eighteen sessions. Without preferencing, spreads are wider when communication is allowed. With preferencing (and no order-flow payments), individuals do not have incentives to narrow the spread and a wide spread may be maintained without a collusive agreement. However, spreads narrow somewhat when individuals are given the opportunity to compete using alternatives to price (that is, payment for order flow).Financial markets

Time-varying volatility in Canadian and U.S. stock index and index futures markets: A multivariate analysis

We use a multivariate generalized autoregressive heteroskedasticity model (M-GARCH) to examine three stock indexes and their associated futures prices: the New York Stock Exchange Composite, Standard and Poor's 500, and Toronto 35. The North American context is significant because markets in Canada and the United States share similar structures and regulatory environments. Our model allows examination of dependence in volatility as it captures time variation in volatility and cross-market influences. Estimated time-variation in volatility is significant, and the volatilities are highly positively correlated. Yet, we find that the correlation in North American index and futures markets has declined over time.Financial markets ; Futures ; Stock market

An empirical examination of the price-dividend relation with dividend management

Some recent empirical evidence suggests that stock prices are not properly modelled as the present discounted value of expected dividends. In this paper we estimate a present value model of stock price that is capable of explaining the observed long-term trends in stock prices. The model recognizes that firm managers control cash dividend payments. The model estimates indicate that stock price movements may be explained by managerial behavior.Stocks ; Stock market

Efficiency in index options markets and trading in stock baskets

Researchers have reported mispricing in index options markets. This study further examines the efficiency of the S&P 500 index options market by testing theoretical pricing relationships implied by no-arbitrage conditions. The effect of a traded stock basket, Standard and Poor's Depository Receipts (SPDRs), on the link between index and options markets is also examined. Pricing efficiency within options markets improves, and the evidence supports the hypothesis that a stock basket enhances the connection between markets. However, when transactions costs and short sales constraints are included, very few violations of the pricing relationships are reported.Options (Finance) ; Stock - Prices

Institutional investors, analyst following, and the January anomaly

Studies have documented that average stock returns for small, low-stock-price firms are higher in January than for the rest of the year. Two explanations have received a great deal of attention: the tax-loss selling hypothesis and the gamesmanship hypothesis. This paper documents that seasonality in returns is not a phenomenon observed only for small firms' stock or those with low prices. Strong seasonality in excess returns is reported for a sample of widely followed firms. Sample firms have unusually low excess returns in January, and returns adjust upward over the remainder of the year. These results are consistent with the gamesmanship hypothesis but not the tax-loss-selling hypothesis. As financial institutions rebalance their portfolios in January to sell the stock of highly visible and low-risk firms, there is downward price pressure in January. In addition, the results suggest that firm visibility explains why seasonality in returns is related to firm size and stock price. Once we control for visibility, market value and uncertainty do not appear to be important determinants of seasonality

Cooperating to Resist Coercion: An Experimental Study

This study sheds light on the difficulties people face in cooperating to resist coercion. We adapt a threshold public goods game to investigate whether people are able to cooperate to resist coercion despite individual incentives to free-ride. Behavior in this resistance game is similar to that observed in multi-period public goods games. Specifically, we observe "out-of-equilibrium" outcomes and a decrease in successful resistance in later periods of a session compared to earlier ones. Nevertheless, cooperation remains relatively high even in the later periods. Finally, we find that increasing the resistance threshold has a substantial negative effect on the probability of successful resistance.

Social Distance and Reciprocity

Contrary to the predictions of non-cooperative game theory, trust and reciprocity are commonly reported in simple games. We conduct a one-shot investment game to examine how social distance affects behavior in two-person exchanges. Two aspects of social distance are examined: ex post revelation of complete information on the second playerâ??s choice set and ex post revelation of information regarding the second playerâ??s identity. The results indicate that reciprocity is not affected by knowledge of the choice set, but depends critically on the possible revelation of the decision makerâ??s identity. That is, the possibility that the second playerâ??s identity (picture) is revealed to his/her counterpart has a profound effect on the degree of reciprocity extended.